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Challenges and roadmaps 
for moving towards a 
high‑income economy
Ligang Song and Yixiao Zhou
China’s per capita income reached US$10,000 in 2019—an important milestone 
in measuring the significant improvement in wellbeing for 1.4 billion Chinese 
people resulting from the decades-long program of reform and development. 
In  the  same  year,  China’s total gross domestic product (GDP) reached 
US$14.3 trillion, accounting for 16.4 per cent of global GDP according to World 
Bank estimates, which matches closely to China’s share of about 18 per cent of 
global  population. Along with the rise in per capita income and total GDP, 
the Chinese  economy witnessed some fundamental changes in the pattern of 
industrialisation, continuing to move towards high value-added production, trade 
and investment, progress on innovation and technological change and large-scale 
poverty reduction. These changes reflect some key features associated with a new 
and more advanced stage of growth and development. These structural changes 
are expected to continue to deepen and will allow China to accomplish its goal of 
becoming a high-income economy, which is one marked by a level of per capita 
income above US$12,270.1 
1  The World Bank classifies countries into low-income, lower middle-income, upper middle-income and high-
income economies according to gross national income per capita (World Bank 2021).
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Dynamic changes in moving up the ladder 
of development
China’s consistent, rapid economic growth over four decades was made possible 
by a good combination of economic reform and opening (Lin 2013a) and its 
demographic structure (Cai et al. 2018). The strong incentive effects of reform 
and opening matched so well with China’s abundant supply of labour (initially low 
skilled, then shifting towards highly skilled at later stages of development) during 
the high-growth period in explaining the fundamental pattern of China’s economic 
development (Li et al. 2012). Some key development lessons can be learned from 
this experience.
First, China’s pattern of economic growth has centred on the development of 
manufacturing industries, which for a consistently long period drew significant 
investment despite contraction in its share in total investment in recent years 
(Figure 1.1). Investments in industry created employment, facilitated the 
unprecedented scale of urbanisation, established a comprehensive manufacturing 
base and turned China into an international industrial powerhouse through 
deepened international integration and specialisation at the beginning, following 
the East Asian manufacturing-based growth model in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
later through participating in global production networks (Kojima 2000; Lin 
2013b). The development of manufacturing has had positive externalities as 
expounded by Kaldor’s growth laws, which say there is a strong positive correlation 
between the growth of manufacturing output and the growth of GDP, a strong 
positive correlation between the growth of manufacturing output and the growth of 
productivity in manufacturing, and a strong positive relationship between the growth 
of manufacturing output and the growth of productivity outside manufacturing 
(Thirlwall 2015). One empirical work using cross-provincial data from China has 
validated such growth laws in the Chinese context (Thirlwall 2011: 111). 
Second, China’s industrial sector development did not leave the development of the 
agricultural sector too far behind. In fact, China’s agricultural sector has maintained 
record productivity growth throughout the reform period while going through its 
own transformation (Sheng and Song 2019). This allowed a continuously large 
number of migrant workers to move to the cities, while the rural sectors have 
become an important source of demand for industrial goods due to the steady rises 
in rural household incomes. The way in which industrial and rural development 
support each other through rural reform and urbanisation has led to rapid increases 
in income in both sectors, narrowing the income gaps between them. A significant 
change in government policy towards agriculture in 2005 saw for the first time in 
Chinese history the abolition of agricultural taxes, lessening the financial burden 
on farmers (Heerink et al. 2006), although much needs to be done to deepen rural 
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reform, especially reforms of both leased and rural residential lands (Liu 2018). 
This  is in sharp contrast to the experience of many developing countries, where 
industrial growth was achieved at least temporarily at the expense of rural sector 
development through policies of ‘urban bias’ (Pugh 1996), which eventually dragged 
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Figure 1.1 Fixed‑asset investment in three types of industries as a share of total 
investment in China (1996–2020) 
Source: Authors’ construction using data from CEIC Database. 
Third, infrastructure development in China has been a success story during the 
reform period. The massive investments in infrastructure by both government 
and the private sector—including in roads, bridges, railways, ports, air links, fast 
trains, large-scale water projects, electricity and gas—have paved the way for foreign 
investment and played an important role in enhancing the process of marketisation, 
which facilitates freer internal flows of goods, factors of production and ideas 
(Qin 2016; Song and van Geenhuizen 2014; Yu et al. 2012). The literature on the 
‘new economic geography’ suggests that widening the market brings benefits in terms 
of increased competition and contestability in markets and, therefore, transportation 
infrastructure allows greater dissemination of knowledge and technology (Canning 
and Bennathan 2000). As Canning and Bennathan (2000: 2) pointed out:
[I]f the takeoff in developing countries relies on a co-ordinated bout of 
investment, the public provision of risky, large scale infrastructure projects may 
provide a trigger for private sector investment and escape from a poverty gap. 
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The Chinese experience in infrastructure development supports this point. China 
is now on its way to building the so-called new infrastructure that will underpin its 
embrace of the digital economy (Meinhardt 2020). 
Fourth, the periods in which China’s rapid economic growth took place coincided 
with the periods in which globalisation processes were enforced or reenforced, 
marked by the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Under the auspices of the WTO, 
global trade and cross-border investment flows were accelerated and China became 
an important player in the process. The year 2021 marked the twentieth anniversary 
of China’s accession to the WTO. Over the past 20 years, China has become the 
largest trading nation in the world through its deep integration with the global 
economy and domestic reforms in compliance with the requirements of the WTO 
(Drysdale and Hardwick 2018). By 2020, China had become the largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), surpassing the United States, against a background 
in which global total FDI fell by 42 per cent due to the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD 2021). 
China had also become a big investor in overseas markets, with its total outflow of 
FDI reaching US$118 billion, making it the third-largest overseas investor after 
the United States and Japan in 2019. Although falling from its peak of outward 
investment reached in 2016, China’s outward investment in the countries of the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continued to grow rapidly (to 11.7 per cent in 
2019). China has made great efforts in opening its markets to foreign competition, 
deepening its domestic reforms, addressing issues such as intellectual property rights, 
state subsidies and market competition, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform 
to fully comply with the requirements of the WTO (Yu 2018; Zhou et al. 2019).
Fifth, the catch-up phase of China’s economic development saw significant progress 
in innovation and technological change, underpinned by its human capital and 
increased capacity for innovative activities. China’s spending on research and 
development (R&D) climbed 10.3 per cent to RMB2.44 trillion (US$378 
billion) in 2020, as reported by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2021). 
According to the NBS report, R&D spending accounted for 2.4 per cent of China’s 
GDP in 2020 (Figure 1.2). The report shows that, by the end of 2020, China had 
522 ‘national key laboratories’ and 350 ‘national engineering research centres’ 
in operation; some 457,000 projects had been funded by the National Natural 
Science Foundation of China in 2020 and 3.6 million patents had been granted—
up by 40 per cent from 2019. These developments allowed China to leapfrog its 
technological capabilities in several key areas, including digital technologies, as well 
as compelling it to pay more attention to the protection of intellectual property 
rights in the transition from technological imitation to innovation (Zhou 2014). 
According to the Global Innovation Index, which provides detailed metrics about 
the innovation performance of 131 countries and economies around the world, 
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China was ranked first in innovation performance for middle-income countries and 
fourteenth globally. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reported 
that its China office received a record total of 1.54 million patent applications in 
2018, ahead of the United States, Japan, South Korea and the European Patent 
Office (EPO). China recorded double-digit growth in 2018, while patent filings 
slightly dropped in the United States and Japan. More than 84 per cent of all patent 
filings in 2019 occurred in the intellectual property (IP) offices of China, the United 
States, Japan, South Korea and the EPO. China accounted for more than 40 per 
cent of the world total (Figure 1.3).
In lifting China’s technological capabilities, both the public and the private sectors 
have been working more closely in making technological breakthroughs in areas 
such as new sources of energy, electric cars, aviation and space technologies and 5G 
networks. For example, by 2020, China had built the world’s largest 5G network, 
accounting for more than 70 per cent of the global total and leading the world 
in terms of registered patents on key 5G technologies. China has attached great 
importance to the development of its ‘5G+ Industrial Internet’ strategy, which 
has been emphasised in the central government’s main working reports for 
four consecutive years. According to the China Academy of Information and 
Communications Technology, China has more than 1,100 5G+ Industrial Internet 
projects under construction, covering 22 industries, including cement, automobiles, 
petrochemicals, steel, mining and oil fields (Xinhua 2021b). 
According to a report by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
the quantity of industrial robots produced in 2020 increased by 19.1 per cent 
year-on-year (Xinhua 2021a). The real hope is that these developments in frontier 
technologies relating especially to the digital transformation of the economy could 
lead to economy-wide improvements in productivity. Such a transformation would 
have global implications in terms of new modes of industrialisation, new patterns 
of trade and cross-border transfers of technology, and new pattern of consumption.
Sixth, one of the damaging consequences of the so-called investment-driven model 
of growth is environmental degradation. China’s decades-long industry-led growth 
path has been characterised by rapidly growing energy and emission intensities and 
increases in its global market shares of manufactured products and natural resources 
such as petroleum and minerals (Roberts et al. 2016; Zheng et al. 2020). Its carbon 
emissions and share in global emissions have constantly increased since the 1970s and 
noticeably accelerated after 2002, when the pace of its industrialisation accelerated. 
As a result, incremental carbon emissions have surged, with China surpassing the 
United States since 2007 to become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. 
Given the scale, pace and trajectory of its industrialisation, China faces an enormous 
challenge for mitigation. Yet, it is clearly in the country’s interests to do so given 
the high price it has been paying for environmental degradation. To confront this 
challenge, China has adopted a grand strategy that includes technological change 
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and innovation, market price mechanisms, adjustments of industrial structure, the 
use of renewable energy and changes in consumption patterns, with a hope that low 

























Figure 1.2a. R&D intensity in various economies, 1996–2018
Brazil China India
Israel Japan Republic of Korea
Russian Federation United States of America World





































Figure 1.2b. R&D personnel intensity, 1996–2018
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Figure 1.2 R&D intensity and R&D personnel intensity in various economies
Note: R&D intensity is R&D expenditure as a share of GDP (R&D intensity). R&D personnel intensity is 
Total R&D personnel per thousand labour force. 
Source: Constructed from UNESCO data.












Figure 1.3 Major countries in patent applications in 2018
Source: World Intellectual Property Database website.
Finally, the modernisation drive has fundamentally changed the fabric of Chinese 
society. With rising income levels, China has created the world’s largest middle class 
(Kharas 2017) and eliminated absolute property (Guo et at. 2019); its universal 
healthcare covers 93 per cent of the population, and its urbanisation ratio reached 
62 per cent in 2020. With massive investment in education, China has substantially 
improved the literacy of its people through compulsory education and expanded 
levels of training. Its higher education sector has also begun to enter the global top 
university rankings (Fraumeni et al. 2019; Li et al. 2014). At the same time, its 
population is ageing (Figure 1.4). 
Because mortality will continue to decline and fertility will probably stay at 
a relatively low level, population ageing is likely to be an irreversible trend of 
long-term development rather than a historical event occurring at a particular 
time. (Zhao 2011: 296) 
In summary, there have been three significant windows of opportunity for economic 
transformation in China in the past 40 years. China has successfully met the 
challenges of the first two and is yet to prove its success for the third. The first window 
was the historic opportunity to reform and open the economy in the late 1970s, 
which allowed China to decisively move away from the centrally planned system 
to embrace an open market economy that fundamentally unleashed all productive 
forces in creating wealth, leading to high economic growth and much improved 
standards of living. The second window of opportunity was China’s accession to 
the WTO in 2001, which formally admitted China to the global trading system, 
allowing it to build a more rules-based market-compatible system with a high degree 
of interdependence with the rest of the world. China has since benefited enormously 
from globalisation and contributed to the improvement of global welfare while 
exerting strong competitive pressure on its trading partners in dealing with the 
enormous adjustment costs. The third window of opportunity is how China in the 
post-COVID-19 pandemic world will embrace digital technologies to transform 
its mode of economic growth and address the challenges of structural change, 
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deglobalisation, an ageing population, income inequality, public sector debt and 
climate change. Success in addressing all the key challenges will hold the key for 


























































Population: age 0 to 14 Population: age 15 to 64 Population: age 65 and above
Figure 1.4 China’s population by age group as share of total population,  
1990–2020 (per cent)
Source: Authors’ construction using data from CEIC Database. 
At the same time, some longstanding structural problems remain, such as resource 
misallocation, inefficiency, high emission intensities, income inequality and lack 
of market-compatible institutions. In the Chinese context of a partially reformed 
system, these problems need to be addressed through broad-based supply-side 
reforms, institution-building and social changes to prevent China from falling 
into the so-called middle-income trap, where income growth stagnates and society 
loses momentum for growth and development resulting from the rising costs of 
production and an inability to keep pace with structural reform to produce more 
high valued-added goods through improved productivity and technological progress. 
Again, building market-compatible institutions is the key for securing long-term 
growth and development.
There is some urgency for this as China tries to avoid ‘getting old before it gets rich’ 
(Dollar et al. 2020). The pace of China’s move towards an ageing society highlights 
the need to deepen its supply-side structural reforms, including reform of the family 
planning policy and its household registration system (hukou) and rural reforms. 
This concern is warranted considering economic growth has been decelerating in 
recent years—in part because of demographic change: there has been an absolute 
fall in China’s working-age population since 2012, fertility rates continue to fall and 
its total population is expected to fall from 2025 (Bai and Lei 2020). Part of that 
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growth deceleration is also due to the falling level of productivity in recent years. 
The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan, which will be implemented from 2021 with a new 
development strategy, aims to address these structural issues and to build a more 
mature market system while continuing to raise the level of per capita income and 
address the challenges of climate change and income inequality.
Maintaining growth amid the 
COVID‑19 pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic—a once-in-a-century event—began at a time when there 
were many uncertainties in the global economy, including the slowdown in China’s 
economic growth. The global economy contracted by –3.5 per cent as a result of 
widespread lockdowns and severe disruptions to global supply chains. China became 
the only major economy to achieve growth, of 2.3 per cent, amid the onslaught 
of the pandemic in 2020, against the background of global economic contraction 
(IMF 2021). China’s economy has recovered steadily, with employment and people’s 
wellbeing effectively guaranteed as economic and social development have been 
better than expected. China’s job market remained stable in 2020, with the surveyed 
unemployment rate in urban areas standing at 5.6 per cent—below the government’s 
annual target of 6 per cent. In the same year, China’s total GDP surpassed RMB100 
trillion (equivalent to US$14.7 trillion), accounting for about 17 per cent of global 
GDP. This achievement ended the final year of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan 
(2016–20) on a positive note, despite the impact of the pandemic. 
A roadmap to a high‑income economy: 
The Fourteenth Five‑Year Plan and the new 
strategy of ‘dual circulation’
China’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery coincides with the implementation of 
the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan—the economic and social development blueprint 
for the period 2021–25, as well as the long-term vision for China by 2035 (NDRC 
2021). The vision proposes that China will realise ‘socialist modernisation’, become 
a ‘socialist modern nation’ and reach medium developed-economy status by 2035. 
The plan sets out the key priorities for the next five years for China’s growth and 
development. Setting a long-term development goal is important for rebuilding the 
confidence of the Chinese people after the heavy blow dealt by the pandemic. 
The five-year plan could be a watershed moment in China’s economic development 
path, as policy goals move up a gear from ‘comprehensively building a well-off 
society’ to ‘comprehensively building a modern socialist nation’. Policies in the plan 
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aim to strengthen the underpinnings of the modern nation’s long-term growth in 
a well-rounded approach, covering the economy and the market, governance and 
law, defence and security, culture and identify, science and technology, environment 
and health, participation in the global economy and governance. The plan has 
19  chapters and 65 subchapters, sets out 20 main indicators of economic and 
social development and describes measures and initiatives, including 102 major 
engineering projects within the plan’s five-year period. Local and sectoral plans 
fleshing out these targets in greater detail will be released throughout the year.
The plan covers several key themes, including: enhancing innovation and scientific 
research to provide strategic support to economic development and scientific 
and technological self-reliance; strengthening the domestic market, boosting 
domestic demand and deepening supply-side reforms under the ‘dual circulation 
strategy’; deepening market reforms and enhancing coordination between the 
government and the market; prioritising rural development through the pull of 
urban development; optimising and promoting coordinated regional development 
and new urbanisation; developing China’s cultural soft power; enhancing green, 
sustainable and low-carbon economic growth; further opening up to world markets, 
relying on the large domestic market to enhance international cooperation, 
promoting BRI cooperation and participating in the reform of global economic 
governance; improving people’s living standards and their sense of achievement, 
wellbeing and safety, while responding to population ageing; establishing strategies 
for and coordinating development of national security; and strengthening national 
defence and military modernisation.
In the plan, the urgency of technological innovation is palpable. Chapters 2, 3 and 5 
elaborate on the issue of innovation and technological progress. Because China’s 
labour force peaked in 2011 and its society is ageing, the rate of entrepreneurial 
activity and innovation may slow, while labour costs, care responsibilities and 
demand for healthcare resources will add to the cost of operating the economy. 
Counteracting forces include continued technological progress, labour-substituting 
and augmenting automation and rising labour quality. For any country, technological 
progress can come from both domestic innovation and absorption of technological 
diffusion from abroad. As tensions in technological competition rise, China is 
compelled to rely more on domestic R&D. We therefore expect to see a rise China’s 
R&D expenditure from this year. 
Chapter 4 of the plan discusses developing China’s domestic market and building 
a ‘new development pattern’, which centres on the ‘dual circulation strategy’ first 
articulated by President Xi in May 2020 as China began to plan its post-pandemic 
economic recovery. The dual circulation strategy aims to promote a stronger 
domestic market (‘internal circulation’) while continuing to strengthen China’s 
international economic position (‘external circulation’). Domestic circulation is the 
staple component of this strategy, while external circulation is the complement. 
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The establishment of this strategy reflects several considerations: increasingly 
uncertain international markets due to trade conflicts; global value chains becoming 
more regionalised and localised after the pandemic due to security concerns; 
rebalancing from export-driven to consumption-driven growth and raising 
domestic consumption and utility; and enlarging the domestic market and reducing 
unevenness in growth and incomes across regions. While China may be able to rely 
more on indigenous innovation to drive technological progress, declining access 
to international knowledge flows would be costly to any country, as innovation 
processes are becoming more interconnected and networked. Therefore, China will 
need a strategy to become more internationally connected to knowledge flows. 
Overall, the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan reveals a strong resolution to overcome 
various challenges and, if successful, the capabilities learned would enable China to 
achieve high-income status sooner than expected.
Structure of this book
Against the above background, this book explores the challenges faced by the 
Chinese economy in the transition to a high-income economy, including agricultural 
development, financial reform, internationalisation of the renminbi, urbanisation, 
as well as topics related to innovation, corporate-sector development and market 
competition. China’s growth experience has been full of exciting changes and 
important lessons about reform and structural change, and this year’s China Update 
is again the way to gain insights into these. 
In Chapter 2, Cai Fang and Jia Peng detail the relationship between China’s status as 
an upper middle-income country and domestic trends in social mobility, particularly 
as these questions relate to China’s ability to overcome the middle-income trap. 
Using  cross-country data, the authors investigate the relationship between 
development stage, growth rate and social inequality, and examine the drivers 
of Chinese growth over the past 40 years of reform, detailing how these drivers 
have changed over time. They find that the primary drivers that sustained social 
mobility in decades past—namely, labour market mechanisms, massive internal 
migration and major structural economic reforms—are now inadequate as China 
has developed and low-hanging growth opportunities have attenuated. 
The authors challenge the idea that rising problems of social mobility can be tackled 
solely through expansion of the economic pie. Instead, they argue that these issues 
must be additionally addressed via economic and social reforms, including progressive 
taxation and redistribution policies, as well as the mitigation of institutional obstacles, 
especially the hukou system. The authors conclude by offering policy suggestions 
aimed at enhancing social mobility and a more equitable sharing of developmental 
dividends. They suggest reform of basic social services provision to operate on de 
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facto rather than de jure residence status, while additionally highlighting the central 
government’s institutional responsibility to mitigate the costs of hukou reform to 
alleviate the associated externalities faced by local governments. 
Considering China’s increased dependence on the importation of agricultural goods 
to meet growing domestic demand, the authors of Chapter 3, Rao Sihang, Liu 
Xingshuo and Sheng Yu, investigate China’s current and historical comparative 
and competitive advantages for 17 major crop and livestock products. Using global 
commodity-level agricultural trade data for the period 1978–2018, the authors 
calculate the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and relative trade advantage 
(RTA) indices to compare China’s relative advantages in the trade of certain 
commodities. They reveal a rapid decline in China’s earlier comparative advantage 
for most agricultural products compared with the rest of the world, indicating that 
the rise in demand caused by population and economic growth has outpaced growth 
in agricultural output. With even further growth in food demand anticipated over 
the coming decade, the authors forecast future demand by commodity and calculate 
the overall bilateral complementarity coefficient for China and several important 
countries and regions to best determine potential sources of supply. Their findings 
indicate that it is in China’s interest to import land and water-intensive goods to free 
up its own land and resources for products for which it possesses relative advantage. 
The authors point out that there are more than 3.5 billion hectares of land suitable 
for agriculture throughout the world, but only around 1.5 billion hectares are being 
used effectively. If trade and investment relationships could be rearranged between 
China and the rest of the world based on their comparative competitiveness, global 
food supply would significantly increase. Therefore, rearranging agricultural trade 
between China and her trading partners could present a win-win strategy for China 
as well as for the world. Therefore, the concern that China’s food demand will 
compete with demands from other developing countries, imposing greater pressures 
on global food supply, may be misplaced.
In Chapter 4, Wang Wei, Deng Yusong, Shao Ting, Wang Ruimin, Niu Sanyuan 
and Liu Xin detail the many achievements of China’s urbanisation since the start 
of the reform and opening period more than 40 years ago. The authors describe a 
process in which the urbanisation level has steadily increased, urban patterns have 
been optimised, cities’ overall competitiveness has been significantly enhanced and 
the system of urban governance has continually improved. Accompanying all these 
advances has been the steady improvement in residents’ living standards. With its 
urbanisation rate at 60 per cent, China has now entered a new stage of urbanisation, 
characterised by the pursuit of high-quality development—a status that coincides 
with a new technological revolution. 
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Looking forward to 2050, the authors predict that China will enter the ranks of 
high-income countries and its industrial structure will undergo profound changes. 
With the transformation and upgrading of urban industries, cities in the future will 
focus on the requirements of high-quality development. The authors contend that 
China will need to continually improve the quality and efficiency of urbanisation 
to create an efficient, low-carbon and green urban development model, arguing 
that the creation and application of a new technological revolution present an 
opportunity for the high-quality development of Chinese cities. Their findings 
indicate that the huge domestic market potential and institutional dividends 
brought by the new round of reform and opening will be the drivers of the next 
stage of China’s urbanisation.
Governments in China currently find themselves constrained by the necessary 
trade-offs between cutting tax rates to incentivise business investment and boost 
consumption and maintaining tax revenue to match its expenditure. To reconcile 
the tension, the authors of Chapter 5, Yanchao Xu and Shawn Xiaoguang Chen, 
propose a tax-neutral reform centred on the improvement of tax enforcement across 
firms, which are currently subject to misallocation and aggregate productivity losses. 
They examine the theoretical mechanisms sustaining such reform and empirically 
investigate its feasibility, finding that the underlying mechanisms rest on the positive 
feedback loop of ‘lower tax rate = better tax enforcement and compliance = higher 
productivity = greater tax base = lower tax rate’. Based on county-level public financial 
data and industrial firm surveys during 2000–07, the authors use the abolition of 
agricultural taxes in 2005 as a ‘quasi-natural experiment’ to test key mechanisms. 
Using the estimates of key parameters, the authors roughly estimate the lower bound 
of the value-added tax rate cut able to sustain revenue-neutral reform.
In Chapter 6, Sizhong Sun explores aggregate innovation activities and their growth 
effects in China. Through examination of both inputs (including R&D) and 
outputs (including patents), the author reaches several conclusions with important 
implications for China’s growth potential: first, innovation in China is on an upward 
trajectory, with little evidence of a slowdown in growth; second, innovation appears 
to promote economic growth in the long run at both the national and the industry 
levels; third, there is no short-run growth effect from innovation at the national 
level. Considering the growth effect of innovation and the increasingly binding 
resource constraints faced by China, innovation will likely play a more important 
role in China’s future economic growth.
Analysis of the financial health of Chinese companies provides important clues for 
understanding the trajectory of the Chinese economy and is useful for assessing 
the effectiveness of government policies affecting business and corporate activity. 
With previous analyses of the state of China’s corporate sector indicating a general 
decline in profitability and an increase in corporate leverage since the Global 
Financial Crisis, in Chapter 7, Joel Bowman seeks to provide an update on more 
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recent developments in the sector through an examination of official survey data 
supplemented by granular data derived from the financial statements of more 
than 3,700 nonfinancial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The author finds that more recent declines in corporate profitability have 
been primarily driven by the private sector, even as private firms maintain higher 
levels of profitability than state-owned firms. 
The findings show that major drivers of this trend include a squeeze on less-regulated 
credit caused by reforms aimed at reducing risk in the financial system, and the private 
sector’s greater exposure to a global slowdown in manufacturing and trade. This has 
been felt particularly acutely by export-oriented manufacturing firms, affected by 
relative economic sluggishness in advanced economies and by the US–China trade 
dispute. After examining the status of corporate leverage and the special challenges 
faced by the real estate sector, the author details recent government measures aimed 
at easing financial conditions for small firms, while acknowledging the challenge of 
achieving these aims in practice.
Developed in the context of economic globalisation and low domestic land and 
labour costs, processing trade became an important source of China’s growth, 
industrialisation and employment. In Chapter 8, Kunwang Li and Haoran Hu 
examine the impact of policies aimed at transforming and upgrading processing 
trade in China, the implementation of which began in 2003. The authors use 
Chinese customs and industrial panel data for the period of 2000–06 to empirically 
test the impact of transformation and upgrading policies for processing trade on 
enterprise productivity by use of the double-difference method. 
Their findings indicate that these policies have contributed to resource misallocation 
and have had a net negative effect on productivity. As the policies explicitly promote 
the transfer of processing trade from the dominant eastern regions of China to the 
west and centre, the eastern regions endowed with natural geographic and logistical 
advantages have been most negatively impacted, disturbing production efficiency 
and original resource allocation. Given that these policies are aimed at cultivating 
private firms, the authors find that foreign-owned and joint-venture firms engaged 
in processing trade with imported materials have been especially negatively affected 
by the policies’ crowding-out effects acting as a drag on production efficiency. 
They find that processing trade has exhibited a steady downward trend since 2000, 
but product structure has improved. Nonetheless, the authors caution that industrial 
policy should be orientated towards efficiency to avoid creating new distortions.
In Chapter 9, Liqing Zhang, Libo Yin and You Wu analyse bilateral offshore renminbi 
exchange rate returns in an augmented uncovered interest rate parity regression to 
assess the offshore renminbi’s safe-haven characteristics. To explore the issue, the 
authors evaluate the relationship between the bilateral exchange rate returns on 
the offshore renminbi against major global currencies and BRI currencies, as well 
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as global risk factors. The empirical results of their study indicate the following: 
first, the offshore renminbi exhibits safe-haven characteristics, which exist in 
certain major currencies and some national currencies in the BRI regions; second, 
the safe-haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi underlying some national 
currencies in the BRI regions are relatively weak compared with major currencies; 
third, the above-mentioned features possess time-varying characteristics, and the 
hedging values of the offshore renminbi are more prominent in extreme cases. The 
related results provide important references for asset allocation, hedging strategy 
arrangements and even the prevention of systemic risk in global financial markets.
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Tackling social challenges to 
avoid the middle‑income trap
Cai Fang and Jia Peng
[T]hey have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have 
many when they reach the summit.
— Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
Introduction
In 2018, the Chinese economy grew to equivalence to the economy of the euro area 
or two-thirds of the economy of the United States and accounted for 16 per cent of 
the global economy. With a growth rate of 6.1 per cent in 2019—higher than any 
other major economy—the Chinese economy further raised its importance in the 
world economy. At the same time, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
exceeded US$10,000—significantly above the average level of the upper middle-
income countries.1 
Many economists, think tanks and international institutions believe China’s growth 
will continue to be robust in the near future. China is already in its transition to 
high-income status and seems certain to cross the threshold between middle-income 
and high-income countries in a few years. According to international experiences, 
this stage of development is critical to maintaining economic growth and social 
stability. In what follows, we summarise some aspects of those experiences. 
1  Unless noted otherwise, this chapter uses the World Bank’s criteria of 2010 US dollars to identify low-income 
countries (US$1,005 GNI per capita), lower middle-income countries (US$1,006–3,955), upper middle-income 
countries (US$3,956–12,235) and high-income countries (> US$12,235).
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First, although the World Bank set a level of gross national income (GNI) per 
capita as the threshold for high-income countries (currently US$12,235), there has 
never been a guarantee that countries that fulfil the income criterion will maintain 
their high-income status; nor is the criterion a guarantee for sustained growth. 
Additional  indicators are needed to determine whether a country can sustain its 
development. Indicators of social development are particularly important as they 
can embody the purpose and sustained sources of economic development. 
Second, for most of the upper middle-income countries close to the high-income 
threshold, economic growth tends to slow, while there is divergence in growth 
performance among countries (Eichengreen et al. 2011, 2013). Countries that 
fail to properly tackle the slowdown—and, as a result, perform poorly in social 
development—often become stuck in the vicious cycle of growth stagnation and 
income gap widening, which economists call the ‘middle-income trap’.2
Third, as the low-hanging fruits of growth drivers become scarce and opportunities 
to implement reform characterised by Pareto improvement diminish, countries 
must tackle the economic slowdown while also maintaining social mobility. 
Making  a  bigger pie and dividing it fairly require further reform by breaking 
up vested interests, tapping into new sources of growth through innovation and 
strengthening government redistribution. 
Since China entered the group of upper middle-income countries (with per capita 
GDP exceeding US$4,000) in 2010, its demographic transition has shifted into 
a  fundamentally different phase. The working-age population (aged 15 to 59) 
has been in rapid decline and the population dependency ratio has increased 
accordingly. As  a result, labour shortages, slower human capital improvement, 
diminishing returns to capital investment and decelerated labour migration (which 
slows productivity increases) all lead to the weakening of potential growth capacity 
and a slowdown of actual growth.
The average annual growth rate of GDP fell significantly, from 10.1 per cent in the 
period 1980–2010 to 7.0 per cent in the period 2012–19. According to estimates 
of China’s potential growth rate, its economy will continue to follow a downward 
trend until the growth rate regresses to the mean.3 
2  Gill and Khara (2007) first use this concept for analysing challenges facing East Asian economies, whereas 
many researchers more often refer to Latin American countries as typical examples of it.
3  Pritchett and Summers (2014) predicted China’s growth rate would regress to the mean (the average rate of the 
world economy) in 2015, which was proven wrong. As Cai and Lu (2013) estimate, as the deceleration of China’s 
potential growth rate is moderate and gradual, the actual growth rate is expected to remain reasonably high compared 
with most other major economies for some time, regressing to the mean sometime close to 2050. 
2. TACKLING SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO AVOID THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP
21
How the benefits of development are shared among the people lies in both the 
speed of making the pie and the mechanism of dividing it. With distribution 
patterns unchanged, slower growth of output tends to mitigate the level of sharing 
and to change the nature of sharing. In China, the narrowing trend of the income 
gap has retreated moderately since growth began to slow. The falling trend in the 
Gini coefficient of household income—from 0.491 in 2008 to 0.462 in 2015—
has stalled since 2016. As for the distribution of household disposable income, its 
improvement was even more short-lived. The ratio of the top 20 per cent to the 
bottom 20 per cent in the quintile of urban household disposable income decreased 
from the high point of 5.77 in 2008 to 5.00 in 2012, and then increased to 5.90 in 
2018. The same ratio for rural household income decreased from the high of 8.39 
in 2011 to 7.41 in 2013 and then increased to 9.29 in 2018.
This chapter investigates global experiences based on cross-nation data to shed light 
on why economic growth slows and social development stagnates in the upper-
middle-income stage. It particularly focuses on lessons that have implications for 
China as it transitions to high-income status. 
Section two describes the changes in the economic growth rate and income 
distribution in relation to development stages based on cross-nation data. 
Section three explains why the economic slowdown tends to reduce social mobility 
in China. Section four explores institutional obstacles to social mobility in China’s 
transition to high-income status. Section five concludes with a suggestion that, in 
response to the unique challenges facing China, redistribution policy should focus 
on equalising access to basic public services. 
The economic slowdown and consequent 
worsening of distribution
Conventional theories of growth consider economic development as a homogeneous 
process—that is, nations expand their economy and increase per capita income by 
following a predetermined path without disturbance by changes in development 
stages. Under the neoclassical growth theory, the hypothesis of conditional 
convergence that correlates growth performance with initial per capita income 
expects countries with low incomes at the starting point to grow faster than those 
with higher initial incomes once they have the necessary endowments, institutions 
and infrastructure in place. The difference in growth rates between poorer and 
richer countries leads to a convergence among countries (see, for example, Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
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Those theories pay little attention to the differences in growth patterns between 
countries at different stages of development.4 These differences, however, are what 
result in differentials in economic performance and related social development.
A simple observation of the relationship between initial income and subsequent 
growth performance suggests that, if there is any convergence, it closely relates to the 
stage of development. In Figure 2.1, we show the descriptive relationship between 
per capita GDP in 1990 and its growth rate in 1990–2018. 
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b present scenarios for all 214 countries (and territories) with 
data availability and for 164 low and middle-income countries with per capita GDP 
lower than US$12,000, respectively. In both scenarios, there is little correlation 
between initial income and the growth rate—that is, no convergence is found. 
Figure 2.1c presents the scenario for 116 middle-income countries with per 
capita GDP between US$1,000 and US$12,000. In this manifestation, there is 
an insignificant correlation between initial income and later growth, showing only 
a  vague convergence. In the scenario expressed by Figure 2.1d, which includes 
43 upper middle-income countries with per capita GDP between US$4,000 and 
US$12,000, the correlation between initial income and later growth and thus 
convergence is more apparent relative to the aforementioned scenarios. 
These descriptive presentations of hypothetical convergence reveal the reality of 
developing countries in catching up to their more advanced counterparts in the 
period concerned.
Many low and lower middle-income countries have been stuck in a low-level 
equilibrium trap due to a lack of the necessary conditions for economic take-off, 
which is manifested in their cumulating around the threshold between lower middle-
income and upper middle-income status. In such stages of development, countries 
vary significantly in terms of growth performance, with some being superstars in 
catching up and others trapped in stagnation. 
Those low and middle-income countries that have successfully caught up with their 
high-income counterparts have by and large experienced the development of a dual 
economy and thus benefited from the demographic dividend. As can be predicted 
by the definition of convergence itself, the upper middle-income countries in such 
a state tend to see a moderate slowdown, because of a diminishing labour supply, 
high investment returns, resource reallocation efficiency and the advantages of 
technological backwardness. 
4  Though empirical studies on ‘convergence clubs’ group together countries in different stages of development 
to see how they grow differentially, they do not particularly employ the perspective of development stages. For 
example, see Baumol (1986). 


































































Figure 2.1 Stage of development versus economic growth 
Source: World Bank (2021).
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As is shown in Figures 2.1c and 2.1d, in the middle-income stage, and especially 
the upper middle-income stage, growth rates show a tendency for convergence 
among countries.
Those countries that experienced a slowdown in the later stage of transition to upper 
middle-income status—particularly near the high-income threshold—tended to 
diverge in growth performance depending on how successfully they tackled the 
growth slowdown. It is such a critical period that divides countries on to different 
tracks: moving up to high-income status or falling into the middle-income trap.
Let us turn to the nexus between income distribution and stages of development. 
By plotting data collected from the early industrialised countries, Kuznets (1955) 
found an inverted U-shaped curve for income inequality. That is, as per capita 
income increases, income inequality measured by, say, the Gini coefficient rises in 
the early stage of development and, after peaking—or reaching the Kuznets turning 
point—it begins to decline. Kuznets’s observation has been widely criticised, in part 
because it is not confirmed by new evidence and in part probably because it has been 
cited to support various versions of ‘trickledown economics’.
Again, we use World Bank data to see what the relationships between per capita 
GDP and the Gini coefficient look like in relation to stages of development. 
From Figure 2.2a, which plots 119 low and middle-income countries, one cannot 
find the pattern suggested by Kuznets where the Gini coefficient increases with 
increasing per capita GDP. 
Figures 2.2b and 2.2c present income distribution in 94 middle-income countries 
and 40 upper middle-income countries, respectively, and both show little correlation 
between per capita GDP and the Gini coefficient. It is worth noting from these two 
figures that upper middle-income countries typically have high inequality. 
Figure 2.2d depicts the pattern for all 153 countries with data availability. Since this 
scenario is formed after adding samples of high-income countries to the previous 
scenarios, the appearance of a Kuznets curve should be credited to high-income 
countries’ pattern of income distribution.5 
Some coarse findings are summarised here. First, the Kuznets curve does not 
exist—at least according to the data shown in Figure 2.2. Nor is there any empirical 
evidence to support an increasing Gini coefficient in step with per capita income in 
the early stage and a mechanical Kuznets turning point. 
5  The diverging trends in income distribution among countries, especially among upper middle-income 
countries, deserve to be noted. That is, with the increase in per capita income, income distribution has been 
improved in some countries, while it has deteriorated in others. 




































































Figure 2.2 Income distribution and stages of development
Source: World Bank (2021).
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Second, although there is great variation in the income inequality index among 
countries in all stages of development, there appears to be a certain nexus between 
the Gini coefficient and per capita GDP, especially when looking at the  upper 
middle-income and high-income countries. That adds to the evidence that 
upper  middle-income countries are subject to the middle-income trap, which 
usually manifests in an economic slowdown and a widening of the income gap. 
Third, the smaller Gini coefficients—namely, equitable income distribution—
shown in high-income countries are actually the results after adjustment for taxes 
and transfers. Together with the second finding, it can be said that redistribution 
policies become increasingly important when countries enter the upper middle-
income stage and move to the high-income stage. 
The same factors that cause a growth slowdown in the upper middle-income 
countries weaken the function of the labour market in reducing inequality and 
social mobility (primary distribution). In this stage of development, as redistribution 
policies are not yet well prepared, countries are apt to be troubled by worsening 
income distribution. 
Admittedly, redistribution and related policy measures do not necessarily result in 
a narrowing of the income gap. In reality, there are many cases where redistribution 
policies either remain little more than window dressing due to slower growth or 
actually increase inequality as a result of the stronger bargaining power of vested 
interest groups. Still, such phenomena imply that this is a critical stage at which 
to introduce redistribution policies and choose an effective way of implementing 
them. What these findings imply for China in promoting social mobility in its 
transition to high-income status will be discussed in what follows.
Changes in social mobility as China moves 
to higher‑income status
What we conclude so far is that the stage of development is helpful for understanding 
economic growth and social development and for interpreting countries’ success 
or failure in these processes. In moving closer to high-income status, China has 
witnessed not only an economic slowdown but also weakening social mobility. 
The fruits of rapid growth of the Chinese economy during the reform period from 
the late 1970s have been widely shared among Chinese people, mainly through 
labour market mechanisms. The nature and mechanism of sharing have been closely 
related to China’s specific development stage and the unique growth pattern the 
Chinese economy adopted in the period—until both changed. 
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From the 1980s to the 2010s, China had a favourable opportunity window 
with regards to population, in which the working-age population increased and 
the population dependency ratio declined—both rapidly. Relevant reforms that 
eliminated institutional obstacles to labour migration have transferred surplus 
labourers in agriculture and redundant workers in urban enterprises to employment 
in newly emerged sectors, which has simultaneously enhanced the incomes of rural 
and urban households and reallocated resources in the economy as a whole. 
Through participation in the global economy, China’s abundant labour force 
has translated into comparative and competitive advantages for manufacturing 
commodities. Capitalising on its comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
manufacturing in global industrial chains, China exchanges its abundant labour 
factor for capital factors, with which the developed countries are abundantly 
endowed.6 By and large, such a trading pattern tends to increase returns on labour in 
China and, therefore, Chinese workers have shared the benefits of reform, opening 
up and the resulting growth. 
Specifically, in the period when there was a massive surplus of labourers in 
agriculture and redundant workers in urban enterprises, which curbed the increase 
in wages, total income and the share within it of the wage earnings of rural and 
urban households increased through fuller participation in wage employment. 
As the economy passed the Lewis turning point,7 total income and its share of rural 
and urban household wages increased more depending on wage rate inflation, as 
employees gained stronger bargaining power in the labour market.
Therefore, for most of the past four decades, China’s development process has been 
characterised by the synchronisation of economic growth, employment expansion 
and income increases. In the period 1978–2019, the annual growth rate of 
commodity imports and exports was 18.4 per cent in nominal terms, and the annual 
growth rates in real terms were 9.4 per cent for GDP, 4.0 per cent for employment 
in secondary and tertiary sectors and 8.4 per cent for per capita disposable income. 
As the demographic window closed after the three decades from 1980 to 2010, the 
Chinese economy has no longer been characterised by an unlimited supply of labour. 
This is manifest in the slowdown in labour migration, which has resulted in slowing 
growth of urban employment, a weakening comparative advantage in manufacturing 
and declining shares of Chinese commodities trading with developed countries. 
6  From the 1980s to the 2000s, the share of China’s commodities exports to developed countries remained 
above 75 per cent, while the share of China’s commodities imports from developed countries was also high. Both 
shares have since been in a declining trend. 
7  Cai (2016) suggests 2004 can be viewed as the Lewis turning point in which a labour shortage occurred in 
China’s coastal areas and was afterwards widespread throughout the country. 
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It can be expected that, along with these changes in the economic domain, 
improvements in income distribution will tend to decelerate and, most importantly, 
social mobility will weaken. We can observe social mobility and its trend from both 
horizontal and vertical perspectives. In general, through labour migration—namely, 
horizontal mobility—individuals and families can realise their desired vertical 
mobility by changing their occupation and income status across time, cohorts 
and generations. So, social mobility is not only about reallocation of labour and 
population; most importantly, it is also about patterns of social stratification, a sense 
of happiness, consensus on ideas of social justice and thus social cohesion. In what 
follows, we discuss the trends of social mobility in China via some revealed indicators. 
Since the reforms initiated in the late 1970s, China has witnessed surplus labourers 
transferring from agriculture and migrating from rural to urban sectors, which has 
led to substantial changes in sectoral structures and regional patterns of development. 
In the period 1978–2018, the share of agricultural labour in total labour declined 
from 70.5 per cent to 26.1 per cent, while the proportion of the permanent urban 
population in the total increased from 17.9 per cent to 59.6 per cent. 
As the result of the demographic transition and labour reallocation, however, 
labour migration has decelerated in recent years (see Cai et al. 2016), as is shown 
in Figure 2.3. This diminishing trend in labour mobility between rural and urban 
areas and across regions and sectors tends to drag down social mobility, which is 















































































Figure 2.3 Trends in labour migration 
Sources: Early data are from estimates in Cai (2016: 30); updated data are from NBS (2019).
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Theoretically, in a stage of development characterised by rapid economic growth, 
marked changes in sectoral structure, dramatic expansions in education and massive 
labour mobility across regions and sectors, a country’s occupational structure 
tends to rapidly upgrade towards a more human capital–intensive pattern, which 
promotes overall upward mobility across society. Meanwhile, while society creates 
more opportunities for people to climb the occupational and income ladders, it does 
so without the expense of others moving downward. Greater upward mobility and 
less downward mobility mean that, not only is economic development shared, but 
also social mobility experiences a Pareto improvement. 
There are two critical factors in elevating the occupational structure: the upgrading 
of the sectoral structure as a demand-side factor and improvements in the education 
of the working-age population as a supply-side factor. Both have seen substantial 
changes in the past decades in China, forming the unique pattern of social mobility 
and its change. 
Based on data from the fifth and sixth national population censuses (in 2000 and 
2010, respectively),8 we calculate two indicators to see such changes. The first is 
years of schooling by age. According to each age’s school completion rate, we assign 
zero for no schooling, completion of primary school is six years, nine years for 
junior high school, 12 years for senior high school, 15 years for junior college, 
16 years for university and 19.3 years for graduate school (weighted average of 
master’s and PhD students). The second indicator is the proportion of technical 
personnel and office staff among workers,9 which is supposed to show the state of 
occupational upgrading. 
Plotting the indicators in Figure 2.4, one can find two features concerning 
educational attainment and occupational upgrading in relation to time and age. 
First, both human capital and the job mobility of employees improved significantly 
in the period 2000–10, which shows mutual promotion among economic growth, 
structural change and education expansion.10 Second, from comparisons at specific 
points across ages, the average education and occupational upgrading in 2000 
and 2010 decreases as age increases. This implies that, while human capital plays 
a positive role in promoting job mobility, population ageing tends to weaken the 
human capital endowment and job mobility.
8  Please refer to the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (data.stats.gov.cn) for more details of 
the fifth and sixth national population censuses.
9  One can consider it a proxy of the proportion of ‘white-collar workers’, though we omit those who are 
identified as cadres because that categorisation does not distinguish management personnel from administrative 
and government cadres. 
10  Compared with the developed countries, the uniqueness of the Chinese case is the rapid development of both 
its economy and its education system. In the United Kingdom, for example, the role of education in occupational 
change is not decisive. See Goldthorpe (2016).







































































Figure 2.4 Educational attainment and occupational upgrading by age 
Source: NBS website: www.stats.gov.cn/.
Further examination shows that the average proportion of technical personnel and 
office staff in the population aged 16 and older increased from 12.5 per cent in 
2002–06 to 18.9 per cent in 2012–17. As those factors that promote occupational 
upgrading alter, however, one can expect a decelerating trend in job mobility.
Almost all changes accompanied by the disappearance of the demographic 
dividend—such as slowing human capital improvement, the shrinking share of 
manufacturing in the economy, contracting employment in the secondary sector 
and the dominance of the service sector in absorbing employment11—tend to drag 
down occupational upgrading and thus mitigate social mobility. 
11  Unlike employment transfer from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors, which is of productivity-promotion 
type, the employment transfer from secondary to tertiary sectors has led to a decline in labour productivity of the 
overall economy. For example, in 2018, the employment share of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors was 26.1%, 
27.6% and 46.3%, respectively, whereas their labour productivity (value added per labour) was 32,000  yuan, 
171,000 yuan and 136,000 yuan, respectively. 
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Trends for social mobility, therefore, can move in different directions depending 
on the country’s stage of development. First, with rapid economic growth and 
structural change, social mobility is more likely to be a type of positive-sum game, 
or Pareto improvement. It is mainly through this type of social mobility that 
Chinese residents have been sharing the fruits of economic development over the 
past decades. Second, in a state of relatively static economic growth and structural 
change, opportunities for occupational upgrading become scarcer, and some people’s 
upward mobility may be accompanied by others’ downward movement. This is also 
a possible scenario for a slower-growing China. 
The scenario in which social mobility takes the form of a zero-sum game may 
accordingly produce an adverse effect. That is, as all individuals and families strive 
for the top, those already at the top and trying to maintain their status unavoidably 
clash with those on the bottom and trying to break the existing pattern of social 
stratification. Such conflicts in turn make social mobility less of a win-win situation, 
reducing the sense of happiness at the individual level and of cohesion at the 
societal level. 
The massive expansion of the working-age population, rapid economic growth 
and a rapidly changing sectoral structure are all phenomena of a particular stage 
of development, whereas social mobility should occur at any stage of development. 
Therefore, the way to promote social mobility should be changing over time. 
It is widely believed that growth is the ultimate way to eliminate growing pains. 
However, it is pointless to suggest that the only thing one should do to address the 
unfairness in dividing the pie is to make a bigger pie. The causes of social immobility 
and income inequality are rooted in institutions. Therefore, promoting social 
mobility and reducing income inequality require social and economic reforms. 
In what follows, we will discuss how China can enhance social mobility and improve 
income distribution by removing various institutional obstacles.
What institutional barriers deter China’s 
social mobility?
Social immobility not only widens the income gap, it also extends it to future 
generations, causing solidification of social divisions. As labour market mechanisms 
increasingly become inadequate to tackle immobility and inequality, the government 
should step in and implement redistribution policies that include not only progressive 
taxation, income transfers and public services provision, but also a much broader 
range of policies that promote social mobility. 
CHINA’S CHALLENGES IN MOVING TOWARDS A HIGH-INCOME ECONOMY
32
In China today, the differentiated access to basic public services between rural 
and urban areas, across regions and among groups of residents serves as a major 
institutional barrier, stymieing social mobility—and the household registration 
(hukou) system legitimises such gaps. 
The initial purpose of the hukou system—established as part of the planning 
system—was to deter people’s migration between rural and urban areas and across 
regions through strict population registration and segregated, exclusive provision of 
public services. After its formation in 1958, and except for limited occasions such 
as university enrolment, military conscription and planned recruitment, there was 
hardly any migration between regions, and especially between rural and urban areas 
in the 1960s and 1970s. This blocking of occupational change and the consequent 
income gap between rural and urban sectors in the pre-reform period made China 
the least mobile society in the world.
Since the mid-1980s, labour migration between rural and urban areas and between 
regions has been expanded. However, although the original intention of the hukou 
system has changed, its function of separating the provision of basic public services 
remains unchanged. The longstanding dual structure of society resulting from this 
segregation creates a special group of people—namely, migrant workers—who face 
not only tangible obstacles to becoming legitimate residents of the cities, but also 
intangible barriers to climbing the social status ladder. 
In 2018, there were 172.7 million migrant workers living in places other than the 
townships in which their hukou was registered. As entitlements to public services 
in urban areas are largely determined by people’s hukou status, migrant workers 
(78.2 per cent of whom are in cities) are not treated equally in terms of access 
to social protection. Based on China Urban Labour Survey (CULS) data,12 we 
found significant gaps in workplace treatment and public service provision between 
migrant and local workers, with only minimal improvement during the period 
2010–16 (Table 2.1).
First, migrant workers’ wages are still systemically lower than their local 
counterparts. In 2016, the hourly wage of migrant workers was 73 per cent of that 
of local workers. Despite migrant workers’ efforts to increase their monthly earnings 
through overtime—for example, their working hours are 26 per cent higher than 
those of local workers—that does not eliminate the wage gap. Based on data from 
12  The fourth round of the CULS was conducted by the Institute of Population and Labour Economics at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2016. It sampled 15,448 individuals from 6,478 households in 
260 communities in Shanghai, Fuzhou, Wuhan, Shenyang, Xi’an and Guangzhou. Of the total sample, 9,753 
individuals from 3,897 households were local and 5,695 individuals from 2,581 households were migrants. For 
details, see: iple.cssn.cn.
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an early round of the CULS, Wang (2005) found that hukou status could explain 
43 per cent of the wage difference between the two groups. That is, after controlling 
for education and other individual characteristics, the wage gap remains.
Second, migrant workers’ participation in social insurance programs is significantly 
low. For example, the percentage of migrant workers participating compared with 
their local counterparts is 40 per cent for basic pension insurance, 44 per cent for 
unemployment insurance and 45 per cent for basic medical insurance.
Table 2.1 Differential treatment in the urban labour market
2010 2016
Migrants Locals Migrants Locals
Work and pay
Weekly working hours 57.00 43.70 55.20 43.90
Monthly wage (RMB) 2,158.00 2,368.00 4,839.00 5,206.00
Hourly wage (RMB) 9.80 13.50 24.10 33.00
Coverage rate (%)
Pension insurance 26.40 77.90 32.60 80.80
Unemployment 
insurance
10.40 51.80 31.60 71.10
Medical insurance 26.30 74.10 37.50 82.60
Other (%)
Children’s attendance at 
local school* 
— — 67.00 100.00
Receiving minimum 
living guarantee
— 4.20 0.70 1.90
* ‘Children’s attendance at local school’ includes only those at senior high school or lower; as the 
questionnaire does not ask the location of the school, we presume it is a local school in the surveyed cities.
— No data available.
Because of migrant workers’ insecure employment, employers are unwilling to 
contribute social insurance for migrant workers, migrant workers themselves are not 
willing to participate in either employee-based or resident-based social insurance 
programs and many migrants find work through labour-dispatch agencies, which 
provides both the agencies and the employers with an excuse to exclude workers 
from social insurance coverage. 
Finally, migrant workers also lack equal access to other public services in the cities 
where they live and work. For example, the proportion of migrants receiving 
a minimum living guarantee is 35 per cent of that of locals, and only 67 per cent of 
migrant children attend local schools. According to the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS 2019), the proportion of migrant children attending local public and private 
schools (with government financial support) is 82.2 per cent and 11.6 per cent, 
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respectively, at the primary level, and 84.1 per cent and 10 per cent at the secondary 
level. As for migrants’ housing, 19 per cent were purchased, 61.3 per cent were 
rented, 12.9 per cent were provided by employers and only 2.9 per cent were 
provided through a local government subsidy. 
Conclusion and policy suggestions
In the upper middle-income stage of development, even though an economic 
slowdown naturally occurs, relatively moderate but more sustainable growth 
can be realised if the growth pattern can be transformed to fit the new stage. 
Similarly,  nurturing labour market competition and implementing more 
redistribution policies can maintain social mobility and thus the sharing of the fruits 
of development. 
What challenges China today is that the existing institutional barriers stymie social 
mobility in general and the hukou system, in particular, prevents labourers from 
fully integrating into cities. There is a paradox to removing those barriers—that is, 
on the one hand, it is the central government’s responsibility to initiate the necessary 
reforms and, on the other, central and local governments are the ones who must 
practically implement existing policies. In what follows, we suggest some policy 
proposals to solve that dilemma.
The first is to separate public service provision from hukou by introducing more 
inclusive, universal social protection programs. At present, the provision of basic 
social insurance, guaranteed minimum living standards, compulsory education and 
subsidised housing is the responsibility of local governments. That local governments 
provide basic public services in accordance with de facto residence status (living in 
cities for six months or longer) rather than de jure residence status (having local 
hukou) can essentially break the barriers to social mobility.
A second proposal is to strengthen the central government’s responsibility for 
bearing the costs of reform of the hukou system so as to incentivise both levels of 
government in pushing reform forwards. At present, there is a lack of incentive for 
local government in providing equal public services to migrants and in carrying out 
the hukou system reform aimed at legitimising migrants’ residence status.
According to Lu and Cai (2014), the hukou system reform can increase the potential 
growth rate through raising labour supply, creating resource reallocation efficiency 
and expanding consumption, which increase revenues for both central and local 
governments. Those reform dividends, however, cannot be exclusively obtained by 
specific localities while local governments bear almost all the reform-related costs such 
as the expense of incorporating migrants into full coverage of local public services. 
2. TACKLING SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO AVOID THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP
35
Given the hukou system reform has positive externalities to China’s economic 
and social development, the central government taking major responsibility for 
financing the reform is not only the key to breaking the deadlock, but also in line 
with policymaking and institutional logic. 
A third proposal is to transform local governments’ role from promoting GDP 
growth to improving social development by getting the focus right on the public 
finance system. In an era of population ageing, individual cities can undoubtedly 
benefit from attracting incoming, often more productive, residents as long as the 
central government pays the initial costs. 
Further reforms should focus on properly defining the function and boundaries of 
public finance, reasonably dividing revenues and expenditures between central and 
local governments and granting municipal governments the power, responsibility 
and autonomy to provide public services. This way, local governments will have 
appropriate motivation to compete for migrant workers and their families by 
providing better public services. 
The link between local public service provision and labour migration and social 
mobility can be understood in the theoretical framework coined by Tiebout (1956) 
and McGuire (1974). These authors model two corresponding behaviours—that is, 
local governments or communities intentionally attract or expel residents by altering 
the type and magnitude of public goods provision, on the one hand, and potential 
migrants choose where they want to reside in accordance with their preference for 
public goods, on the other. Social mobility—horizontal and vertical—is obviously 
in the utility function of both behaviours. 
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China’s agricultural trade: 
A global comparative 
advantage perspective
Rao Sihang, Liu Xingshuo and Sheng Yu
Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed rapid growth in agricultural production and 
consumption as well as a growing gap between food demand and supply in China. 
This makes the country one of the leading food importers on the global agricultural 
market. Between 1978 and 2018, China’s agricultural output (in terms of real value-
added measure) grew at the rate of 4.7 per cent per annum—far more than the 
population growth rate (1.0 per cent per annum)—helping to stabilise domestic 
food consumption prices (Huang and Rozelle 2018; NBS 2019). However, ongoing 
economic and population growth since then have driven food demand to outpace 
food supply, thus putting great pressure on domestic agricultural production, which 
was already constrained by the limited supply of land and water resources. To resolve 
the emerging conflict between domestic food demand and supply, imports of 
agricultural products from the international market have been increasing over time. 
The increased food imports by China has aroused growing concerns over whether 
China’s demand for food will impact global food security in the future. For instance, 
China’s total food imports in 2018 accounted for less than 2 per cent of its food 
consumption, but this already represented more than 8 per cent of global tradable 
agricultural products. This made China one of the largest importers of agricultural 
products in the world by 2018—second only to the European Union (WTO 
2019). Meanwhile, forecasts suggest China’s food self-sufficiency ratio will decline 
from 98 per cent in 2020 to 93 per cent in 2035, even if agricultural total factor 
productivity (TFP)—an indicator of technological progress—is able to grow at a rate 
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of 2 per cent per annum (CAE 2020). This implies that the volume of agricultural 
products sourced by China from the international market will more than double 
by 2035. Should global food production and trade face more uncertainties caused 
by the outbreak of natural disasters, the impacts of climate change or deteriorating 
international relations, China’s food demand would compete with demands from 
other developing countries, imposing greater pressures on the global food supply.
However, the above concerns could be redundant if global agricultural resources 
were properly exploited based on dynamic comparative advantage. There are more 
than 3.5 billion hectares of land suitable for agriculture throughout the world, but 
only around 1.5 billion hectares are being used effectively (FAO 2020). The majority 
of the spare arable land is in places such as the pan-Amazon region and major 
agricultural countries in Eastern Europe and Africa, and yields below the world 
average. If trade and investment relationships could be rearranged between China 
and the rest of the world based on their comparative competitiveness, the global 
food supply would significantly increase. For instance, the increased agricultural 
trade between China and African countries in recent years has provided economic 
incentives for both parties to increase their investment in agricultural production 
and facilitate the adoption of advanced agricultural technologies (Sheng et al. 2020). 
In this sense, rearranging agricultural trade between China and her trading partners 
could present a win-win strategy for China as well as for the world. 
To demonstrate this point, this chapter utilises global agricultural trade data 
organised by commodity (obtained from FAOSTAT database) to systematically 
analyse agricultural trade between China and the rest of the world and its underlying 
determinants for the period 1978–2018. We first investigate China’s agricultural 
trade patterns and characteristics, before going on to estimate the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) and relative trade advantage (RTA) indices for major 
agricultural commodities, which are categorised into 10 types of crops and seven 
types of livestock products. Then, we compare and analyse the complementarity 
between China and the rest of the world for each category of commodity, with the 
aim of sorting out the potential patterns of agricultural trade. Lastly, we discuss 
how agricultural trade between China and the rest of the world could be rearranged 
to enable better allocation of global resources based on countries’ comparative 
advantage and competitiveness. 
The results show that the existing pattern of agricultural trade between China and 
the rest of the world does not fully reflect these countries’ dynamic comparative 
advantages. In particular, North America’s comparative advantage in agricultural 
commodities has been declining over time compared with the rest of the 
world, although it currently accounts for a large proportion of China’s imports. 
This, combined with the intensified trade friction between China and the United 
States, limits the potential for bilateral agricultural trade. With further increases in 
domestic demand, China is expected to diversify its agricultural imports by turning 
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to potential markets in the developing world—that is, Eastern Europe, South 
America and Africa. Countries in these regions have different advantages in different 
agricultural products, which may enable them to become alternative and reliable 
agricultural trading partners for China in the near future.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two discusses the pattern of 
China’s agricultural trade and its characteristics over the past 40 years. Section three 
provides a measure of the RCA index, the RTA index and overall bilateral 
complementarity (OBC). Section four analyses the comparative and competitive 
advantages of China’s major agricultural products over the past 40 years compared 
with the rest of the world. Section five examines the complementarity by commodity 
between China’s agricultural products and those of the world’s major agricultural 
countries, thus identifying several potential future trade partners, while section 
six concludes. 
China’s agricultural trade from 1978 to 2018
China’s agricultural trade pattern
China’s agricultural trade started to increase in 1978 and has long been used as an 
important means to balance domestic agricultural production and consumption. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the changes in China’s total agricultural imports, exports and net 
trade at current prices for the past 40 years. From 1978 to 2018, China’s agricultural 
trade increased from US$5.45 billion to US$179.4 billion, with an average 
annual growth rate of 9.1 per cent, which was about twice the growth of output 
value (5.3 per  cent per annum) for the same period (Huang and Rozelle 2018). 
Underlying the aggregated agricultural trade, agricultural imports increased from 
US$3.1 billion in 1978 to US$123.3 billion in 2018, with an average growth rate 
of 9.6 per cent per annum, exceeding that of agricultural exports (8.2 per cent per 
annum) over the same period (agricultural exports increased from US$2.4 billion in 
1978 to US$56.1 billion in 2018).
Agricultural imports have grown more quickly than exports, especially in recent 
years, showing China’s growing dependence on the international market to feed 
its own population. While China’s agricultural trade remained in surplus from 
1984 to 2002, its trade deficit in agricultural commodities, which began in 2003, 
has been growing over the past two decades. By 2018, China’s agricultural trade 
deficit reached US$67.2 billion—45 times its agricultural trade deficit in 2003 
(of US$1.5 billion). In addition to the increased net food demand caused by rapid 
population and economic growth, the open-to-trade policy and the decline of China’s 
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relative comparative advantage after its accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) are also considered important drivers of the growing agricultural trade 
deficit (Huang and Rozelle 2018).
This rapid growth in net imports of agricultural products also led to China’s improved 
status in global agricultural trade. Figure 3.2 shows the trend in China’s  share of 
total global agricultural exports and imports between 1978 and 2018. From 1978 
to 2000, China’s share increased with some fluctuation, with the average share of 
imports remaining close to that of exports. However, from 2000, China’s share 
of total global agricultural imports increased sharply, from 2 per cent to 8 per 
cent, before gradually levelling off in recent years. This is in contrast with a more 
modest rise in its share of total global exports (from 3 per cent to about 4 per cent). 



































































Import value Export value Net export value
Figure 3.1 China’s agricultural trade, 1978–2018 (millions of US$)
Source: FAOSTAT database.






















































Import share Export share
Figure 3.2 China’s share of global agricultural exports and imports, 1978–2018 
(per cent)
Source: FAOSTAT database.
The increasing agricultural trade deficit triggered China to intensify support for 
domestic production and enact trade protection policies. Since the late 2000s, 
the average levels of producer support ratios and trade protectionism have been 
increasing in China, contrary to the earlier trend in the 2000s immediately before its 
WTO accession, as well as the trends in many developed and developing countries. 
Both Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
and non-OECD countries have significantly reduced their levels of producer support 
and agricultural protection over the recent decade and have gradually shifted their 
policies towards promoting marketisation and improving the competitiveness of 
their agricultural products. As is shown in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, the average ratio 
of the producer support estimate (PSE) to agricultural output value among OECD 
countries has declined—attributable to the efforts of their governments to adjust the 
structure of domestic production and improve trade competitiveness. The increase 
in domestic support for agricultural production and trade protection in China has, 
to some extent, biased resource reallocation domestically, and could negatively affect 
efforts to improve agricultural comparative advantage and competitiveness. 





























































































































OECD - Total China non-OECD
(a) Ratio of PSE to agricultural output value (b) Nominal protection coefficient (NPC)
Figure 3.3 Production support and trade protection in China, OECD countries 
and non‑OECD countries, 1995–2015
Source: OECD PSE database.
In sum, China’s net imports of agricultural products have been rapidly increasing 
over the past two decades to supplement the shortfall in domestic agricultural 
production. In addition to the increased food demand caused by rapid population 
and economic growth, changes in the relative productivity and competitiveness of 
agricultural production and intensified trade protectionism could also be important 
drivers of China’s agricultural trade deficit.
Changes in agricultural trade patterns by commodity 
and by region
In addition to the characteristics at the aggregate level, agricultural trade in China 
possesses some distinct features according to commodity and region. We attempt to 
summarise some of these characteristics from two perspectives.
First, the commodity structure of agricultural trade has changed substantially over 
the past 40 years. Figure 3.4 depicts the changes in the commodity structure of 
China’s agricultural trade between 1978 and 2018. It is apparent that the increase in 
China’s agricultural trade is concentrated in several types of commodities. For crop 
products, the growth comes mainly from China’s increased exports of fruits and 
vegetables, while the rapid growth in total crop imports is caused mainly by the 
expansion of oil crop imports, including oilseeds and soybeans. For livestock 
products, exports of poultry meat have been growing rapidly since 2000, but China 
has become more dependent on the international market for the supply of dairy and 
other meat products, such as beef and mutton. 
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(a) Crop (exports) (b) Crop (imports)
















































































































































































































Pork Beef Mutton Poultry Eggs Dairy
Figure 3.4 Changes in the structure of China’s agricultural trade, 1978–2018
Source: FAOSTAT database.
However, a closer look at the commodity-level trade data shows that almost all 
products were in deficit in recent years—even those that registered a strong export 
increase such as vegetables and fruits. Figure 3.5 shows the data by commodity for 
China’s exports and imports of major crops and livestock products. On the one 
hand, China was a net exporter of several crop products before the twenty-first 
century, but it has lost its comparative advantage and come to increasingly rely on 
the international market over the past 20 years. On the other hand, for livestock 
products, China remained almost entirely self-sufficient over the first 30  years 
of the reform and opening-up period, before showing a growing dependence on 
international trade in the past 10 years. With further population and economic 
growth, it is foreseeable that Chinese domestic demand for pork, beef, lamb and 
dairy products will continue to grow in the future. By 2018, major agricultural 
products—with the exception of sugar beet, poultry and eggs—were all in trade 
deficit, and this trend is predicted to continue to increase. The rapid growth of 
imports and trade dependence not only reflects the widening gap between domestic 
production and demand, but also indicates that agricultural production is gradually 
losing its comparative advantage in China.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Import value Export value Net export value
Figure 3.5(a) Crops























































































































































































































































































































































































Import value Export value Net export value
Figure 3.5(b) Livestock products
Figure 3.5 Value of China’s imports and exports of major agricultural products, 
1978–2018
Source: FAOSTAT database.
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Second, the regional distribution of China’s agricultural trade has diversified over 
recent years, but it remains unbalanced (Figure 3.6). China’s agricultural exports 
were once concentrated in Asia, but exports to other continents have continued to 
increase over recent years. For instance, in 2018, more than 60 per cent of China’s 
agricultural exports were concentrated in Asia, especially in Japan and South Korea, 
while its exports to non-Asian countries except the United States, although still 
relatively small, have displayed an increasing trend since 2010. In contrast, China’s 
agricultural imports once originated primarily from developed countries; however, 
sources for imports have shown an inclination towards land-rich developing countries 
in recent years. For instance, previously more than half of China’s agricultural 
imports originated from developed countries including the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, but Brazil has grown to become the largest source of 
China’s agricultural imports in recent years. Figure 3.7 reports China’s imports of 
soybeans and beef in thousand metric tonnes by region including countries like 
Australia, the United States, Brazil and Argentina. Given that China has a growing 
demand for land-intensive products, it will show an increasing inclination towards 
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Figure 3.6 Regional distribution of China’s agricultural exports and 
imports, 2018
Source: MoFCOM (various years). 
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Figure 3.7(b) Beef and beef by‑products
Figure 3.7 China’s imports of soybeans and beef, by region 
(thousand metric tonnes)
Source: MoFCOM (various years).
CHINA’S CHALLENGES IN MOVING TOWARDS A HIGH-INCOME ECONOMY
48
In sum, China has significantly increased its agricultural imports over the past 
20  years, partly because of its constrained resource endowments, increased 
production costs and the rapid growth of domestic demand. Such trends will 
continue to increase in the foreseeable future as population and income levels 
continue to grow. To meet China’s growing demand while ensuring global food 
security, it is important to know what China will import and from where these 
increased imports should come. This will therefore require an in-depth analysis of 
the production and trade comparative and competitive advantages of each major 
agricultural product in China (which will determine the trade) compared with the 
rest of the world.
Methodology
According to international trade theory, comparative advantage is the fundamental 
determinant of agricultural trade patterns throughout the world. As one of the 
world’s largest producers and consumers of agricultural products, China should 
rearrange its agricultural trade to reflect its comparative advantages compared with 
the rest of the world, as global agricultural production and consumption change 
over time. To predict China’s future agricultural trade, it is essential to use standard 
approaches to measure and analyse the changes in the comparative advantage and 
international competitiveness of China’s major agricultural products. 
The RCA and RTA indices
In the literature, the most commonly used measures of a country’s trade 
competitiveness are the trade competitiveness index, world market share (WMS), the 
RCA index and the RTA index. Although different indices have different advantages, 
their results are generally mutually consistent when providing a measure of revealed 
comparative and competitive advantages at the commodity level. Based on both the 
availability of data and project length, we chose to use the RCA index and the RTA 
index in this study.
Most previous studies have focused on the competitiveness of either a single 
agricultural product or agricultural products as a whole, while neglecting 
competitiveness analysis according to product between major agricultural countries. 
In this study, we propose to use the RCA and RTA indices to measure and compare 
the changing comparative and competitive advantages for 17 major agricultural 
products in China and its major trading partners. Detailed information on these 
16 agricultural products/product groups are presented in Appendix Table 3.1.
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A standard RCA index takes the form of Equation 3.1, and the corresponding 
relation between the RCA index and the level of trade comparative advantage is 
given in Table 3.1. 
Equation 3.1
RCAij = Xjw / Xwt
Xij / Xit 
In Equation 3.1, Xij is the export value of agricultural product j in country i; Xit is the 
total value of agricultural exports from country i; Xwj is the export value of agricultural 
product j in world trade; and Xwt is the total value of global agricultural exports.
Table 3.1 RCA and the corresponding level of trade comparative advantage
RCA Level of trade comparative advantage
RCA > 2.5 Extremely strong
1.25 ≤ RCA ≤ 2.5 Relatively strong
0.8 ≤ RCA < 1.25 Medium
RCA < 0.8 Relatively weak
While the RCA index provides a good measure of comparative advantage for 
a country based on its exports, the structure of its import demand should also be 
included. To deal with this problem, the RTA index is also introduced. Unlike the 
RCA index, the RTA index fully represents comparative advantage based on the use 
of all resources. In practice, a standard RTA index is defined as in Equation 3.2.
Equation 3.2
RTAij = Xwj / Xwo
Xij / Xio –
Mwj / Mwo
Mij / Mio 
In Equation 3.2, Xij (Mij) is the export (import) value of agricultural product j 
in country i; Xio (Mio) is the total export (import) value of all other agricultural 
products except j in country i; Xwj (Mwj) is the export (import) value of agricultural 
product j in world trade; and Xwo (Mwo) is the total export (import) value of all 
other agricultural products except j in world trade. A positive RTA indicates that 
agricultural product j of country i has a comparative advantage over other countries, 
while a negative RTA indicates no comparative advantage.
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The overall bilateral complementarity index
An analysis of the comparative advantage of China’s agricultural trade over the 
past 40 years can indicate which products China will import. However, it will not 
tell us from where the newly created agricultural trade will come. In particular, if 
the current trading partner cannot fully meet China’s growing demand, it will be 
important to know whether there will be alternative trading partners that could help 
to fill the gap.
In theory, the relationship and cooperation potential between two countries 
(or regions) in the trade of a certain product can be measured by constructing 
a  bilateral trade index. One of the most commonly used measures is overall 
bilateral complementarity (OBC), which is mainly used to analyse the competitive 
or complementary relationship between two countries (or regions) in the trade of 






In Equation 3.3, RTAip and RTAjp represent the RTA indices of product p in country 
(or region) i and j, respectively. A positive OBC index indicates that the covariance 
between the RTA indices of two countries (or regions), i and j, in the trade of 
product p is negative, and that these two countries (or regions) are complementary 
in the trade of product p, with one country at a comparative advantage and the other 
at a comparative disadvantage. On the other hand, a negative OBC means that the 
covariance of RTA indices is positive, which indicates that these two countries (or 
regions) are in a competitive situation in which both have a comparative advantage 
in the international trade of product p. It should be noted that, if one country’s 
comparative disadvantage is worsening while the other is losing its comparative 
advantage, although the signs of the two countries’ RTA indices are not the same 
(that is, the former is negative, while the latter is positive), the two countries are on 
the same trend—that is, the covariance is positive. In this case, although the OBC 
is negative, the two countries are not in a competitive situation, as one of them does 
not have a comparative advantage and the other is losing its competitiveness.
Unlike the RCA and RTA indices, which only calculate the trade advantage at 
a certain point, the OBC reflects the trade of two countries or regions over time. 
Although the changes in comparative advantage over a certain period can be 
represented by the RCA and RTA indices and their changes, the OBC can reflect the 
bilateral trade relations and cooperation potential between two countries or regions 
in a better and more intuitive way.
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Estimation strategy
Based on the proposed approaches, our estimation process consists of three steps. 
First, we used the RCA and RTA indices to measure the changes in the comparative 
and competitive advantages of crops and livestock products at the aggregate level and 
by commodity in China for the past four decades. Second, we identified the major 
producers of each agricultural product in the world, using the criteria that their 
share of global production should total more than 1 per cent, before calculating 
their RTA and RCA indices for the past 20 years (1998–2018). By  comparing 
the RTA and RCA indices in China with the indices of the selected countries, we 
determined China’s comparative advantage in international trade. Third, to identify 
China’s potential trade partners, we selected several countries and regions with 
comparative advantage in different agricultural products and used the OBC to 
check their complementarity with China.
The comparative and competitive advantages 
of China’s agricultural trade and changes 
over time
Changes in comparative and competitive advantages 
in China’s agricultural trade
Using the data on the imports and exports of major crops and livestock products 
in China over the period 1978–2018, we calculate the RCA and RTA indices for 
17 types of agricultural commodities and analyse the comparative and competitive 
advantages of each commodity and their changes over the past 40 years. The estimated 
RCA and RTA indices for the crops and livestock products at the aggregate level and 
by commodity are shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, respectively. 
China had a comparative advantage in producing major crops during the early 
reform period, but this gradually declined after the mid-2000s. As is shown in 
Figure 3.8a, the RCA indices for rice, corn and cotton used to be above 2.5 over 
a certain period before 1991, suggesting there was a strong revealed comparative 
advantage for the production of these three products. For other crop products such 
as oilseeds, soybeans, sugar/sugar beet, vegetables and fruits, the average RCA indices 
were also above 1.25, which implies they held a relative comparative advantage. 
However, the comparative advantages of major crops have gradually declined since 
the late 2000s. As shown in Figure 3.8a, the average RCA indices of nine out of 
10 commodity groups (with the exception of vegetables and fruits) are significantly 
below 0.8, which suggests the comparative advantage for most crops—in particular, 
land-intensive products—has been disappearing.
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Figure 3.8(a) Crops 















































































Figure 3.8(b) Livestock products
Figure 3.8 The RCA index of major agricultural products in China, 1978–2018
Source: Authors’ estimates by using FAOSTAT database.
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Figure 3.9(a) Crops
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Dairy
Figure 3.9(b) Livestock products
Figure 3.9 RTA indices of China’s major agricultural products, 1978–2018
Source: Authors’ estimates by using FAOSTAT database.
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A similar trend change has also been seen in livestock products. As shown in 
Figure 3.8b, China once had a strong comparative advantage in the production of 
pork and eggs (the RCA indices used to be more than 2.5), a moderate comparative 
advantage in poultry meat (the RCA indices were between 1.25 and 2.5) but no 
advantage in beef, lamb and dairy (the RCA index was below 1). However, the 
comparative advantage of the majority of livestock products has been in decline 
over the past 10 years. Apart from poultry and eggs, whose RCA indices are still 
above 1, the RCA indices of other livestock products are significantly below 1.
Figure 3.9 further shows the change in the competitive advantage for China’s major 
agricultural products between 1978 and 2018 using the RTA index. Consistent with 
the comparative advantage analysis, we show that China used to have a competitive 
advantage in trade for almost all agricultural products except wheat, cotton and 
dairy. However, the competitive advantages of major agricultural products have 
gradually declined over time. In the past 10 years, China has had only a relatively 
modest competitive advantage in the trade of sugar beet, fruits, vegetables, poultry 
and eggs, the production of which has been rapidly scaled up and industrialised. 
In sum, China had comparative and competitive advantages in many crop and 
livestock products during the early reform era, going back to the 1980s and the 
1990s. However, its comparative and competitive advantages for most agricultural 
products in the global market have gradually declined over time. For the moment, 
except for sugar beet, vegetables, fruits, poultry and eggs, for most agricultural 
products (in particular, land and resource-intensive products such as coarse grains 
and oilseeds), China has almost no comparative or competitive advantage compared 
with the rest of the world. This, to some extent, reflects the fact that the growth of 
domestic agricultural output (due either to the limited improvement in production 
efficiency or constrained resource supply) has not been able to meet the growth in 
domestic demand caused by rapid population and economic growth. Thus, imports 
of these agricultural products are being used to fill the gap between production 
and consumption. 
Comparing the comparative and competitive advantages 
of major agricultural products across countries
How are the comparative and competitive advantages of major agricultural products 
changing in the rest of the world? Are they also falling over time? To answer this 
question, we further calculate the RCA and RTA indices for major crops and 
livestock products at the aggregate level and by commodity in their major producing 
regions. The purpose of this is to understand which countries or regions have the 
potential to supply the international market with each commodity.
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Cereal crops
Although China’s wheat production never held a comparative or competitive 
advantage during the past four decades, rice and corn production did once possess 
a comparative and competitive advantage, before being gradually lost over the past 
decade. To understand how the world market has changed over time, we measured 
the comparative and competitive advantages of cereal crops in their major producing 
countries throughout the world. Figure 3.10 presents the changes in the RCA and 
RTA indices for other major producing countries and regions from 1998 to 2018, 
compared with China. 
The RCA and RTA indices for rice in China are at a lower level relative to other 
major producing countries, and have been declining over recent years, indicating 
that rice production in China is losing its comparative and competitive advantages. 
Since the domestic demand for rice has decreased and shifted towards high-value/
high-quality products, such a change in the comparative advantage is more likely to 
be caused by production-side factors. There are two possible reasons: one is related 
to increasing production costs, given the dominance of smallholder farms in the 
industry and the rise of labour and land costs in recent years. The other is the 
lack of technological innovation in the rice-processing industry. There are few large 
domestic processing enterprises in China. Indeed, 95 per cent of processors are 
small or medium-sized, and they are suffering from the impact of massive imports 
of cheap rice from neighbouring countries. 
In contrast to the changing trend in China, the comparative and competitive 
advantages of rice production are rising or have continued to be maintained at 
a relatively high level in some other developing countries in South and Southeast 
Asia, including Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, India and Pakistan. Most 
of these countries have a tropical or subtropical monsoon climate and conditions 
amenable to intensive rice cultivation, as well as low economic development and 
an abundant supply of cheap labour. The comparison of the RCA and RTA indices 
of China with those of rice-producing countries/regions shows that South and 
Southeast Asia—especially Cambodia and Pakistan—may possess great potential 
to provide additional supplies of rice to the international market in the near future. 
Although wheat production is gradually increasing in China, it remains an industry 
at a competitive disadvantage compared with the rest of the world. Throughout the 
past two decades, net wheat imports remain at a high level. While the wheat price 
on the international market has been falling due to the recent increase in supply, 
China’s domestic wheat price has continued to increase due to increasing production 
costs. This has exacerbated China’s comparative and competitive disadvantages in 
the international wheat market. 
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Figure 3.10(b) RTA index
Figure 3.10 RCA and RTA indices of cereal crops for China and other major 
producers, 1998–2018
Source: Authors’ estimates by using FAOSTAT database.
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In addition to China, for the moment, Central Asia, North America, Eastern Europe 
and Australia are the world’s four-largest wheat producing/exporting regions. 
Among these regions, the RCA and RTA indices of Kazakhstan and Russia are 
significantly higher than those of the other major producers. With greater potential 
for productivity improvement and the development of spare land, the comparative 
and competitive advantages of wheat production for those countries/regions will 
continue to increase, and they are expected to provide a greater supply of wheat to 
the international market.
As one of the most important feed crops, corn has surpassed rice to become the 
largest cereal crop in China, yet its comparative advantage has diminished in recent 
years. With increasing domestic demand and declining comparative and competitive 
advantages, China is expected to increase its imports of corn in the near future 
due to the rapid expansion of its livestock industry (and its use of corn for feed). 
Based on our estimates of the RCA and RTA indices, South Africa, North America, 
South America and Eastern Europe now possess strong market competitiveness in 
corn production, and South America and Eastern Europe have displayed significant 
growth in their advantages in recent years. In particular, Ukraine, Romania, Brazil 
and Argentina have relatively large advantages in corn trade, which have been on 
the rise in the past 20 years. Therefore, these countries and regions should have great 
potential to increase corn supply to the international market in the future. 
Economic crops
In contrast to cereal crops, economic crops have a relatively higher market value since 
they have a wider range of industrial usages. From the early 1980s, marketisation 
reform gradually changed the enterprise structure of agricultural production in rural 
China, and the proportion of economic crops in total crop output significantly 
increased. However, similar to cereal crops, many economic crops are losing their 
comparative and competitive advantages in the international market. 
Figure 3.11 presents the changes for China in the RCA and RTA indices of six types 
of economic crop, compared with the major producing countries in the rest of the 
world, between 1978 and 2018.
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Figure 3.11(b) RCA II
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Figure 3.11 RCA and RTA indices of economic crops for China and other major 
producers, 1998–2018
Source: Authors’ estimates by using FAOSTAT database.
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Although China used to be one of the largest cotton producers in the world, it has lost 
its comparative advantage in recent decades compared with other major producing 
countries. In the 1980s and the 1990s, China’s demand for cotton increased along 
with the development of its domestic textile industry, providing strong incentives 
for farmers to produce cotton. However, this trend has changed since 2000. Our 
measures of the RCA and RTA indices show that China used to have a comparative 
advantage in cotton production in the past but has shifted to increasing imports 
gradually. As potential suppliers to China, Uzbekistan has a far greater comparative 
advantage, while Kazakhstan, India and Egypt are also important cotton producers. 
With the development of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, there exists great potential 
for future cooperation between China and these countries in the cotton trade.1 
Oilseeds and soybeans are not only important oil crops, but also can be processed to 
make feedstuff. The production of these two crops in China is falling far short of the 
increasing domestic demand, causing a heavy reliance on the international market to 
make up for the shortfall. As an example, soybean production in China has continued 
to decline in recent years, with more than 80 per cent of domestic demand being 
met by the international market (mainly imports from North America). Throughout 
the world, South and North America still dominate the production and supply of 
these two crops. In particular, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, the United 
States and Canada have significant comparative and competitive advantages in the 
international market. Since China–US trade frictions have increased uncertainties 
around future economic cooperation, more attention is being placed on diversifying 
the import markets in South America to cultivate more stable and reliable supplies 
of oil crops. 
Sugar production in China has never had any comparative advantages compared 
with other major global producers, especially as the planting area for sugar crops 
in China has continued to decline due to rising production costs and declining 
international prices over recent years. In contrast, many developing countries—
including Pakistan, Egypt, Thailand and Cuba—have increased their comparative 
advantage in sugar production over the past decade. Given their price advantage 
in the international market, there will be a continuing increase in the sugar supply 
from these countries. 
1 It is noteworthy that, although China’s cotton market has been faced with short supply, cotton imports have 
dropped significantly in recent years. This is partly because the domestic textile industry has shifted in recent years 
to Southeast Asian countries in response to increased labour and material costs. If this trend continues, China’s trade 
dependence on cotton imports will decline in the future.
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Vegetables and fruits are among the few agricultural products in China that still 
hold a moderate comparative advantage, even though their trade has been in deficit 
for the past decade. Over the past 40 years, driven by increasing per capita incomes, 
vegetables and fruits have become indispensable products in the national diet. 
Meanwhile, China’s total and per capita outputs of fruits and vegetables have been 
growing rapidly, with total imports and exports also expanding. The production 
of vegetables and fruits is evenly distributed throughout the world, while the 
diversity of fruits and vegetables in each country due to differences in climate and 
environment is an important factor contributing to the active international trade 
in these products. With the uptick in domestic consumption and the enhancement 
of national awareness about nutrition and health, demand for vegetables and fruits 
in China will inevitably continue to expand, meaning foreign imports will also 
continue to increase and diversify.
Livestock products
Figure 3.12 depicts the changes in the comparative and competitive advantages 
of livestock products in China and the world’s major producers between 1998 
and 2018. At the aggregate level, the comparative and competitive advantages of 
livestock products have declined in China for the past two decades, but the country 
maintains a comparative advantage for some products, such as poultry and eggs.
Pork is the most important livestock product in China, accounting for around 
60 per cent of total meat consumption, yet it has become a disadvantaged industry in 
recent years compared with other producing countries. Although domestic total and 
per capita pork production have been growing, there is still a widening gap between 
domestic production and demand due to the increase in domestic consumption and 
the impact of factors such as breeding costs and food safety. Consequently, Chinese 
pork imports have increased since 2010. In the rest of the world, pork production 
is concentrated mainly in the Americas, including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the United 
States and Canada, and Europe, in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Spain. Among these regions, the comparative and competitive advantages of 
Latin American countries have increased rapidly, alongside Western and Eastern 
Europe’s traditional hold on relatively high comparative and competitive advantages 
in this industry. 






















































































































































































































































1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2018





















































































































































































































































































































1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2018
Figure 3.12(b) RCA II
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Figure 3.12(d) RTA II 
Figure 3.12 RCA and RTA indices of livestock products for China and other 
major producers, 1998–2018
Source: Authors’ estimates by using FAOSTAT database.
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Similar to pork, the production of beef and lamb in China has no comparative or 
competitive advantage compared with the rest of the world. Since 2010, China’s 
beef and lamb imports have entered a stage of explosive growth in recent years. 
Because of constrained domestic production due to high land prices and farming 
costs, the increased demand for beef and lamb in China is expected to depend 
on the international market for supply. The major beef producers in the world are 
Australasia, South Asia, South America and Europe, among which Australia, New 
Zealand, India, Brazil and Argentina have a relatively large comparative advantage. 
For the moment, in China’s imported beef market, the medium and high-end 
products come mainly from Australia and New Zealand, while the medium and low-
end products are supplied mainly by South America. Constrained by the farming 
conditions and production technologies in different countries, this pattern is not 
expected to change much in the near future. As for lamb, China’s total imports grew 
rapidly from 2000. Globally, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
have a strong comparative advantage in trade among the world’s major producers, 
making them suitable lamb suppliers for the international market in the future.
In China’s national dietary structure, poultry meat is second only to pork among 
major meat products and there is a high degree of substitution between the two. 
Among major livestock products, poultry and eggs are the only ones for which 
China still possesses some comparative and competitive advantages and also 
maintains a trade surplus. Although the comparative advantage of poultry and eggs 
in China has also declined over the past two decades, that advantage is still greater 
than for most of the world’s major producers. Apart from China, other net exporters 
of poultry and eggs to the international market include Brazil, Thailand, Poland and 
the Netherlands for poultry, and Turkey and European countries such as Poland and 
the Netherlands for egg products.
China’s dairy production has been at a disadvantage in international trade, and this 
continues to worsen. China lags far behind the major producers in terms of both 
quantity and quality. With the growth of domestic demand for dairy products, the 
deficit has begun to accumulate, and China’s domestic market has become more and 
more dependent on international imports. For the moment, the main suppliers of 
dairy products are Australia, New Zealand and several European countries, including 
France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom, all of which have regional 
advantages and high technological supports; therefore, these countries and regions 
will remain major sources of China’s dairy imports in the future.
In sum, the comparative and competitive advantages of most agricultural products 
in China have been in decline for the past 20 years compared with the rest of the 
world. As well as the United States and European countries, many developing 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have been able to gradually increase 
their comparative and competitive advantages in the production of particular 
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agricultural products. This will increase the potential supply of agricultural products 
to the international market and offer alternative regions for China to source its 
future demand. 
China’s potential trading partners: 
Complementarity analysis
As China’s population and per capita income continue to grow, the coming decade 
will witness further increases in domestic food demand. In addition to increasing 
domestic agricultural productivity, it is inevitable that China will source more of 
its domestic supply from the international market. As has been illustrated in the 
previous sections, both China and the rest of the world will stand to benefit from the 
expansion of China’s agricultural trade if these increases are based on the respective 
countries’ comparative advantage and competitiveness. Thus, in this section, we first 
provide a forecast of food demand by commodity in the near future, and then use 
the OBC index to list potential source countries. 
China’s future net demand for agricultural products
While the comparative advantage of major agricultural products in China has 
declined over the past 20 years, it is still important for China to maintain a relatively 
high level of self-sufficiency in its food supply. There is a belief that, given China’s 
huge population and continuing growth trends, it will be hard for the world to meet 
such a dramatic increase in China’s demand for food imports. As previously noted, 
China currently imports less than 2 per cent of its total food, which accounts for 
more than 8 per cent of global tradable food.
Based on forecasts made by the China Center for Agricultural Policy (CCAP), 
China will continue to maintain a high food self-sufficiency ratio over the next 
decade or two through improvements in agricultural productivity. However, with 
China’s population continuing to grow until 2035, its food self-sufficiency ratio 
may drop from 98 per cent in 2020 to 92–95 per cent in 2035. This implies that 
more than twice the current domestic food demand will need to be sourced from the 
international market in the next two decades.
Table 3.2 compares the self-sufficiency ratio of major agricultural products for 2025, 
2035 and 2050. Although production of and demand for the main cereal crops will 
be roughly balanced domestically, there will be a widening gap between domestic 
demand and supply of most economic crops and livestock products. This, to some 
extent, reflects the shift in domestic food consumption towards high-value and 
high-quality products driven by increasing per capita income. In addition, this 
will be a good way for China to improve the efficiency of resource reallocation by 
importing more agricultural products in which it has relatively low comparative and 
competitive advantages.
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Table 3.2 Self‑sufficiency ratio of China’s major agricultural products in 2025, 
2035 and 2050
Commodities Self‑sufficiency ratio (%)
In 2025 In 2035 In 2050
Rice 98 98 98
Wheat 98 98 98
Maize (corn) 92 82 81
Cotton 74 67 55
Oilseed 87 87 90
Sugar 58 40 22
Vegetables 100 100 100
Fruits 100 100 100
Pork 99 98 98
Beef 85 77 65
Lamb 91 85 75
Poultry 100 99 98
Eggs 100 100 100
Dairy 72 68 60
Source: CCAP forecast based on the ChinaAgro Model.
Based on our estimates of the RCA and RTA indices, China’s major cereal crops, 
including rice, wheat and corn, are gradually losing their comparative advantage. 
However, the self-sufficiency ratios of rice and wheat are predicted to remain above 
98 per cent, as they are top priorities for national development.2 This implies that 
domestic food grain production will be able to roughly meet domestic consumption 
demand, despite the shortage of land resources and rising production costs. 
In  contrast, there will be increasing demand for feed grain (in particular, corn), 
which will need to be sourced from elsewhere as the demand for livestock products 
increases over time. Given that US–China trade frictions have cast doubts on the 
future stability of international cooperation, it is clear that China will seek to 
broaden its import channels to ensure diversified sources of future imports.
Compared with cereal grains, economic crops including cotton, oilseed and sugar 
have more comparative disadvantages. By 2025, about 13 per cent of oilseed, 26 per 
cent of cotton and 42 per cent of sugar demand for the domestic market had to be 
met through imports. Along with the decrease in the self-sufficiency ratios for these 
agricultural products over the coming decade or two, their imports will increase 
substantially due to their relatively lower comparative advantage in China compared 
2  The issue of grain supply is a fundamental and critical issue affecting the national economy and people’s 
livelihood. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), China has established 
a national grain security strategy of ‘giving priority to China, relying on domestic resources, ensuring production 
capacity, with moderate imports and technological supports.’
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with other crop products in China and the rest of the world. This does not include 
soybeans, of which more than 90 per cent are already coming from the international 
market. Nowadays, most of these products are imported from new continental 
countries, such as North and South America and Australia. Yet, the question remains 
whether these regions and countries will continue to increase their supply.
As for livestock products, China’s total imports have soared since 2010, caused 
largely by increased domestic production costs. With the exception of poultry 
and eggs, the production of most livestock products in China is still based on the 
household production system and/or small-scale businesses, which are sensitive to 
land resources, labour prices and feed costs. As a consequence, domestic livestock 
production in China is at a price disadvantage and has lost its competitiveness. 
By 2020, 9 per cent of beef, 10 per cent of lamb and 25 per cent of dairy products 
were coming from the international market, though pork production roughly met 
domestic demand. With increased consumption demand and competition from 
the rest of the world, a greater proportion of feed grain, as well as beef and lamb, 
is expected to come from imports, even if self-sufficiency in pork is maintained. 
Predictions of China’s future agricultural 
trading partners
Given its forecast future food demand structure, China will need to increase its 
imports of high-value and land- and water-intensive agricultural products to free 
up more resources for the production of agricultural products for which China 
possesses a relative comparative advantage. This arrangement can only be achieved 
when other countries are able to supply enough to meet China’s demand. China’s 
existing trading partners are more or less constrained by their potential supply 
capacity (because of limitations in their natural endowment supplies or difficulties 
in the bilateral relationship). Thus, it is necessary for China to identify new 
trading partners, according to their potential (rather than real) complementarity in 
agricultural production with China.3
In this sense, we are most interested in analysing the trade potential between China 
and land-abundant developing countries. This is because these countries have great 
potential to increase agricultural output due to the availability of spare land and 
other agricultural resources, although they are yet to use them effectively due to a lack 
of economic investment and technological support. Therefore, if the comparative 
advantage of these countries in agricultural products complements China’s future 
imports, the potential of increased agricultural exports to China will bring economic 
incentives to scale up and industrialise their agricultural production, thus increasing 
global agricultural output and contributing to global food security.
3  The potential complementarity between two countries was interpreted based on their OBC coefficient as well 
as their RTA changing trends.
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Figure 3.13(a) shows the complementarity between China and major producing 
countries and regions for the three major cereal crops. As for the maize market, 
the OBC index for corn between South America, Eastern Europe and China was 
enhanced between 2012 and 2018, as their comparative advantage in corn production 
increased. In particular, Argentina and Russia have shown great potential for providing 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.13(b) Economic crops 















































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.13(c) Livestock products
Figure 3.13 OBC coefficients for agricultural commodities between China 
and the world’s major producers, 2012–18
Source: Authors’ estimates by using FAOSTAT database.
Compared with food crops, the self-sufficiency rate for economic crops in China is 
much lower. Imports of cotton, oilseeds and sugar crops have been rising sharply 
over the past decade, due to high domestic production costs and international 
competition. In the foreseeable future, trade dependence on these three products 
will continue to rise.
Figure 3.13(b) shows the complementarity for economic crops between China and 
other trade-advantaged countries and regions for the period 2012–18. First, among 
the world’s major cotton exporters, the comparative advantages of South America, 
North America and Central Asia in the cotton trade have increased significantly. 
In particular, developing countries such as Brazil and Kazakhstan are alternatives for 
China’s cotton product imports. Second, for soybeans, the OBC coefficient between 
China and South America is positive. This suggests the comparative advantage of 
oil crops in South America may have more complementarity in agricultural trade 
with China. Third, sugar imports for China, which are influenced heavily by 
domestic policies, have increased with some cyclical fluctuation over time. Among 
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major exporters, Thailand shows high complementarity with China. Thus, if the 
sugar trade is dominated by market behaviour in the future, Thailand could be 
a promising alternative to Cuba.
As for trade in livestock products, China’s imports (in particular, of beef, lamb 
and dairy products) currently come primarily from Australia, Europe and North 
America. However, our estimates of the OBC coefficients for these three products 
show that some developing countries in South Asia, North America, South America 
and Europe also have strong capacity to supply those products (Figure 3.13[c]). 
In particular, as the comparative advantage of the United States has decreased in 
recent years, the comparative advantage of countries in South Asia, South America, 
Africa and Australia has been increasing. Therefore, these countries could become 
new sources for China of livestock products, especially given the current trade 
tensions between China and the United States. Specifically, while medium-range 
to high-end meat and dairy products will come mainly from traditional trading 
partners including developed countries like Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and Germany, developing countries in South Asia, South America and 
Africa, including India, Brazil and Argentina, will be able to supply China with low-
end to medium-range products. With growing export advantages, these countries 
will be suitable future sources of livestock imports for China. 
Conclusions
Using global commodity-level agricultural trade data for the period 1978–2018, 
this chapter systematically examines the comparative and competitive advantages 
of crop and livestock products at the aggregate level and by commodity in China 
and changes over time. In addition, we investigate the potential production 
complementarities that exist between China and its potential suppliers of each 
product. The results indicate that the comparative and competitive advantages of 
major agricultural products in China have declined rapidly in recent years, making 
China (with its increasing demand) an important food importer on the international 
market. In addition to relying on existing trading partners, China needs to explore 
the potential supply of particular agricultural products from developing countries 
with increased comparative advantages. Based on relative comparative advantages, 
this newly created agricultural trade will help not only to improve the welfare of 
China and its trading partners, but also to ensure global food security by boosting 
global food production. 
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At the commodity level, we show that many developing and developed countries 
have high levels of complementarity with China in the bilateral trade of feed 
grains, oil crops and other agricultural products, including developing countries 
in Eastern Europe, South America and Africa. These countries have different 
advantages in agricultural production, holding the potential to become alternative 
and reliable agricultural trading partners for China in the future. Properly increasing 
China’s agricultural trade with the rest of the world, based on comparative advantage 
and competitiveness, will not only help to alleviate domestic pressure on relatively 
scarce agricultural and ecological resources, but also provide the world with 
economic incentives to increase its agricultural production, and thus contribute to 
global food security. 
Appendix Table 3.1 Trade and production data of agricultural commodities
Commodities Code






















Total agricultural products 1882 /
/ = no data about certain commodities in original database
Source: FAOSTAT database.
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China’s urbanisation in the new 
technological revolution
Wang Wei, Deng Yusong, Shao Ting, Wang Ruimin,  
Niu Sanyuan and Liu Xin 
By the end of 2019, China’s urbanisation rate had reached 60.6 per cent, indicating 
its entrance into the mid-to-late stage of urbanisation. Facing the future, China must 
grasp the vast opportunities to promote urbanisation along a healthy trajectory, 
clarifying its driving mechanisms, studying new trends and characteristics and 
properly responding to existing risks and challenges.
The process of China’s urbanisation
China’s urbanisation development model is endogenous to its economic development 
path and the transformations of its industrial structure. Under the strategy of giving 
priority to the development of heavy industry during the planned-economy period, 
China’s urbanisation experienced a rapid process of industrialisation, resulting in 
a large number of industrial cities. Nevertheless, urbanisation at this stage was 
constrained by some institutional mechanisms, preventing it from enjoying the 
benefits from the global third technological revolution after World War II. Since the 
period of reform and opening up and with the establishment and improvement of 
the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, the economy has been 
integrated into the global economic system and has developed rapidly. Cities in 
China have come to make full use of the diffusion and spillover effects of foreign 
advanced technologies to transform and upgrade their industrial structure.
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The tortuous development stage of urbanisation, 
1949–1978
When the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, China’s urban population was 
57.65 million, accounting for 10.6 per cent of the country’s total population. 
From 1949 to 1957, due to the strategy of prioritising the development of heavy 
industry, many cities were built and expanded around 694 key industrial projects. 
In 1958, the Great Leap Forward campaign triggered the migration of large numbers 
of rural people to China’s cities. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s economic 
and social development were severely disrupted and the urbanisation process was 
reversed (Figure 4.1). At this stage, the process of urbanisation mainly revolved 
around the geographic distribution of major industries, especially the location of 
key national defence projects. Population size and industrial structure were subject 
to strict controls by the central planning system. Cities were regarded mainly as 
administrative centres, and their importance for economic growth and social 
governance was neglected.
Figure 4.1 Changes in China’s urbanisation rate, 1949–1978
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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The smooth start of urbanisation, 1978–2000
From 1978 to 1984, China adopted a new development mode of ‘strictly controlling 
the expansion of large cities, encouraging the growth of small cities and developing 
rural towns’ (State Infrastruction Commission of the People’s Republic of China 
1980). The growth of township enterprises promoted urbanisation by encouraging 
peasants to leave their farms and work in factories in towns. In 1984, the reform 
of China’s urban economic system was initiated. Many villages were transformed 
into towns, and large segments of the rural population moved into small towns. 
After Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’ in 1992 and the socialist market economy 
reforms in 1994, China began to implement urban-driven regional development 
and a ‘coastal city first’ development strategy. From 1990 to 2000, the number of 
cities rose from 467 to 663, the urban population increased from 300 million to 
460 million and the urbanisation rate increased from 26.4 per  cent to 36.2 per 
cent (Figure 4.2). At this stage, advanced economies in the world had successively 
entered the era of comprehensive informatisation, and China also seized the huge 
industrial development potential brought about by this revolution in information 
technology. Using its advantages in low labour and land costs in coastal areas, China 
took the lead to develop related industries, and the electronic information industry 
quickly became important in many coastal cities.
Figure 4.2 Changes in China’s urbanisation rate, 1978–2000
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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The rapid development stage of urbanisation, 2000–2011
After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, it rapidly 
developed  into an important global manufacturing base, accelerating its 
urbanisation process. Between 2000 and 2011, China’s urbanisation rate increased 
from 30.89 per cent to 51.27 per cent—the fastest period of urbanisation witnessed 
during the 40  years of reform and opening up (Figure 4.3). Referring to the 
urbanisation model, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan in 2011 proposed that China ‘rely 
on large cities and focus on small and medium-sized cities to gradually form urban 
clusters with large radiation effects’. With the deep integration of China’s industrial 
development into the international division of labour and participation in global 
market competition, the focus of industrial policy shifted to comprehensively 
supporting technology and product upgrades in capital-intensive industries, 
nurturing technology-intensive industries and continuing to expand the scope of 
opening up. The proportion of tertiary industries steadily increased from 39.8 per 
cent to 45.5 per cent, surpassing secondary industries for the first time (Figure 4.4). 
The process of urbanisation and the upgrading of the industrial structure progressed 
synchronously, and the quality of urbanisation gradually improved.
Figure 4.3 Changes in China’s urbanisation rate, 2001–2011
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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Figure 4.4 Changes in China’s industrial structure, 2001–2011
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
New urbanisation development stage, from 2012
Since the Eighteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 
China’s economic and social development have entered a new era. The Central 
Urbanisation Work Conference held on 12 December 2013 proposed following the 
new urbanisation path characterised by intensive, intelligent, green and low-carbon 
development. Significant breakthroughs have been made in the construction of pilot 
free-trade zones and the opening up of inland border areas. A number of central 
inland regional cities—such as Chongqing, Chengdu, Wuhan and Zhengzhou—
have entered a period of rapid growth. In 2013, China proposed the Belt and 
Road Initiative to further expand its economic axis and development corridors and 
become a new driving force for urbanisation. In 2016, the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan proposed ‘taking urban agglomerations as the main form’ of urbanisation and 
accelerating their construction and development. China’s urbanisation rate increased 
from 52.6 per cent in 2012 to 60.6 per cent in 2019 (Figure 4.5). A new round of 
global technological change has been accelerating, and a series of new technologies, 
industries and models has emerged in China. The proportion of tertiary industries 
rose from 45.5 per cent to 53.9 per cent, showing that China’s urbanisation has 
entered a new pattern dominated by service industry development (Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.5 Changes in China’s urbanisation rate, 2012–2019
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
Figure 4.6 Changes in China’s industrial structure, 2012–2019
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
4. CHINA’S URBANISATION IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
81
China’s urbanisation achievements
The urbanisation level is steadily increasing
During the 40 years of reform and opening up, China’s urbanisation level increased 
rapidly. From 1978 to 2019, the urbanisation rate increased from 17.9 per cent to 
60.6 per cent, and the total urban population reached 848 million (Figure 4.7). 
The  urban area of Chinese cities increased from 178,100 sq km in 2008 to 
208,900 sq km in 2018, while the built-up area increased from 30,400 sq km in 
2004 to 58,500 sq km in 2018 (Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.7 Urban population and urbanisation rate in China, 1949–2018
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
Continuous optimisation of urban patterns
The number and scale of Chinese cities have expanded rapidly. At the end of 2017, 
there were 14 cities with a registered household population of more than 5 million, 
16 cities with a population of 3–5 million and 219 cities with a population of 
0.5–3  million (Figure 4.9). The urbanisation pattern has been continuously 
optimised and the construction of the three major urban agglomerations—Beijing–
Tianjin–Hebei, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta—has accelerated. 
The ‘19 + 2’1 urban agglomeration pattern was formed and has developed steadily. 
1  The ‘19 + 2’ urban agglomerations are: Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Shandong 
Peninsula, West of the Taiwan Strait, Harbin–Changchun, Southeastern Liaoning, Central China, Middle of the Yangtze 
River, Chengdu–Chongqing, Guanzhong Plain, Beibu Gulf, Middle Shanxi, Hohhot–Baotou–Erdos–Yuzhong, Middle 
Guizhou, Middle Yunnan, Lanzhou–Xining, Ningxia, North Mount Tianshan, as well as Lhasa and Kashgar.
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In 2016, the abovementioned three most influential urban agglomerations were 
home to 18 per cent of the population on 2.8 per cent of the country’s land area, 
and produced 36 per cent of national gross domestic product (GDP).
Figure 4.8 Urban and built‑up areas in China, 2004–2019
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
Figure 4.9 Number of China’s prefecture‑level cities, 2000–2019
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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The comprehensive competitiveness of China’s cities 
has increased significantly
After 70 years of urbanisation, China’s urban economy has continued to expand. 
The urban industrial structure has been continuously optimised, while overall 
competitiveness has increased significantly. In the Global Urban Competitiveness 
Report for 2019–20, jointly released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and 
the United Nations Human Settlement Program (CASS and UN-Habitat 2019), 
103 of the 291 cities in China ranked higher than previously for competitiveness. 
Among them, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing and Guangzhou entered 
the world’s top-20 competitive cities.
The appearance of cities and residents’ lives have 
improved rapidly
Figure 4.10 Changes in China’s urban per capita housing area, 1978–2019
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
With the advancement of urbanisation, shortages of public services and infrastructure 
such as urban water, power and gas supplies, drainage, sewerage and garbage 
disposal have been greatly alleviated, and residents’ travel and living conditions have 
been greatly improved. In 2017, the area of country’s urban road network reached 
7.89 billion m2. By the end of 2018, 35 cities had established rail transit networks, 
operating 185 lines, with a total length of 5,761.4 km. At the end of 2017, the 
urban water supply penetration rate was 98.3 per cent, the gas penetration rate 
was 96.3 per cent, the sewage treatment rate reached 95.5 per cent, the domestic 
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garbage treatment rate reached 99.0 per cent and the treatment rate of sewage was 
97.7 per cent. In 2018, China’s urban average per capita housing area reached 39 
square metres, on top of a 3.7-fold increase between 1949 and 1978 (Figure 4.10).
Continuous improvements in urban public services 
and governance systems
Today, China has essentially established a sustainable social insurance system 
with wide coverage and basic guarantees. Health and other urban public services 
have been continuously improved, while the process of guaranteeing more equal 
access to basic public services has been steadily advancing. The number of urban 
residents participating in pension insurance increased from 57.1 million in 1989 
to 435 million in 2019, and the number of people participating in basic medical 
insurance likewise increased, from 42.9 million in 2007 to more than 1 billion in 
2019 (Figure 4.11). Many cities in China are in the process of establishing cross-
department, cross-industry and cross-regional-government information-sharing 
and business collaboration, accelerating the modernisation of urban governance.
Figure 4.11 The number of Chinese urban residents participating in pension 
insurance and basic medical insurance, 1989–2019
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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The new industrial structure is dominated by the 
service industry
With reference to the changes in the industrial structure of developed economies at 
different stages of development, the value added of tertiary industry in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France has come to account for more than 70 per 
cent of their respective GDP. On the other hand, advanced manufacturing in 
Germany and Japan developed well, and their proportion of secondary industry 
is significantly higher than that of other advanced economies. In 2019, the service 
industry accounted for 53.9 per cent of GDP in China, indicating it is the primary 
leader of the country’s urbanisation. It is expected that the value added of China’s 
tertiary industry in 2020, 2035 and 2050 will increase to 55.3 per cent, 63 per cent 
and 70 per cent of GDP, respectively. Overall, the process of urbanisation from 
2020 to 2050 will see China’s industrial structure undergo major adjustments and 
transformations. The potential for tertiary industry development is still large, while 
primary and secondary industries will continue their downward trend. A new type 
of industrial structure characterised by producer services and the integration of 
primary, secondary and tertiary industries will be gradually stabilised.
The impact of the new technological revolution 
on China’s urbanisation
The new technological revolution and high-quality development of China’s 
economy are highly intertwined and can provide major opportunities for ongoing 
urbanisation. This will not only effect the degree and speed of urbanisation, 
accelerating the development of metropolitan areas and urban agglomerations, but 
it will also improve levels of urban governance, gradually narrowing the gap both 
between regions and between urban and rural areas, while simultaneously promoting 
high-quality development.
Providing impetus for high‑quality urbanisation
The main mechanism by which the new technological revolution will impact the 
high-quality development of cities will be the development of new production factors 
and industries, as well as the promotion of high-tech industries and productive 
services. Judged according to the current fields of application, digital technologies 
typified by big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence and so on have already 
been put into large-scale commercial use. Additionally, smart manufacturing, new-
energy vehicles, smart cities and mobile phone technology have rapidly multiplied 
and become new economic engines. The use of modern logistics and information 
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and other technologies can further reduce the cost of urban–rural exchanges and 
promote the transfer of technology to the countryside, thereby improving agricultural 
productivity and efficiency, which is conducive to the continued transfer of rural 
surplus labour to the city.
Shenzhen is a typical example of high-quality urbanisation driven by the technological 
revolution. In 2019, Shenzhen was awarded approximately 12,000 patents from the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)—the highest ranking in China. According to the 
Report on High-Quality Development of Chinese Cities in 2020, published by the 21st 
Century Economic Research Institute (2020), Shenzhen also ranks as the top city for 
high-quality development in China. Shenzhen has provided strong financial support 
for technological innovation, successfully aggregating technological industries and 
related employment. Another example is the Yangtze River Economic Belt urban 
agglomeration. An empirical study by Yang and Yang (2019) used indicators such 
as economic vitality, innovation efficiency, green development, people’s quality of 
life and social harmony to show how the level of high-quality development in the 
Yangtze River Economic Belt has improved significantly. In terms of driving factors, 
technological innovation can significantly improve the level of a city’s high-quality 
development, and it has a significantly higher promotional effect than other factors. 
Moreover, there is also an overlay effect for the urban clusters in the lower reaches of 
the Yangtze River where development quality is already high.
Promoting low‑carbon, green and sustainable 
urban development modes
The new technological revolution is leading the low-carbon and green development 
of Chinese cities through industrial restructuring, which enhances the position of 
Chinese cities in the global value chain and industrial division of labour. Information 
technology and manufacturing are deeply integrated. Big data are generated through 
intelligent manufacturing. By changing the relative combination of production 
factors, the global industrial chain and division of labour will also be shifted. 
Second, the new technological revolution improves labour productivity and energy 
factor inputs. Reductions in carbon emissions in a single city are achieved without 
simply transferring high-emission industries to other cities, but by improving labour 
productivity and energy factor inputs through technological progress. Third, the new 
technological revolution changes the original production mode, which was extensive 
in scale but lacking in customisability. Intelligent, incremental manufacturing and 
other technologies can help realise customisation by incorporating user needs 
into production. Finally, the concept of green transportation will reshape citizens’ 
behaviour. New transportation modes such as electric vehicles, the Internet of 
Vehicles and share-bicycles significantly lower the carbon emissions from urban 
transportation systems.
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Empirical studies show that, during China’s rapid urbanisation, industrial upgrading 
and rising incomes contributed to lower energy intensity in all regions (World Bank 
2007). The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC 2017) estimated that 
non–fossil fuels will account for 35 per cent of primary energy generation in China 
by 2050, and carbon emission intensity will fall to 18 per cent of 2010 levels. 
Innovation in energy technology will see the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) of 
photovoltaic power and wind power drop by 71 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively 
(Chen 2018). For example, the Xiong’an New Area has created a zero-carbon smart 
green-energy system and recently achieved ‘carbon neutrality’. This was realised 
by taking advantage of its own geothermal energy and fully adopting technology 
systems such as multiple energy coordination, source–network–load–storage 
coordination, as well as centralised and distributed coordination via the energy 
internet. It is expected that zero carbon emissions can be achieved in the Xiong’an 
New Area through full reliance on renewable energies after 2040 (Guo and Gao 
2018). New-energy electric vehicles (EVs) are the main breakthrough for China’s 
automobile industry to overtake. Since 2014, the EV industry in China has reached 
sales of more than 1 million, ranking it first in the world (Chen 2009; Zhou 2018). 
According to Zheng et al. (2019), from 2011 to 2017, the top-five provinces for 
EV sales had reduced their carbon emissions by 612,000 tonnes (combined total).
Promoting the industrial and population 
capacities of cities
Most of the new types of businesses represented by the digital economy are located 
in large cities. They have become places of high efficiency, high concentrations of job 
opportunities, platform economies and innovative enterprises—all of which bring 
challenges to the capacities of cities. The new technological revolution has brought 
about continued improvements in metropolitan transportation systems: first, by 
replacing traditional radial modes of expansion of central and peripheral areas of 
a city. Interconnection and interoperability help to accelerate the co-urbanisation 
of metropolitan areas. Second, traffic congestion in large cities is eased, significantly 
increasing their population carrying capacity, thus making better use of the scale 
and density effects of population agglomeration. Third, the complementary effects 
of the functional division and spatial allocation of labour and other resources 
within the city are maximised, promoting the coordinated development of industry 
(Liu 2001).
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Figure 4.12(a) The spatial expansion 
of Shanghai City, 1991
Source: School of Transportation Engineering, 
Tongji University.
Figure 4.12(b) The spatial expansion 
of Shanghai City, 2000
Source: School of Transportation Engineering, 
Tongji University.
Figure 4.12(c) The spatial expansion 
of Shanghai City, 2015
Source: School of Transportation Engineering, 
Tongji University.
Taking Shanghai as an example, 
from 1990 to 2015, the amount of 
urban construction land increased 
by more than 1,500 sq km, and more 
than RMB1 trillion was invested in 
the construction of a comprehensive 
transportation system including hubs, 
highways, expressways and rail transit, 
to meet the transportation demands 
of expanding production activities 
(Figure 4.12). Urban residents’ average 
daily travel increased from 4.5 km 
in 1995 to 6.9 km in 2014—a  rise 
of more than 50 per cent (School of 
Transportation Engineering 2019). 
This increase indicates that residents 
have accessed more employment 
opportunities and more public services 
over a larger area. For example, Deng 
(2015) indicated that the Guangzhou–
Zhuhai intercity rail improved the 
spatial agglomeration rate of primary 
and secondary industries by 20 per cent 
because they were particularly reliant on 
physical transportation. The increase in 
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the population density of cities is as high as 2,246 people per sq km. It can be 
seen that intercity rail transit plays a very important role in promoting the overall 
development of urban agglomerations.
Improving the capacity of urban governance
Since the beginning of the reform and opening-up period, China’s urban 
governance has undergone a transition from governments having overall control 
of the allocation of resources, through the planned economy to the application of 
institutional innovation and advanced technologies. The widespread application of 
digital and smart technologies in cities has promoted changes in urban management 
and improved the supply and efficiency of public services.
Let us take Hebi City, Henan Province, as an example. As a prefecture-level city 
in central China, Hebi is socioeconomically small compared with developed cities 
in the Yangtze and Pearl river deltas, and it lags on various economic indicators. 
However, with the local government’s emphasis on the modernisation of urban 
governance and the construction of ‘smart Hebi’ and other digital government 
projects, the city’s telecommunications business has grown rapidly and stimulated 
the development of thriving tertiary industries. The public’s satisfaction with their 
participation in governance, levels of online services, emergency response times 
and public safety has reached above 88 per cent (Niu 2017). In addition, urban 
governance models such as ‘grid management’ have been successfully explored in 
many parts of China. As of 2012, more than 90 cities had adopted or were in the 
process of implementing grid management.
Resolving inequalities in the process 
of urbanisation
According to the ‘China Comprehensive Social Survey 2008 to 2015’, China’s 
inequality of opportunity index fell from 0.254 in 2008 to 0.176 in 2015 (Li 2019: 
Figure 4.13). However, from a global perspective, the impact of China’s inequality 
of opportunity on income inequality is still relatively high, and the rural inequality 
of opportunity index (0.1738 in 2015) remained higher than that of urban areas 
(0.0805 in 2015). There are obvious differences in environmental factors (gender, 
place of birth, social status of father, and so on) between urban and rural areas that 
result in inequality of opportunity. The inequality of opportunity caused by unequal 
access to education has decreased significantly in rural areas, but it is still higher 
than in urban areas.
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Figure 4.13 China’s income inequality index and the proportion of inequality 
of opportunity
Source: Li (2019).
The new technological revolution will help close the urban–rural inequality gap 
in several ways. First, advances in agricultural technology (related to animal 
breeding, fertiliser use, irrigation, and so on) have a direct effect on increasing 
agricultural output and rural residents’ incomes. The adoption of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) such as mobile devices can also lower transaction 
costs, increasing market opportunities for the rural population (World Bank 2019). 
Second, significant improvements in rural education and investment in human 
capital will reduce the urban–rural income gap (Wang and Fan 2005). Finally, the 
revolution in information technology and the resulting changes to business and 
social security models will help boost rural economies (Picot and Lorenz 2010). 
The internet has a significant blocking effect on the income gap between urban and 
rural residents in China (Guo and Zhang 2019), of which inclusive digital finance 
is a very good example (Jia 2019).
However, various problems of inequality and imbalance may eventually become 
even more prominent. First, the extent to which technological changes can promote 
industry differs between cities, and the populations of unsuccessful cities will likely 
decrease rapidly. Second, the manufacturing industry is still an important sector 
for absorbing employment in China’s central and western regions. In the short and 
medium terms, these regions may continue to suffer from the income-damaging 
effects of industrial transformation and face competition from emerging countries 
in Southeast Asia and Africa when undertaking industrial transfers from eastern 
China. The income gap between China’s western and eastern regions may thus 
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be widened. Finally, repetitive or low-skill work will be replaced with automation 
technologies. Due to the polarisation of service industry incomes, increases in 
market concentration and an increase in income gaps within large companies 
brought about by the technological revolution, income inequality within cities may 
be exacerbated in the short term.
The trend and outlook for China’s urbanisation
China has now entered the late stage of its urbanisation acceleration period. 
According to general development laws, the leading industries driving urbanisation 
will shift to those in the service sector. Metropolitan areas will become the main 
spaces for population agglomeration, and population migration will gradually shift 
from rural–urban to intercity migration. Urban development will shift from rapid 
quantitative expansion to high-quality development. From the perspective of the 
macro-socioeconomic landscape, China will enter the ranks of upper-middle-income 
countries by 2035. Its economic, social and industrial structures will experience 
major changes, entering the high-quality development stage driven by service 
industries and led by consumption. China’s road to urbanisation will be marked 
by improved quality and efficiency, scientific development models, continuous 
optimisation of urban systems and modernisation of governance systems.
The general trend of urbanisation between 2020 
and 2050
By 2019, the urbanisation rate in China reached 60.6 per cent—higher than 
previous estimates by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). International 
experience shows that when countries achieve middle-income status, urbanisation 
rates will reach approximately 50 per cent, while all high-income countries 
display urbanisation rates above 70 per cent. According to our forecast, China’s 
urbanisation rate will reach 72.4 per cent in 2035 and its per capita GDP will reach 
US$36,000 (World Bank, DRC and People’s Republic of China 2014). Morgan 
Stanley’s The Rise of China’s Super-Cities: New Era of Urbanisation report predicted 
that China’s urbanisation rate would reach 75 per cent by 2030. At the stage of high-
quality and high-income development, China’s economic and industrial structures 
will be more balanced and effective, innovation will play a more important role as 
a driver of development and the mechanism for urban agglomeration—in which 
large and small and medium-sized cities develop synergistically—will become more 
formalised.
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China’s urbanisation has entered a stage focused on the 
pursuit of high‑quality development
Ray M. Northam (1979) showed that the urbanisation process could be summarised 
as a slightly flattened S-shaped curve. He took a rate of above 70 per cent as the 
indicator of the terminal stage of urbanisation (Table 4.1), while arguing that 
when the urbanisation rate exceeds 70 per cent, economic development will be 
dominated by tertiary and knowledge-intensive high-tech industries. Population 
growth will shift to a ‘low birth rate and low mortality rate’ pattern, the population 
growth rate will stabilise and differences between urban and rural areas will become 
smaller. According to the experiences of developed countries, the main driver of the 
terminal stage of urbanisation is the third technological revolution, represented by 
information technology, and globalisation. The information technology revolution 
then magnifies the differences between regions within a country and enterprises 
allocate resources and organise production nationally according to these differences. 
At this stage, there will be new divisions of production between cities.
At China’s current stage of urbanisation, the competitiveness of cities and the 
vitality of their leading industries increasingly depend on the advantages acquired 
by the development of education, scientific research and institutional mechanisms, 
while the traditional advantages of geography and natural resources have already 
been relatively weakened. The various systems and policies of the city have taken 
basic shape and urban management has increasingly become subject to legal and 
standardised processes, making adjustment and reform difficult. For example, 
Zhao et al. (2015) compared the level of innovation in Shenzhen and Shanghai 
and found that, although Shanghai has more abundant educational resources, 
greater investment in social research and development and economic aggregates, 
Shenzhen is better than Shanghai in terms of patent output, the performance of 
strategic emerging industry development and innovative enterprise development. 
The main reasons for these differences are that Shenzhen has a better commercial 
atmosphere, a higher degree of marketisation, a more complete industrial support 
system, a more innovative and business-friendly financial system and more inclusive 
cultural environment. Therefore, in the late stage of urbanisation in China, more 
intensive institutional reforms are needed to further enhance cities’ competitiveness 
and industrial vitality.
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of and problems with the three stages of urbanisation
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China’s urbanisation development prospects
At present, China’s urbanisation has entered the new era of its development, and 
2020–50 will be a crucial period. In the first half of urbanisation, the development 
of cities was focused chiefly on growth rates. However, with the transformation 
and upgrading of urban industries, cities will in future focus on the requirements 
for high-quality development, including improving the quality and efficiency of 
urbanisation and forming a low-carbon, green and efficient urban development 
model, while continuing to modernise urban governance.
Urbanisation quality and efficiency have 
improved significantly
The new technological revolution will improve the quality and efficiency of 
development of Chinese cities. Cities with an economy of scale and complete 
infrastructure will attract innovative elements such as technology, knowledge, human 
talent and funds. Relying on a city’s huge consumer market, industry can smoothly 
shift from labour intensive to knowledge and technology intensive, thus enhancing 
regional economic vitality. A number of new industries, enterprises and products 
will emerge and effectively guarantee the long-term competitiveness of the city.
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The urban development model is more scientific 
and reasonable
By 2050, China’s urban spatial resources will likely be better utilised, urban planning 
will be more refined and the urban environment more liveable. Cities will no longer 
blindly expand in size or rely on land transfers to promote urban construction. In the 
future, the development of Chinese cities will ideally be focused on social, economic 
and ecological quality. City managers should also be more focused on guiding urban 
spatial planning, maintaining a reasonable and moderate development intensity and 
sustaining harmony between humans and nature. They should establish a sustainable 
investment and financing model and the focus of investment will have to shift to 
enhancing the city’s overall competitiveness and meeting a higher level of residents’ 
needs. The investment and financing system will be market-oriented and use policy 
funds such as local bonds, local fiscal revenue and development finance to attract 
social capital.
Continuous optimisation of urban systems and patterns
From 2020 to 2050, the main body of spatial development will be urban 
agglomerations, and the effect of the coordinated development of large, medium and 
small cities will be fully manifest. By 2050, China’s three major urban agglomerations 
are expected to be home to 30 per cent of the population and generate more than 
60 per cent of GDP. At the same time, in areas where resources and environmental 
carrying capacities are stronger—such as Chengdu–Chongqing, the Central Plain 
and the middle reaches of the Yangtze River in China’s west and centre, as well as 
Harbin–Changchun in the north-east—several urban agglomerations will have been 
cultivated to promote a balance between population and economic distribution. 
It  is estimated that, by 2050, China’s 19 urban agglomerations will attract more 
than 80 per cent of the country’s urban population and occupy about 65 per cent of 
the country’s urban construction land.
The modernisation level of the urban governance system 
is improved
Deep integration of the internet, big data, artificial intelligence and other 
technologies with urban governance systems can greatly improve China’s urban 
management, improve the intelligence, convenience and proximity of public 
services and effectively resolve various ‘urban diseases’. City management centres 
will encourage more citizens to participate in urban management and community 
self-governance activities. Social security, education, medical care and infrastructure 
will be further improved.
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Strategic choices to promote high‑quality 
development of Chinese cities
According to the ‘three-step’ deployment proposed at the Nineteenth National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, a ‘well-off society’ will be built by 2020, 
socialist modernisation will have been achieved by 2035 and a modernised socialist 
country will have been established by 2050. In the next stage of urbanisation, China 
must establish goals of high-efficiency, low-carbon, green and inclusive development 
for industry, socioeconomic systems, markets and technology to construct a new 
path of urbanisation. The development and application of new technological 
innovation represent a new opportunity for China, while the potential of its huge 
domestic market and the institutional dividend brought about by new rounds of 
reform and opening up are unique driving mechanisms of urbanisation.
Strengthening the supporting effect 
of industries
At the end of 2018, the added value of China’s service industry accounted for 
only 53.3 per cent of GDP, which was still far below the average level of 74 per 
cent for developed countries. The service industry is the largest contributor to 
employment. In the process of urbanisation, population agglomeration, changes 
in lifestyle and improvements in living standards will serve to expand the demand 
for consumer services. The optimal allocation of production factors, the linkage 
of the three industrial sectors and refinement of the social divisions of production 
will also expand the demand for services. In addition, with further improvements 
in technology and mechanisation levels in agriculture and changes in agricultural 
production organisation and business models, agricultural productivity will continue 
to increase, providing a relatively sufficient labour force for the urban sector.
Active integration in the new technological revolution 
to enhance cities’ innovation capability
After years of hard work, China’s overall levels of technological advancement and 
capacity for innovation have been significantly improved. Some important fields 
are among the best in the world and some industries are now positioned at the 
high end of the global value chain. Applications and breakthroughs are showing up 
in the new generation of information technology, typified by advances in artificial 
intelligence, quantum information, mobile communications, the Internet of Things 
and blockchain technology. Since the 2018 Central Economic Working Conference, 
policies and implementation plans related to the ‘new infrastructure’ have been 
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deployed and promoted. On the demand side, new infrastructure will help stabilise 
growth and employment, serve consumption upgrades and better meet the Chinese 
population’s need for a better life. On the supply side, new infrastructure will 
create the basic conditions for innovation and development, especially as China 
moves to seize the heights of global technological innovation. For example: since 
2014, Shanghai has accelerated the construction of a ‘science and innovation centre 
with global influence’ and introduced a series of measures such as ‘22 Options 
on Scientific and Technological Innovation’ and ‘Implementation Opinions on 
Promoting the Development of New Generation Artificial Intelligence’. In May 
2020, the Shanghai Municipal Government issued the ‘Shanghai Action Plan for 
Promoting New Infrastructure Construction (2020–2022)’, involving 48 major 
projects and an estimated total investment of RMB270 billion.
Making full use of the development potential 
of a large domestic market
To advance the process of urbanisation, China must make full use and unleash the 
potential of its massive domestic market. The increase in the level of urbanisation 
and public services has led to the continuous expansion of urban consumer groups 
and the upgrading of the consumption structure and potential, which have provided 
continued impetus for economic development. There is still a lot of room for regional 
rebalancing in the urbanisation process. The Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta 
and other regions embarked early on a high-quality development track, while 
the development advantages of megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen continue to increase. Additionally, large cities such as Hangzhou, 
Nanjing, Wuhan, Zhengzhou, Chengdu and Xi’an have also already formed new 
regional growth poles.
Unlocking the institutional dividends brought 
by the new round of reform and opening up
In the middle and late stages of urbanisation, the institutional barriers that hinder 
development still exist and the institutional dividends of reform and opening up are 
still vast. First, it is necessary to realise the marketisation of migrant workers and the 
equalisation of basic public services through the reform of the household registration 
system (hukou) to rapidly increase China’s total factor productivity. Second, the 
factor market should be reformed by removing the barriers to the free flow of labour, 
land, capital, technology, information and other factors. The interactive two-way 
flow of factors between urban and rural areas should be actively encouraged. 
Next, industrial competitiveness should be promoted by reforming monopolistic 
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industries, breaking both administrative and natural monopolies. The principle of 
competitive neutrality should be introduced to improve industrial competitiveness. 
Finally, the international competitiveness of Chinese cities can be improved by 
implementing a proactive opening policy. This includes seizing the opportunity of 
a new round of major projects exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative, the 
Hainan Free Trade Island and Shanghai Free Trade Zone, as well as the opening and 
further expansion of the service and high-end manufacturing industries.
Conclusions
China’s urbanisation model is endogenous to its economic development path and 
model of industrial structural change. Since the period of reform and opening up, 
China’s economy has rapidly integrated into the global economic system and its 
urban industrial structure has undergone transformation and upgrading. The new 
technological revolution and high-quality development of China’s economy will 
provide significant opportunities for high-quality urbanisation in China. In the 
next stage, China must establish a goal of high-efficiency, low-carbon, green and 
inclusive urbanisation for industry, socioeconomic systems, markets and technology 
to build a new urban development path. The new technological revolution will 
effectively transform and upgrade cities’ traditional manufacturing industries and 
generate a large number of new industries that are technology and knowledge 
intensive, especially in the services sector. China’s huge domestic market potential 
and the institutional dividends brought by the new round of reform and opening up 
will be a unique driving force of urbanisation.
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Yanchao Xu and Shawn Xiaoguang Chen
Introduction
As China’s decades-long phenomenal economic growth gradually loses momentum, 
the tension between cutting taxes to promote growth and maintaining fiscal revenue 
looms large for the country’s governments. From 1978 to 2011, the average growth 
rate of China’s economy was more than 9 per cent. Since 2012, it has entered the 
so-called ‘new normal’ of declining growth. Over the past three years, the downward 
pressure has further strengthened. The new domestic and international economic 
situation has brought challenges to fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal and tax 
reforms characterised by tax and fee reductions (jianfei jiangshui) have emerged as 
key policies for three reasons. First, expansionary monetary policy is already bounded 
by global low interest rates. Additionally, monetary policy is expected to remain 
stable due to concerns about asset bubbles and inflation. Second, conventional 
fiscal stimulus through public investment is already subject to diminishing marginal 
effects. Third, the general consensus holds that many businesses in China are 
suffocating from rising costs and high taxes. Therefore, reducing taxes and fees 
seems to be an inevitable policy choice for Chinese governments. 
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To reduce the burden on firms and restore market vitality, the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council have continued in recent 
years to introduce policies and measures to cut taxes and fees.1 However, given 
the current economic situation and the fiscal and taxation systems, these tax cuts 
led to a decline in revenue. On 1 May 2018, the value-added tax (VAT) rate for 
manufacturing and other industries decreased from 17 per cent to 16  per  cent 
and the rate for transportation and other industries decreased from 11  per  cent 
to 10  per  cent. The  scale of VAT reduction from May to December 2018 was 
about RMB270 billion. Based on this rough calculation, if the VAT is reduced by 
1 percentage point, China’s annual tax revenue will drop by RMB462.86 billion, 
which is 7.52 per cent of China’s domestic VAT revenue in 2018 and 2.5 per cent 
of the national general public budget. The amount exceeds the government’s total 
expenditure on culture, sport and media, and is close to its total expenditure on 
environmental protection. On 1 April 2019, the Ministry of Finance, the State 
Taxation Administration and the General Administration of Customs released 
‘Circular No. 39 of 2019’, stipulating that, for general VAT taxpayers in China, 
taxable sales of imported goods would be adjusted from 16 per cent to 13 per 
cent; tax rates originally applicable at 10 per cent would be adjusted to 9 per cent. 
In a press conference held by the State Taxation Administration on 23 July 2019, 
Cai Zili, executive deputy director of the Taxation Reduction Office and director 
of the Department of Revenue Planning and Accounting, stated that, from April 
to June 2019, net VAT reductions reached RMB318.5 billion (State Taxation 
Administration of China 2019b). Based on our calculations, the net reduction of 
VAT in those three months exceeded total expenditure on energy conservation and 
environmental protection for the first half of 2019.
The decline in tax revenue may harm the economy. Due to rigid demand for local fiscal 
expenditure, ‘tax reduction and fee reduction’ may turn into ‘tax reduction and fee 
increase’. This is not only consistent with the typical response of local governments, 
but also confirmed by recent tax and non-tax revenue data.2 If this happens, the 
policy goal of stimulating business vitality through tax and fee reductions will be 
difficult to achieve. Guo (2019) believes ongoing tax and fee reductions will see 
1  Especially since 1 April 2019, China’s manufacturing VAT rate has been reduced from 16 per cent to 
13 per cent. The VAT rates in construction and other industries have been reduced from 10 per cent to 9 per cent. 
On 22 March 2019, the Economic Daily asked in the headline to the story about the tariff reduction measures, 
‘Unclear: Do we mean “the largest tax cuts in history”?’ (Sohu Technology 2019).
2  According to the Ministry of Finance’s ‘Financial Revenue and Expenditure in the First Half of 2019’, released 
on 13 July 2019, national tax revenue in the first half of 2019 increased by 0.9 per cent year-on-year, and non-tax 
revenue increased by 21.4 per cent year-on-year (State Taxation Administration of China 2019a). On 10 May 2019, 
Premier Li Keqiang clearly emphasised at the panel discussion on the implementation of the tax reduction and fee 
reduction policy that ‘[we must] resolutely prevent the use of various names to arbitrarily charge fees, and we must 
not allow anyone to hinder tax reduction and fee reduction’ (China Network of Court 2019). Guo (2019) shows 
that in total local government fiscal revenue, the proportion of the general public budget revenue fell from 46.4 per 
cent in 2015 to 40.5 per cent in 2018, while the proportion of government funding revenue continued to increase, 
from 22.1 per cent to 29.9 per cent.
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the fiscal deficits and revenues of governments at all levels significantly affected and 
may trigger fiscal risks. Due to a lack of new tax sources, local governments will 
have to borrow in response to falling fiscal revenues, which may worsen local debt 
problems. Furthermore, the decline in tax revenue may lead local governments to 
reduce expenditure on education and public security, resulting in adverse effects on 
social equity, human capital accumulation and social stability.3
The main constraint facing China’s fiscal policy is how to reduce taxes and fees 
while securing fiscal revenue. Scholars in China have proposed various policy 
solutions.4 In this study, we propose a revenue-neutral reform characterised by ‘rate 
cuts and productivity enhancement’—that is, by reducing the statutory tax rate 
(‘rate cut’), strengthening tax enforcement and administration, reducing disparities 
in effective tax rates among firms and improving aggregate production efficiency 
(‘productivity enhancement’), governments can maintain tax revenue from a 
greater tax base. This chapter combines the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
tax-evasion model, Hopenhayn’s (2014) resource misallocation model and Olley 
and Pakes’ (1996) productivity theory to analyse the feasibility of revenue-neutral 
reform. Based on the National Statistics on Prefecture, City, and County Finance for 
2000 to 2007 (Ministry of Finance 2000–07), and annual firm-level data from 
the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (NBS 2000–07), we use the abolition 
of agricultural taxes in 2005 as a fiscal shock to county governments to study the 
impact on tax enforcement and subsequent allocation efficiency across firms. Based 
on the estimated key parameters from the reduced-form regressions, we estimate the 
lower bound for the VAT rate deduction under the revenue-neutral reform model. 
We show that improved tax enforcement can reduce the effective tax rate difference 
between firms and enhance aggregate productivity. The estimation results show that, 
in an ideal scenario where all firms uniformly pay the statutory tax rate, the rate can 
be reduced to around 13 per cent without changing tax revenue.
The preconditions of the revenue-neutral reform we propose are that China’s tax 
enforcement and administration are subject to serious problems. Many empirical 
studies have provided direct evidence of the discretionary power of local governments, 
even when it comes to VAT collection, which is usually thought to be very strictly 
enforced. For example, Chen (2017b) used the abolition of China’s agricultural 
taxes in 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment and found that the VAT rate of firms in 
counties with greater fiscal pressure after the reform increased significantly. Lu and 
Guo (2011) believe improvements in tax enforcement and administration are the 
main cause of increases in tax revenue. 
3 After local government revenues decreased, education expenditures have decreased significantly.
4 For example, Guo (2019) proposed measures to address fiscal risks caused by tax and fee reductions by formulating 
fiscal consolidation strategies, strengthening fiscal governance and implementing tax expenditure budgets.
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Moreover, weak tax enforcement leads to dispersion in effective tax rates across 
firms. Of course, we may expect this dispersion to gradually decrease with the 
simplification of tax rates and adoption of tax-collection technology; however, several 
recent studies show, surprisingly, that the dispersion in the effective tax rate across 
firms did not in fact decline between 2007 and 2017 (Bai et al. 2019; Lu 2019). 
According to theories of misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; Hsieh and 
Klenow 2009), dispersion in tax rates across firms can lead to the misallocation of 
resources among firms and reduce aggregate productivity. Chen (2017b) found that 
there is a big difference between the statutory VAT rate and the effective tax rate in 
China,5 and the total factor productivity (TFP) loss caused by dispersion in the VAT 
rate was as high as 7.9 per cent. 
Existing studies of tax and fee reductions in China mainly aim to reduce the burden 
on firms. Few have analysed resource allocation at the macro-level or aggregate 
productivity. Our study makes the following contributions to the literature: first, 
we theoretically study the feasibility of revenue-neutral reform and its underlying 
mechanisms, which are based on a positive feedback loop of ‘lower tax rate → better 
tax enforcement and compliance → higher productivity → greater tax base → 
lower tax rate’. Second, using the estimates of key parameters, we calculate the lower 
bound of the statutory VAT rate that is able to sustain revenue-neutral reform.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section two proposes a theoretical 
model; section three conducts the empirical work; section four quantifies the lower 
bound of the VAT rate deduction under the revenue-neutral reform; while section 
five concludes.
Theoretical model
This section proposes a model to explain the key mechanisms underlying the 
proposed revenue-neutral reform. The model includes firms’ tax-evasion behaviour 
and production and governments’ tax enforcement. The model features two 
mechanisms. On the one hand, strict tax enforcement and administration can reduce 
the dispersion in effective tax rates across firms, thereby improving the efficiency 
of resource allocation. On the other, a reduction in the statutory tax rate leads to 
better compliance, which consequently reduces effective tax rate disparities across 
firms and further improves aggregate productivity. In the end, ‘rate reduction’ and 
5 Bai et al. (2019) use data from the 2007–15 China Tax Survey on corporate taxation inequality to show that, 
for Chinese companies, the actual tax rate has actually increased since 2009. Lu (2019) showed the discretionary 
tax enforcement in total taxation, VAT and corporate income tax using Chinese listed-company data for 2008–17, 
and suggested there is no downward trend in the actual tax rate.
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‘productivity enhancement’ form a virtuous cycle. To verify whether the theoretical 
model is in line with China’s current reality, we formulate testable propositions from 
the model to guide our empirical work.
Framework
Assume that all firms are facing the same statutory tax rate, t. Due to the lack of 
strict tax enforcement and administration, firms are evading tax to varying degrees; 
τt is the effective tax rate for company i.
Definition 1: Strict tax enforcement and administration refer to τi = t for ∀i. Lax tax 
enforcement and administration mean the following two conditions hold at the 
same time:
• The effective tax rate of some firms is lower than the statutory tax rate, τi ≤ t for 
∀i and ∃i, such that τi < t. 
• There are dispersions in effective tax rates between firms—that is: var(τi) > 0.
6
We introduce the parameter ε  ∈  [0,+∞), which represents the degree of tax 
enforcement and administration; var(τi) is a decreasing function in ε. 
When enforcement is very strict, we have ε → +∞, thus var(τi). When collection is 
abnormally lax, we have ε → 0 and var(τi) → +∞.
Let yi be the output of firm i, pi is the corresponding price, Y is total output and 
P the price, which is normalised to 1.
Government tax revenue is shown as Equation 5.1.
Equation 5.1
T = Σ iτ i pi y i = τ̄PY
In Equation 5.1, τ̄ = Σi wi ·τi is the macro effective tax rate, which is the weighted 
average of the firm’s effective tax rate, τi; the weight is  and content is 
Σi pi yi = PY.
To facilitate analysis, we assume that the production function satisfies the form of 
AK; ki is the capital stock of firm i and the total capital is k = Σiki.
7 The aggregate 
production function is Y  =  TFP·K, where TFP represents the aggregate total 
factor productivity. If there is dispersion in effective tax rates between firms, the 
misallocation will reduce the TFP to a level lower than TFP e at which resources are 
efficiently allocated. With P = 1, Equation 5.1 can be written as Equation 5.2.
6 We ignore the rare case of τi ≤ t for ∀i, and var(τi) > 0.
7 The conclusion of the Cobb–Douglas production function still holds. We use the AK model for convenience 
of exposition.




In Equation 5.2, capital, K, is a function of the effective tax rate. 
Under circumstances in which the effect of tax rate reduction on investment is small, 
tax revenue is at the rising part on the left side of the Laffer curve. There is a tension 
between tax rate reduction and maintaining tax revenue. To simplify the analysis, we 
make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: –d1nK/d1nτ̄  < 1. That is, the elasticity of net investment to the 
effective macro tax rate is less than 1, and the tax incentive for investment is small.
Generally, τ̄ is a function of the statutory tax rate, t. Additionally, the level of tax 
enforcement and administration, ε, also affects τ̄ and TFP. The relationships can be 
represented, respectively, by τ̄(t;ε) and TFP(ε), for which we formulate the following 
two assumptions.
Assumption 2: When tax collection is strict (ε = +∞), we have τ̄(t;ε) = t. When tax 
collection is lax (ε < +∞), we have τ̄(0;ε) = 0 if t = 0 and τ̄ = 0; and, for a given 
tax enforcement intensity, ε, we have τ̄(t;ε) < t and 0 < ∂τ̄(t;ε)/∂t ≤ 1. That is, when 
the statutory tax rate is zero, the macro effective tax rate is also zero; the macro 
effective tax rate, τ̄, is lower than the statutory tax rate, t, and increases as the 
statutory tax rate rises.
Assumption 3: ∂τ̄(t;ε)/∂ε > 0, dTFP(ε)/dε > 0. Both the macro effective tax rate, 
τ̄(t;ε), and TFP(ε) increase as the tax enforcement intensity, ε, increases.
Based on Assumptions 1–3, we will analyse the properties of the Laffer curve when 
the tax enforcement intensity, ε, varies.
The Laffer curve reflects the relationship between tax, T, and the statutory tax rate, 
t, for a given level of tax enforcement and administration. According to the analysis 
above, we know: T(t;ε) = τ̄(t;ε)·TFP(ε)·K(τ̄(t;ε)).
Given the tax enforcement intensity, ε, the relationship between tax, T(t;ε), and the 
statutory tax rate, t, is the Laffer curve, and ∂τ̄(t;ε) / ∂t indicates the monotonicity 
of the Laffer curve. Given a statutory tax rate, t, the tax, T(t;ε), changes with 
the tax enforcement intensity, ε, and different values of ε correspond to different 
Laffer curves.
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Let the Laffer curve under strict tax-collection conditions (ε = +∞) be T e(t), 
and under lax collection conditions the Laffer curve is T(t;ε). The following two 
propositions hold.
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1–3, the Laffer curve, T(t;ε), monotonically 
increases with the statutory tax rate, t, and the Laffer curve with a low level of tax 
enforcement is located below that with a high level of enforcement.
Since the Laffer curve, T(t;ε), increases monotonically with the statutory tax rate, 
t, lowering the tax rate will inevitably lead to lower taxes. However, Proposition 2 
shows that, by strengthening tax enforcement and administration, the government 
can reduce tax rates and ensure that revenues remain unchanged, which means it is 
feasible to launch a revenue-neutral reform with tax rate reduction.
Proposition 2: Under the condition that the taxation income, T(t;ε)  ≡ T̄, is 
unchanged, we have , and the statutory tax rate, t, and the tax enforcement 
intensity, ε, are inversely changed.
Propositions 1–2 can be shown in Figure 5.1, where the horizontal axis represents 
the statutory tax rate and the vertical axis is total tax revenue. Te(t) represents the 
Laffer curve under completely strict management conditions. T(t;ε0) is the Laffer 
curve with statutory tax rate t and collection level ε0. When the statutory tax rate 
is t0, the total tax revenue is T̄. The equilibrium point is at A. When the statutory 
tax rate is unchanged and the tax enforcement and administration level is increased 
from ε0 to ε1, the Laffer curve rises from T(t;ε0) to T(t;ε1), the equilibrium point 
becomes point B and the total tax revenue corresponding to point B is higher than T̄. 
In a revenue-neutral reform, we can reduce the statutory tax rate to t1 and move the 
equilibrium from point B to point C. As the equilibrium point changes from point 
A to point C, total tax revenue remains unchanged, the level of tax enforcement and 
administration increases from ε0 to ε1 and the statutory tax rate decreases from t0 to 
t1. The variation in T from point A to point B can be captured by ∂T / ∂ε, and that 
from point B to point C by ∂T / ∂t.



















Figure 5.1 Tax enforcement and the Laffer curve
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Micro‑foundation of the Laffer curve
This section provides the micro-foundation for the Laffer curve shown in Figure 5.1. 
It consists of two parts: firms’ tax evasion and firms’ production. For analytical 
convenience, the model assumes that firms’ tax evasion and production are handled 
by different departments. The financial department is responsible for taxation and 
the production department for hiring labour and producing goods.
Analysis of firms’ tax evasion
Drawing on the classic model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), this section 
analyses how the effective tax rate of a firm in the presence of tax evasion is affected 
by the following three policies of the tax department: tax audit (probability ηi ), tax 
evasion penalty (variable Fi ) and the statutory tax rate, t. In the model, the statutory 
tax, t, applies to all firms, but due to the existence of tax discretion and tax cost 
differences, ηi and Fi differ from firm to firm, resulting in different equilibrium 
effective tax rates, τi , across firms, further generating resource misallocation and loss 
of aggregate productivity.
5. REVENUE-NEUTRAL TAX REFORM IN CHINA
109
Assuming the government levies taxes on total sales revenue, the sales revenue of 
firm i is si , the statutory tax base is t, the revenue reported by the firm to the tax 
department is xi , and the amount of tax evasion by the firm is t (si–xi ). The probability 
that the government will conduct tax audits on firms is ηi . In the presence of an 
audit, firms’ tax evasion will be detected. Firms not only need to pay the tax in 
full, but also face a penalty of Fi ·(si–xi ), where Fi is a fixed constant. For the sake of 
calculation, we assume that the utility function of the firms’ financial department 
is Equation 5.3.
Equation 5.3
max(1–ηi )u(cn) = ηiu(cf ) xi
In Equation 5.3, u(·) is the state utility function; cn=st–txi is the after-tax income 
when tax evasion was not caught; otherwise, cf  = (1–t)st–Fi ·(si–xi ) is the net income 
after tax payment and fines.
The firm’s optimal tax declaration decision, xi
*, is determined by the following first-
order conditions (Equation 5.4). 
Equation 5.4
With xi
*, the company’s average effective tax rate is Equation 5.5.
Equation 5.5
 
Propositions 5–6 explain how the tax enforcement intensity, ε, affects the mean, τ̄, 
and variance, var(τi).
Assumption 4: Assuming –∂lnwi /∂lnτi <  1, the elasticity of the tax base to the 
effective tax rate is less than 1, (  (please refer to Equation 5.1)).
Following the model above and Assumption 4, we can obtain Propositions 3–5. 
Combined with Assumption 5, we can get Propositions 6–7. 
Proposition 3: As the statutory tax rate rises, the effective tax rate faced by firms 
increases, and the macro effective tax rate of the economy also rises. That means for 
any firm, i, there is ∂τi /∂t > 0. Combined with Assumption 4, we get ∂τ̄/∂t > 0.
Proposition 4: Strengthening penalties and inspections can increase effective tax 
rates. That means for any firm, i, we have ∂τi /∂Fi > 0, ∂τi /∂ηi > 0. 
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Proposition 5: Treating all taxpayers fairly can reduce the difference in effective tax 
rates between firms—that is, ∂Fi /∂ε > 0.
Propositions 4–5 imply ∂var(τi )/∂var(Fi ) > 0 and ∂var(τi )/∂var(ηi ) > 0.
Assumption 5: For any firm, i, we have ∂Fi /∂ε ≥ 0. For firm i, we have ∂Fi /∂ε > 0 
and ∂var(Fi )/∂ε < 0. For any firm, i, there is ∂ηi /∂ε ≥ 0, and there exists firm i, 
such that ∂ηi /∂ε > 0 and ∂var(ηi)/∂ε < 0. That means, when tax enforcement, ε, 
is strengthened, the punishment for tax evasion, Fi , or the audit probability, ηi , 
would increase, and discretion over punishment or audit probabilities among firms 
is reduced.
Proposition 6: Under Assumptions 4–5, we have ∂τ̄/∂ε > 0.
Proposition 7: Under Assumptions 4–5, we have dvar(τi )/dε < 0.
Firms’ production decisions
This section analyses the relationship between the distribution of the effective tax 
rate, τi , across firms and the aggregate TFP of the economy. Firms’ production 
function takes the form AK in Equation 5.6.
Equation 5.6
yi = Aiki
In Equation 5.6, yi is the total output of firm i and ki is the capital stock. Assuming 
the firm is in a monopolistic competitive industry, the demand function of the firm 
is pi = Q-
θ.
The problem of profit maximisation is , in which 
τi is the effective tax rate of firm i. The solution to the problem above is 
.
Correspondingly, the optimal total output level of firm i is Equation 5.7.
Equation 5.7
And the total capital of all firms is Equation 5.8.
Equation 5.8
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According to Olley and Pakes’s definition of TFP, we have Equation 5.9.
Equation 5.9
By substituting Equation 5.7 into Equation 5.9, we can get Equation 5.10.
Equation 5.10
Assuming lnAi and ln(1–τi ) follow a joint normal distribution, the correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is –ρ(ρ>0). From Equation 5.10, we can prove 
that logTFP can be expressed as Equation 5.11.
Equation 5.11
Equation 5.11 shows that the larger the variance of the effective tax rate, the lower 
is the efficiency of resource allocation. 
Impact of tax enforcement intensity, ε, on aggregate TFP
Based on the results of sections one and two, we have the following conclusions 
about the relationship between the level of tax enforcement and the aggregate TFP.
Proposition 8: ∂lnTFP/∂ε > 0.
So far, Propositions 3, 6 and 8 have provided microeconomic foundations for 
Assumptions 2–3 in section one.
Now we turn to the empirical test of three key hypotheses.
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Empirical test
Hypotheses and empirical strategies
Based on the theoretical analyses in section two, we propose the following 
testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: When the statutory tax rate remains unchanged, firms’ effective tax 
rate rises as regional fiscal pressure increases (that is, Assumption 3).
Hypothesis 2: When the statutory tax rate remains unchanged, as regional fiscal 
pressure increases, the decrease in the percentage of production factors (capital 
stock, labour) is lower than the increased percentage of the effective tax rate (that is, 
Assumption 1).
Hypothesis 3: When the statutory tax rate is unchanged, the variance of the effective 
tax rate among firms reduces as regional fiscal pressure increases. And, when lnAi 
and ln(1– τi) are negatively correlated, the aggregate resource-allocation efficiency 
improves (that is, Assumption 3).
Chen (2016, 2017a) used the abolition of agricultural taxes as a quasi-natural 
experiment to verify Hypothesis 1. We use similar empirical strategies to test 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. We show the prerequisite of Hypothesis 3 (lnAi and ln(1– τi) 
are negatively correlated) in section three (relationships among the main variables).
Data sources
The empirical study in this chapter examines whether fiscal pressure has affected the 
differences in the effective VAT rates for China’s manufacturing firms and ultimately 
improved the efficiency of manufacturing resource allocation. For this purpose, 
we use two datasets for our quantitative analysis: the Annual Survey of Industrial 
Production conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS 2000–
07), which includes all state-owned and non-state-owned firms with annual sales of 
more than RMB5 million; and the National Statistics on Prefecture, City, and County 
Finance (Ministry of Finance 2000–07). The main reason for selecting these two 
datasets is that the former can relatively accurately calculate each firm’s effective VAT 
rate and the latter can calculate the fiscal pressure faced by the local government.
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Measurement of main variables
Exogenous fiscal pressure shock
Following Chen (2017a), we measure the fiscal pressure generated by the abolition 
of agricultural taxes in China in 2005 by Equation 5.12.
Equation 5.12
In Equation 5.12, Agr_taxc,2000–2004 is the sum of county-level agricultural taxes 
between 2000 and 2004; Subsidyc,2000–2004 and Subsidyc,2005–2007 represent the sums 
of transfer payments related to rural tax reform at the county level in 2000–04 and 
2005–07, respectively; and Total_taxc,2000–2004 and Total_taxc,2005–2007 are the sums of 
tax revenue at the county level in 2000–04 and 2005–07, respectively.
We use Agrc×Postt to capture the shock of fiscal pressure across counties and over 
time, where Postt is the dummy variable indicating the year before and the year 
after the abolition of agricultural taxes, and Postt takes a value of 1 if t > 2004 and 
0 otherwise.8
Effective VAT rate and its variance 
Using firm-level data, we can obtain the effective VAT rate of each firm and further 
calculate the variance of the effective VAT rate among firms at the year–county–
(two-digit) industry levels, as shown in Equation 5.13.
Equation 5.13
VarTaucjt = Var[ln(– τcjit)]
The subscripts c, j, t and i are county, (two-digit) industry, year and firm, respectively; 
τcjit is the effective VAT rate of each firm, which is defined as the firm-level ‘Payable 
VAT/Value-added’.
Aggregate TFP
Following Bartelsman et al. (2013), we use the Olley and Pakes (1996) productivity 
decomposition method to calculate the TFP, as in Equation 5.14 (for notational 
convenience, we ignore the county and industry subscripts, c and j).
8 Although the abolition of agricultural taxes officially began on 1 January 2006, from the perspective of taxes 
data, the nationwide large-scale complete taxes deduction and exemption actually took place in 2005.
CHINA’S CHALLENGES IN MOVING TOWARDS A HIGH-INCOME ECONOMY
114
Equation 5.14
In Equation 5.14, TFPt is average productivity using the firm size as weights; T̄F̄P̄ t is 
the arithmetical average of the firm’s productivity; and the last term, , 
represents the efficiency of resource allocation, which we call ‘OP covariance’. Among 
them, sit is the proportion of the output of a single firm in total output; TFPit is the 
productivity of firm i at time t; st is the average of  sit  for each firm, i; and T̄F̄P̄t is the 
average of TFPit for each firm, i.
We use four methods to estimate the TFPit : LP (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003), 
ordinary least squares (OLS), ACF (Ackerberg et al. 2015) and OP (Olley and 
Pakes 1996).
The aggregate TFP in our empirical study is measured by ‘OP covariance’, which 
is calculated by the second component on the right-hand side of Equation 5.14. 
Specifically, sit is the proportion of the total output value of a single firm in the total 
output value at the year–county–(two-digit) industry levels; TFPit is the logarithmic 
productivity of firm i in year t; and T̄F̄P̄t is the year–county–(two-digit) industry 
arithmetical average of the logarithmic productivity of the firm. For simplicity, we 
use ‘LOG(TFP) (OP covariance)’ to represent the aggregate TFP in regression tables.
Control variables 
The key control variables are: 
1. The average of ln(1–τcijt). To be consistent with Equation 5.13, we first calculate 
ln(1–τcijt) for each firm, and then calculate the average of ln(1–τcijt) at the year–
county–(two-digit) industry levels. 
2. The Herfindal index, which is calculated based on the firm’s sales income at the 
year—county–(two-digit) industry levels.
3. The logarithm of the year–county–(two-digit) industry average of firm-level 
output, which, for convenience, is simplified as ‘LOG(Average output)’ in the 
tables of regression results.
4. The average markup—first, we estimate the markup for each firm according to 
the method of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), and then calculate the year–
county–(two-digit) industry average of firm-level markup.
5. Export–sales ratio, which is defined as the ‘total export/total sales income’ at the 
year–county–(two-digit) industry level. 
6. The logarithm of per capita capital stock within the same industry: we first 
calculate the total capital stock and labour force at the year–county–(two-
digit) industry level, and then calculate the per capita capital stock and take 
the logarithm. For simplicity, we will use ‘LOG(Per capita capital stock)’ in the 
tables of regression results. 
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7. The proportion of capital of different ownership in total capital: first, we 
separately calculate the proportion of state-owned capital, collective capital and 
foreign capital in the total capital for each firm, and then calculate the average of 
the abovementioned proportions at the year–county–(two-digit) industry level. 
For simplicity, we will use ‘State-owned capital share’, ‘Collective capital share’ 
and ‘Foreign capital share’, respectively, in tables of regression results.
Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the measurements involved in the 
regressions at the year–county–(two-digit) industry level.
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable name Sample size Mean Std dev. Minimum Maximum
Aggregate TFP 
(LP estimation)
72,523 0.0270 0.089 –1.500 1.8880 
Aggregate TFP 
(OLS estimation)
72,523 0.0030 0.077 –1.389 1.7550 
Aggregate TFP 
(ACF estimation)
72,523 0.0110 0.080 –0.961 1.3740 
Aggregate TFP 
(OP estimation)
72,523 0.0150 0.082 –1.300 1.6990 
VarTau 71,648 0.0156 0.027 0.000 0.1960 
Agr×Post 68,980 0.0840 0.112 –0.646 1.2000
Agr 68,980 0.1580 0.158 –0.646 1.2000 
FP 46,743 –0.0150 0.072 –0.277 0.2247
The average of  
ln(1–τcijt)
72,523 –0.1370 0.085 –0.874 0.0000
The average markup 72,523 1.3350 0.446 0.669 42.0240 
LOG(Average output) 72,523 10.3800 0.784 7.425 13.5520 
LOG(Per capita 
capital stock)
72,523 3.8260 0.795 –1.350 8.2390 
Herfindal index 72,523 0.3180 0.174 0.006 0.9840 
Export–sales ratio 72,523 0.1110 0.198 0.000 0.9990 
State‑owned capital 
share
72,503 0.0590 0.136 0.000 1.0000 
Collective capital 
share
72,503 0.1170 0.188 0.000 1.0000 
Foreign capital share 72,503 0.1060 0.184 0.000 1.0000 
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Variation in key variables
Changes in fiscal pressure and effective VAT rate
Figure 5.2 suggests that the regions with the greatest increase in fiscal pressure have 
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Figure 5.2 Changes in fiscal pressure and average effective VAT rate 
(comparison before and after reform)
Notes: Vertical axis variable: first, we calculate the average effective VAT rates at the county–(two‑digit) 
industry level in 2005–07 and 2000–04, respectively, and then subtract the average for 2000–04 from 
that for 2005–07 for change over time of the average effective VAT rate. Horizontal axis variable: first, 
we calculate the averages of Agr*Post at the county–(two‑digit) industry level in 2005–07 and 2000–04, 
respectively. We then subtract the average for 2000–04 from that for 2005–07 for the change over time 
in fiscal pressure. The shaded area in the graph is the 95 per cent confidence interval.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Changes in fiscal pressure and the variance of the 
effective VAT rate
Figure 5.3 shows that the regions with the greatest increase in fiscal pressure have the 
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Figure 5.3 Changes in fiscal pressure and variance of the effective VAT rate 
(comparison before and after reform)
Notes: Vertical axis variable: first, we calculate the averages of the variance of the effective VAT rate 
at the county–(two‑digit) industry level in 2005–07 and 2000–04, respectively. We then subtract the 
average for 2000–04 from that for 2005–07 for the change over time of the variance of the effective 
VAT rate. Horizontal axis variable: first, we calculate the averages of Agr*Post at the county–(two‑digit) 
industry level in 2005–07 and 2000–04, respectively. We then subtract the average for 2000–04 from 
that for 2005–07 for the change over time in fiscal pressure. The shaded area in the graph represents 
the 95 per cent confidence interval.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Changes in fiscal pressure and aggregate TFP
Figure 5.4 shows the positive effects of fiscal pressure on the aggregate TFP, measured 
by four methods—LP, OLS, ACF and OP, respectively, in panels a, b, c and d.
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Figure 5.4 Changes in fiscal pressure and aggregate TFP (comparison before 
and after reform)
Notes: Vertical axis variables: first, we calculate the averages of the aggregate TFP (TFP_LP, TFP_OLS, 
TFP_ACF and TFP_OP) at the county–(two‑digit) industry level in 2005–07 and 2000–04, based on 
the second component (OP covariance) on the right‑hand side of Equation 5.3, and then separately 
subtract the average for 2000–04 from that for 2005–07, constructing variables of TFP_LP change, 
TFP_OLS change, TFP_ACF change and TFP_OP change. Horizontal axis variable: first, we calculate 
the averages of Agr*Post at the county–(two‑digit) industry level in 2005–07 and 2000–04, respectively, 
and then subtract the average for 2000–04 from that for 2005–07. Following Equation 5.12, we 
get the measurement of fiscal pressure. The shaded area in the graph represents the 95 per cent 
confidence interval.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Correlation coefficient between lnAi and ln(1–τi) 
Proposition 8 and Hypothesis 3 suggest that strengthening tax enforcement can 
improve the aggregate TFP if lnAi and ln(1–τi) are negatively correlated. The data 
show that the correlation coefficient between lnAi and ln(1–τi) is approximately 
0.022 (for the LP method), –0.027 (OLS method), –0.028 (ACF method) or 
–0.025 (OP method).
Regression specification 
The difference-in-difference model is specified as Equation 5.15.
Equation 5.15
ycjt = α×Agrc ×Postt +β×Agrc +Xcjt ×θ+γt +ηcj +εcjt
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In Equation 5.15, the subscripts c, j and t represent county, two-digit industry and 
year, respectively.9 The dependent variable, ycjt , is VarTau (variance of the effective 
VAT rate) and the aggregate TFP (OP covariance) (refer to Equations 5.13 and 
5.14 for definition of the variables). The measurement for Agrc on the right-hand 
side of Equation 5.15 is Equation 5.13. Postt is the dummy variable indicating the 
years since the abolition of agricultural taxes; it takes a value of 1 if t > 2004 and 0 
otherwise; Xcjt is a control variable vector of firm characteristics (‘county–industry–
year’ level); γt is the year fixed effects; ηcj is the county–industry fixed effects; εcjt is 
the random error. The parameter of interest is α. 
Regression results
Fiscal pressure shock and variance of the effective VAT rate
The regression results are reported in Table 5.2. In column (1), we control for the 
year fixed effects and the average ln(1-τ) at the industry level. The results show that 
the variance of the effective VAT rate decreases significantly (at the 5 per cent level) 
with the increase in fiscal pressure. Column (2) includes extra control variables. 
In column  (3), we additionally control for the county–industry fixed effects. 
The estimates in columns (2)–(3) also show that the variance of the effective VAT rate 
among firms in the same industry decreases as the regional fiscal pressure increases. 
Columns (4) and (5) restrict the regression samples to those with the number of 
firms greater than three and greater than four, respectively, at the county–(two-digit) 
industry level, duplicating the regression in column (3).
Table 5.2 Fiscal pressure and variance of the effective VAT rate
Dependent variable: VarTau (variance of the effective VAT rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agr×Post –0.006** –0.007*** –0.009*** –0.008*** –0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Agr 0.000 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002)
Industry average ln(1‑τ) –0.195*** –0.198*** –0.267*** –0.262*** –0.249***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
9 In this chapter, enterprises are divided into the year–county–(two-digit) industry level, which shows the 
possibility that the number of enterprises at this level is very small. To avoid the estimation bias caused by this issue, 
we drop the samples to those in which the number of enterprises is not more than two. The average number of 
enterprises participating in the regressions is nine, the maximum is 479 and the minimum is three. To further test 
the sensitivity of the regressions, we conduct sensitivity analyses by retaining the samples of those with the number 
of enterprises not less than four and not less than five.
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Dependent variable: VarTau (variance of the effective VAT rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average markup –0.001** –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOG(Average output) 0.000* 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOG(Per capita capital stock) 0.000* –0.000* –0.001* –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Herfindal index 0.007*** –0.003*** –0.002* –0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Export–sales ratio –0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State‑owned capital share –0.003*** –0.007*** –0.008*** –0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Collective capital share 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign capital share 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant term –0.011*** –0.020*** –0.024*** –0.024*** –0.020***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County–industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms > 2 > 2 > 2 > 3 > 4
R‑squared 0.378 0.388 0.629 0.631 0.636
Sample size 68,980 68,960 66,382 49,177 38,395
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at county level.
Fiscal pressure shock and change in aggregate TFP
Table 5.3 shows the regression results between fiscal pressure and the aggregate TFP. 
The productivity of firms in columns (1)–(4) is estimated by the methods of LP, 
OLS, ACF and OP, respectively. The regression in panel A of Table 5.3 restricts the 
samples to those with the number of firms greater than two in the same industry. 
It can be seen from the coefficients of the interaction term that aggregate productivity 
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in the manufacturing industry significantly increases as the fiscal pressure increases. 
To further investigate whether the number of firms at the year–(two-digit) industry 
level would affect the regression results, we use the samples with the number of 
firms greater than three and greater than four at the year–(two-digit) industry level 
for regression. The results are displayed in panels B and C of Table 5.3, which are 
basically the same as panel A. 
Table 5.3 Fiscal pressure and aggregate LOG(TFP) (OP covariance)
Dependent variable: Aggregate LOG(TFP) (OP covariance)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP estimation method LP OLS ACF OP
Panel A: Number of firms in the same industry is greater than 2
Agr×Post 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.048***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Industry average ln(1‑τ) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Average markup –0.017*** –0.015*** –0.016*** –0.017***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
LOG(Average output) –0.025*** –0.020*** –0.023*** –0.023***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LOG(Per capita capital 
stock)
–0.002** –0.003*** –0.001 –0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Herfindal index 0.034*** –0.003 0.006 0.013**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Export–sales ratio 0.009* –0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
State‑owned capital share 0.016*** 0.005 0.010** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Collective capital share –0.011*** –0.011*** –0.009*** –0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign capital share –0.017*** –0.010* –0.012** –0.014**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant term 0.306*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.283***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County–industry 
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Dependent variable: Aggregate LOG(TFP) (OP covariance)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP estimation method LP OLS ACF OP
R‑squared 0.433 0.469 0.443 0.437
Sample size 66382 66382 66382 66382
Panel B: Number of firms in the same industry is greater than 3
Agr×Post 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.054***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Panel C: Number of firms in the same industry is greater than 4
Agr×Post 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.051***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
* significant at the 10 per cent level
** significant at the 5 per cent level
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at county level. The control variables of regression in 
panels B and C are the same as those in panel A.
Dynamic effect
In this section, we show the dynamic effects of fiscal pressure on the variance of 
the effective tax rate (in Figure 5.5) and the aggregate TFP with annual change 
(in Figure 5.6). In Figures 5.5–5.6, Befor4, Befor3, Befor2 and Befor1 represent the 
interaction terms between Agr and year dummies for 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, 
respectively; After1 and After2 represent the interaction terms between Agr and year 
dummies for 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Dynamic effect of fiscal pressure and variance of the effective 
VAT rate
Figure 5.5 shows the dynamic effect of fiscal pressure on the variance of the effective 
VAT rate is not significant before the reform. But after a year of reform it has 
a significant, negative effect on the variance of the effective VAT rate.
Dynamic effects of fiscal pressure and aggregate TFP
Figure 5.6 depicts the dynamic effect of fiscal pressure on aggregate TFP measured 
by the covariance of OP based on firms’ TFP estimated by four methods: LP, OLS, 
ACF and OP. The figure shows that the effect is not significant before the reform, 
but there is a remarkable, positive impact of fiscal pressure on the aggregate TFP in 
the year of reform. Moreover, the effect gradually increases over time.
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Figure 5.5 Dynamic effect of fiscal pressure and variance of the effective 
VAT rate
Notes: The longitudinal line represents the 95 per cent confidence interval; Befor4, Befor3, Befor2 and 
Befor1 represent the effect in the fourth, third, second and first year before the reform, respectively. 
‘Reform’ represents the effect in the year of reform. After1 and After2 represent the effect in the first and 
second years after the reform, respectively.
Source: Data for the regression are from NBS (2000–07) and the County Public Finance Statistics 
Yearbook of China (2000–07).
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Figure 5.6 Dynamic effect of fiscal pressure and aggregate LOG(TFP) 
(covariance of OP)
Notes: The vertical axis indicators of a, b, c and d are total TFP—namely, the LOG(TFP) (covariance of 
OP), which is calculated by using the four methods of LP, OLS, ACF and OP, respectively, according to 
the second term on the right‑hand side of Equation 5.14; vertical line segments represent 95 per cent 
confidence intervals; Befor4, Befor3, Befor2 and Befor1 represent the effect in the fourth, third, second 
and first year before the reform, respectively; ‘Reform’ represents the effect in the year of reform; After1 
and After2 represent the effect in the first and second years after reform, respectively.
Source: Data for the regression are from NBS (2000–07) and the County Public Finance Statistics 
Yearbook of China (2000–07).
By how much can China reduce the VAT rate?
In this section, we quantitatively estimate the extent to which the VAT rate can be 
reduced in revenue-neutral reform.
Theoretical analysis
The theoretical model in section two shows that the tax revenue 
T(t;ε) = τ(t;ε)·TFP(ε)·K(τ̄(t;ε)). The relationship between t and ε can be expressed as 
Equation 5.16.
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Equation 5.16
Equation 5.16 is the basis for calculating the range of feasible reduction in the 
statutory  tax rate, t, under the ‘tax-neutral’ reform. However, since the change 
in the  tax enforcement level, ∆ε, is not observable, we need to transform 
Equation 5.16 into expressions of observable variables and estimable parameters in 
the following way.
First, when t is constant, τ̄ and ε correspond to each other one-to-one, so ∂T/∂ε in 
Equation 5.16, can be written as Equation 5.17.
Equation 5.17
Second, when ε is constant, τ̄ corresponds to t one-by-one, and ∂T/∂t in Equation 5.16 
can be written as Equation 5.18.
Equation 5.18
In Equations 5.17 and 5.18, the two elasticities are defined as , 
, respectively.
Under the condition that t is constant, we know ∆ε = (∂τ̄(t,ε)/∂ε)–1 · ∆τ̄. Combining 
Equations 5.16–5.18, we get Equation 5.19. 
Equation 5.19
In Equation 5.19, ∆τ̄ is the change in the effective tax rate caused by the change in 
the tax enforcement level, ε, which can be observed. For convenience of description, 
we define the parameters as Equation 5.20.
Equation 5.20
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The economic meaning of λ is that, on the premise that the government’s tax revenue 
remains unchanged, the effective tax rate, τ̄, can be increased 1 percentage point by 
strengthening tax enforcement, and the statutory tax rate, t, can be reduced by λ 
percentage point.
Estimation of parameters
Equation 5.20 shows that the feasible range of reduction of the statutory tax rate, 
t, in the ‘tax-neutral reform’ depends on ητ̄
K and ητ̄
TFP. These two elasticities can be 
inferred from the previous regression results. Specifically, the fiscal pressure, ∆Agr, 
in the quasi-natural experiment of abolishing agricultural taxes can be used as an 
exogenous driver of the change in the tax enforcement level, ε. ητ̄
K and ητ̄
TFP can be 
estimated by the following two expressions:  and .
Estimation of elasticity ητ̄TFP,
First, according to the regression results in Table 5.3, we know that 
∆InTFP/∆Agr = 0.046. Second, we use Equation 5.15 with the effective VAT rate, 
τijct, as the explained variable. The regression results are shown in columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 5.4. Column (1) controls the fixed time effect, the fixed effect of the firm 
and the logarithmic value-added per capita of the firm. Column (2) additionally 
controls the relative scale of firms in the same industry, Markup, the proportion 
of firms’ exports in total sales revenue, the proportion of capital under different 
ownership in the total capital of firms and the interaction term of county–(two-
digit) industry. The coefficient of Agr×Post (that is ∆τ̄/∆Agr) in column (2) is 0.048. 
Given the average value of the effective VAT rate for 2005–07 is about 12 per cent, 
we know . Therefore, ητ̄
TFP = 0.046/0.4 ≈ 0.1.
Estimation of elasticity ητ̄K, 
ητ̄
K is the elasticity of the input of a firm’s production factors to the effective tax rate 
of that firm. The input factors include both capital and labour.
We use Equation 5.15 to estimate the impact of fiscal pressure on capital stock 
and the labour force. Table 5.4 reports the results. The explained variables of 
columns (3) and (4) are the logarithmic number of employees in the firm. And the 
explained variables of columns (5) and (6) are the logarithmic capital stock of the 
firm. Columns (3) and (5) do not include control variables at the firm level, and 
the impact of fiscal pressure on factors of production is not statistically significant. 
Columns (4) and (6) include extra controls, including the relative size of firms in the 
same industry, the markup, the proportion of the firm’s exports in total sales revenue 
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and the proportion of capital under different ownership in the firm’s total capital. 
The regression results still show that the impact of fiscal pressure on production 
factors is not statistically significant.10
Table 5.4 suggests that ∆lnL/∆Agr ≈ ∆lnK/∆lnAgr ≈ 0.
According to the definition of the elasticity, we know ητ̄
L = ητ̄
K ≈ 0 and ητ̄
K is not 
negative. From Equation 5.20, a greater ητ̄
K implies a bigger λ, which consequently 
leaves more room to cut the statutory tax rate, t, in the ‘tax-neutral reform’.
Table 5.4 The impact of fiscal pressure on the actual VAT rate and factors 
of production11
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Whether to control the fixed 
effect of the year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Whether to control county–
industry fixed effects
No Yes No Yes No Yes
10 This may be because the samples we used did not cover a long period and the adjustment of production factors 
was relatively slow in the short term, and had not yet shown an effect.
11 The reason the regression does not control firms’ logarithmic value-added per capita when the explained 
variables are a logarithm of the number of employees and a logarithm of the capital stock is that the logarithmic 
value-added per capita of firms is used as the outcome variable of the factor input and is placed in the control 
variables of the regression.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Whether to control the fixed 
effect of firms
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R‑squared 0.622 0.625 0.916 0.922 0.867 0.873
Sample size 732,019 727,874 732,046 727,898 732,046 727,898
* significant at the 10 per cent level
** significant at the 5 per cent level
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The standard error calculation of the regression uses a 
clustering method—clustering to the county level. 
A simple calculation of tax reduction range
From the results in section five, we know that ητ̄
TFP = 0.1, ητ̄
L = ητ̄
K ≈ 0. Substitute these 
into Equation 5.20 and we get Equation 5.21.
Equation 5.21
We cannot directly estimate ∂τ̄/∂t for the VAT, but we know that, in our sample 
period, the statutory rate of the VAT is 17 per cent; and, given ∂τ̄/∂t = 1, the 
minimum value of λ is 1.1, under the condition that tax revenue is kept constant, 
and the statutory tax rate for a single VAT, which is managed according to the law, is 
14.38 per cent. We set the tax rate as the upper limit of the optimal VAT rate under 
tax-neutral conditions.
In addition, although there is no accurate estimate of VAT, ∂τ̄/∂t, at present, this 
chapter attempts to use the ‘Corporate Income Tax Unification’ of 2008 to make 
a rough estimate of ∂τ̄/∂t. In 2008, the corporate income tax unification was 
implemented to unify the statutory tax rate among domestic and foreign firms. In 
response to the decrease in the statutory tax rate for domestic firms, we found their 
effective tax rate decreased after the reform, which is consistent with the theoretical 
assumption. Specifically, the statutory rate of income tax for domestic firms 
decreased from 33 per cent in 2007 to 25 per cent (a drop of 8 percentage points). 
In 2008 and 2007, the average income tax rates of state-owned and domestic firms 
above designated size were 14.7 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively (down by 1.3 
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percentage points). Therefore, ∂τ̄/∂t ≈ 1.3/8 = 0.163. Substituting the above result 
into Equation 5.22, we get λ ≈ 6.75, which implies that the lowest possible statutory 
VAT rate to sustain revenue-neutral reform is 12.65 per cent.12
To sum up, under tax-neutral reform, if the VAT is administered as a single statutory 
tax rate, the rate can be reduced to at least 14.38 per cent. Moreover, if we additionally 
take into account better tax compliance following the institution of lower tax rates, 
as suggested by the corporate income tax unification, the statutory rate of the VAT 
can be reduced to 12.65 per cent.
Conclusion
China’s economic growth rate has been declining in recent years, leading Chinese 
local and provincial governments to attempt to stimulate the economy through 
cutting taxes. However, this leads to a decline in government revenue, raising 
concerns about fiscal risk and debt problems for local governments. To solve this 
tension, we propose a revenue-neutral reform through improving tax enforcement, 
cutting statutory tax rates and enhancing aggregate productivity.
Our theoretical model explains the mechanisms underlying the revenue-neutral 
reform. To test the theory, we made use of the abolition of agricultural taxes in 
2005 as a ‘quasi-natural experiment’ to study how improvements in tax enforcement 
can lead to a smaller dispersion in the effective tax rate across firms and to greater 
aggregate productivity. Based on the estimates of several key elasticities, we estimated 
the extent of the VAT rate cut, with our results showing that the statutory VAT rate 
can be reduced to at least 14.38 per cent. Moreover, it can be reduced further, to 
12.65 per cent, when the improvement of firms’ tax compliance in response to the 
statutory tax rate cut is taken into account. The results imply that the latest standard 
VAT rate of 13 per cent, adopted in April 2019, may be sustainable for maintaining 
government revenue as long as governments continue to improve tax enforcement. 
The proposed reform may encounter several problems in its implementation. First, 
strengthening tax enforcement will increase the tax burden on some firms, leading 
to opposition to the reform. Second, the efficiency of resource allocation is difficult 
to observe in the short term and at the local level. The central government must 
take a holistic and long-term perspective to harvest the final fruits of reform. Third, 
strengthening tax enforcement is consistent with the notion of ‘tax by law’, which 
is different from strengthening tax enforcement on firms to make up for the deficit 
due to the shortfall in revenue.
12 It is possible the effect of the income tax unification policy did not fully reflect the year of reform. We calculated 
the average corporate income tax rates of state-owned and domestic enterprises above designated size in 2010 at 
11.7 per cent, then, ∂τ̄/∂t ≈ 0.525, λ ≈ 2.095. At this time, under the condition of tax neutrality, the optimal VAT 
rate for the government to fully collect and administer in accordance with the law is about 13.6 per cent.
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In summation, the revenue-neutral reform that we propose may help not only 
solve current public revenue distress, but also facilitate structural reform and the 
transformation of the Chinese economy towards high-quality development. It 
may also help to make China’s fiscal and tax systems become the ‘foundation and 
important pillars of state governance’, as proposed in the report of the Nineteenth 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
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6
Innovation and its 
growth effects in China
Sizhong Sun
Introduction
Innovation plays a central role in a country’s economic development. Successful 
innovations create new ideas that help society progress. For a business, a successful 
innovation is likely to boost its competitive advantage, by reducing the marginal 
cost of production via process innovation, for example, or by increasing demand for 
its products via product innovation. Innovation can facilitate resource allocation1 
and is one of the drivers of sustainable growth. Policymakers frequently employ 
a number of measures, such as subsidies or tax credits, to encourage innovation. 
One can view innovation as a production process—namely, using a set of inputs (for 
example, research and development) to produce a set of outputs (for example, new 
products). As such, innovation has both an input perspective, such as research and 
development (R&D) expenditure and R&D researchers, and an output perspective, 
including patents. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD 2018) defines four types of innovation in the Oslo Manual—product, 
process, marketing and organisational innovation—which are classifications more 
concerned with the output perspective.
Owing to the importance of innovation, researchers have investigated it from various 
dimensions, one of which is the determinants of innovative activities. For R&D—
the input perspective of innovation—previous studies exploring its determinants 
include Belderbos et al. (2013) in Europe, Japan and the United States; Hammadou 
1 For example, Acemoglu et al. (2011) find that patents—an output of innovative activities—improve resource 
allocation via encouraging experimentation and knowledge transfer.
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et al. (2014) in 14 European countries; Okamuro et al. (2011) in Japan; López 
(2008) in Spain; Chun and Mun (2012) in South Korea; and Kastl et al. (2013) 
in Italy. 
From the output perspective, patents are extensively examined in the existing 
literature. To name a few, Fischer et al. (1994) studied firms’ patent behaviour in the 
Austrian manufacturing sector, while Nicholas (2011) studied patenting behaviour 
in the United States during the 1920s. Gedik (2012) and Aldieri (2011) utilised 
patent citations to capture knowledge diffusion in Australia and the United States, 
respectively. Buesa et al. (2010) explored the determinants of regional innovation 
in Europe, where they treated R&D as the input and patents as the output of 
a  knowledge production function. Chan (2010) studied the international patent 
application decisions of nine agricultural biotechnology firms from 1990 to 2000, 
while Figueroa and Serrano (2013) investigated the determinants of patent sale and 
acquisition decisions by small and large firms.
Compared with the studies of R&D and patents, there is less research exploring 
product, process, marketing and organisational innovation. For some examples, 
however, Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013) investigated how financial 
constraints influenced a firm’s innovation activities, including product innovation, 
in Europe in 2002 and 2005, where they found a negative impact from financial 
constraints on domestically owned firms’ ability to innovate. The relative lack of 
studies on these four types of innovation, despite their clear conceptualisation, is 
possibly due to lack of data, particularly in developing countries. 
In this chapter, I explore innovation in China from both the input (R&D) and 
the output (patents and the aforementioned four types of innovation) perspectives 
at both the national and the industry levels. In particular, I focus on the role of 
innovation in driving economic growth in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and industrial output. 
In so doing, this chapter contributes to the existing literature in two respects. First, it 
aims to provide an updated and comprehensive picture of innovation in China at an 
aggregate level, utilising the available industry and national data. An understanding 
of innovation in China will help readers to better assess China’s economic potential 
in the future. Second, this chapter aims to evaluate the contribution of innovation 
to economic growth in China. Since the beginning of the reform and opening up 
four decades ago, the Chinese economy has been growing at impressive speed, 
and factors such as institutional reform and the release of cheap labour from the 
agricultural sector have arguably played important roles in this growth. Currently 
China has attained the status of an advanced developing economy and is now facing 
the middle-income trap. Some of these factors may no longer be the source of 
economic growth. For example, with China’s potential arrival at its Lewis turning 
point (for  discussions, see, among others, Cai 2010; Garnaut and Huang 2006; 
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Minami and Ma 2010), a labour shortage has become a binding constraint on 
economic growth. In light of such constraints, innovation can be a sustainable 
source of economic growth for China in the future.
The rest of this chapter is organised into five sections. In section two, I briefly 
survey existing studies, focusing on those that cover China. Section three presents 
an update of innovation in China from the dimensions of R&D, patents, as well as 
product, process, marketing and organisational innovation. In section four, utilising 
an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, I explore the role of R&D and 
patents in China’s economic growth in both the short and the long terms. In section 
five, I assess the impacts of innovation on industrial output, utilising industry panel 
data, and finally, section six will conclude the chapter.
Related literature
Researchers frequently explore innovation from two perspectives. The first is to 
examine factors that affect innovation activities—see, for example, Anwar and Sun 
(2013), Zhou (2014) and Zhou and Song (2016) on the determinants of R&D in 
China. The second is to investigate the impacts of innovation activities. My study 
is related less to the first perspective than to the second. As such, I briefly survey 
existing studies that explore the second perspective in this section, focusing on those 
involving China.
R&D is a dimension of innovation that has been extensively explored. Using a rich 
dataset covering the population of China’s large and medium-sized manufacturing 
enterprises, Jefferson et al. (2006) find that R&D expenditure promotes firms’ 
product innovation, productivity and profitability. Li and Lu (2018) find that 
R&D promotes the green-sophistication of Chinese exports. Zhang and Xie (2020) 
examine the impacts of R&D investment and product innovation on China’s export 
performance, and find that these innovation activities promote export propensity, 
but not export intensity. Similarly, Wu et al. (2020) find that innovation activity, 
measured in terms of R&D expenditure, promotes export-extensive, but not export-
intensive, margins. In the mining sector, Rafiq et al. (2016) find that Chinese mining 
firms with R&D activities have higher profitability and sales revenues than those 
without. Similarly, Sun and Anwar (2019) observe that domestic firms in China’s 
iron ore mining industry that conduct R&D are, on average, more productive and 
have higher sales revenue. Chinese government R&D programs are also found to 
promote firms’ innovation outputs, including the number of patents and revenue 
from new product sales (Guo et al. 2016).
Hu et al. (2017) find that the correlation between patents and labour productivity 
has weakened, despite a surge in patent applications in China. The increase in 
applications does not mean that patent quality, measured in terms of citations, 
CHINA’S CHALLENGES IN MOVING TOWARDS A HIGH-INCOME ECONOMY
136
is high. Fisch et al. (2017) observe that, compared with the United States, Europe, 
Japan and South Korea, Chinese patents have lower value in terms of citations, with 
similar findings made by Boeing and Mueller (2019). 
Dai and Cheng (2018) assess the effect of product innovation on firm markup 
and productivity, using a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms. They find 
significantly positive impacts on firm markup and revenue productivity by product 
innovation, but its influence on adjusted productivity is negative or insignificant. 
Zhu et al. (2021) link product and process innovation to employment in China, 
where they find process innovation serves to promote employment, while product 
innovation dampens employment.
Many studies on innovation activities in China explore the regional dimension. 
Chen and Guan (2010) utilise a method of data envelopment analysis to measure 
the efficiency of China’s regional innovation systems, finding a low level of efficiency. 
Similarly, Bai (2013) estimates the regional innovation efficiency in China from 1998 
to 2007 using a stochastic frontier approach and finds low innovation efficiency. 
Fu et al. (2012) investigate the path‐dependent evolution of regional innovation 
systems in Shenzhen and Dongguan.
Fan et al. (2012) assess the regional innovation inequality in China from 1995 
to 2006, finding R&D to be one of the major drivers of increases in inequality. 
Huang et al. (2010) find double-threshold effects for regional innovation on the 
productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment in 29 Chinese provinces 
between 1985 and 2008. Using a multi-agent-based simulation, Wang et al. (2014) 
show that policies can promote the process of innovation diffusion, which in turn 
boosts the economies of less-developed regions, particularly in central China.
Fu and Mu (2014) explore the policy choices in the extended national innovation 
performance framework, while Liu et al. (2011) and Wu (2012) assess the 
evolution of China’s innovation policies. Fan (2014) critically reviews the studies 
of China’s innovation capability, including the development pathway of its 
national innovation system.
The research in this chapter has three distinct features that distinguish it from these 
existing studies. First, it covers more types of innovation activities, including R&D, 
patent, product, process, marketing and organisational innovation. Second, it analyses 
China’s innovation activities and their growth effects at the industry and national 
levels. Third, it does not cover the regional dimension of innovation activities.
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Overview of innovation in China 
Over the past few years, innovation in China—in terms of inputs (R&D) and 
outputs (for example, patents)—has been on a rising trajectory. Figure 6.1 shows 
the trend for both R&D expenditure and the number of full-time-equivalent 
R&D researchers. The top-left panel of Figure 6.1 suggests that the number of 
full-time-equivalent R&D researchers has been growing at increasing speed, to 
reach 4.61 million in 2019. The increasing R&D personnel will, not surprisingly, 
contribute to the growth of innovation outputs, which in turn will boost economic 
growth. The trend for R&D expenditure (as a share of GDP), shown in the top-right 
panel of Figure 6.1, appears different to that for the number of R&D researchers. 
First, it pursued a downward trend before 1997, reaching a low of 0.5 per cent in 
1994; second, after 1997, R&D expenditure began to rise substantially, reaching 
a peak of 2.2 per cent in 2019. However, its growth rate appears to be declining. 
From 1989 to 2019, R&D expenditure (as a share of GDP) increased more than 
threefold, from 0.7 per cent in 1989 to 2.2 per cent in 2019. Despite the figure 
appearing relatively modest (less than 2.2 per cent), the increasingly large size of the 
Chinese economy (GDP) implies a large volume of R&D investment.
The accelerating growth rate in the number of R&D researchers, coupled with the 
declining growth rate of R&D expenditure (relative to GDP), suggests an increased 
share of spending on R&D personnel. The bottom-left panel of Figure 6.1 shows 
the association between the number of R&D researchers and R&D expenditure—
appearing to confirm this. We can observe that a 1 per cent increase in R&D 
expenditure is associated with a more than 1 per cent increase in the number of 
R&D researchers when R&D expenditure is at a high level. Nevertheless, despite the 
link between the number of R&D researchers and R&D expenditure, their growth 
rates do not appear to be substantially linked (the bottom-right panel of Figure 6.1).
In Figure 6.2, I examine patent applications made by both residents and non-
residents and associate them with the number of R&D researchers and expenditure 
levels. The top-left panel of Figure 6.2 exhibits the time trends of patent applications 
of residents and non-residents, from which three features emerge. First, patent 
applications by both residents and non-residents exhibit an increasing trend—
consistent with the rise in R&D expenditure and researcher numbers in Figure 6.1. 
Second, the number of patent applications before 2000, from residents and non-
residents, is relatively modest and the growth trend is less obvious compared with 
that of the post-2000 period—once again, consistent with the pattern of inputs 
(R&D expenditure and researchers). As is observable in Figure 6.1, both R&D 
expenditure and the number of researchers grew substantially faster after 2000 than 
in the preceding period. Third, the number of patent applications made by residents 
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has come to dominate that made by non-residents since 2005, with the gap increasing 
over the years (also see the top-right panel of Figure 6.1). Clearly therefore, residents 
have come to play an increasingly crucial role in innovation in China.
The association between residents’ patent applications and R&D inputs 
(expenditure and number of researchers) also differs from that for non-residents. 
The bottom-left panel of Figure 6.2 plots the number of patent applications against 
the number of R&D researchers and displays the corresponding fitting curves. 
For residents’ patent applications, the convex and upward sloping fitting curve 
suggests a positive correlation with the number of R&D researchers and that the 
degree of association becomes higher at higher numbers of researchers. In contrast, 
despite the similarly positive correlation for non-residents’ patent applications, the 
fitting curve is concave, indicating that a unit increase in the number of R&D 
researchers is associated with a smaller increase in the number of non-residents’ 
patent applications. The bottom-right panel of Figure 6.2 presents the associations 
with R&D expenditure. For residents’ patent applications, we can observe a pattern 
similar to their association with the number of R&D researchers. In contrast, the 
fitting curve of the scatter plot between non-residents’ patent applications and R&D 
expenditure becomes linear. Therefore, R&D inputs appear to be differentially 
associated with patent applications by residents and non-residents.
Figure 6.3 provides a snapshot of product, process, organisational and marketing 
innovation by displaying the distributions of the share of enterprises (above designated 
size) that engaged in these four types of innovation in two-digit industries in 2018. 
The dots and horizontal bars in Figure 6.1 represent the median and mean of these 
shares, respectively. On average, 22.92 per cent of enterprises above designated 
size conducted product innovation, 26.62 per cent conducted process innovation, 
26.91 per cent conducted organisational innovation and 23.4 per cent conducted 
marketing innovation. Comparing the means with the medians in Figure 6.3, we 
can observe that they are close to each other in all four distributions, suggesting 
symmetrical distributions. Comparing the means and medians across the four 
innovation types, we can see that more firms conducted organisational and process 
innovation than marketing and product innovation.
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Figure 6.3 Share of enterprises (above designated size) conducting product, 
process, organisational and marketing innovation, by industry, 2018 (per cent)
Source: NBS (2021).
For product innovation, the instrumentation manufacturing industry has the highest 
share of enterprises conducting product innovation (59.2 per cent). In  contrast, 
the coal mining and washing industry reports the lowest share of enterprises 
with product innovation (2.5 per cent). Among enterprises conducting process 
innovation, the instrumentation manufacturing industry again registers the highest 
share, with 51.6 per cent, while the mining sector displays the lowest share, with 
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the coal mining and washing industry at 9.2 per cent and other mining industries at 
8.3 per cent. The instrumentation manufacturing industry continues to also occupy 
the top position in organisational innovation, registering a share of 45.6 per cent. 
In contrast, the nonmetallic mining and dressing sector reports the lowest share, 
of 14.4 per cent. In marketing innovation, the industries with  the highest and 
lowest shares are the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and the ferrous 
metal mining and dressing industry, with shares of 46 and 6 per cent, respectively, 
while the instrumentation manufacturing industry has the second-highest share of 
enterprises with marketing innovation, at 44 per cent. Generally, the mining sector 
exhibits lower shares across all four types of innovation when compared with the 
manufacturing sector.
Owing to data availability, I am able to examine the dynamics of product innovation 
in terms of the number of new-product projects across industries between 2011 
and 2018. Figure 6.4 presents these distributions across the eight years in question. 
Here we can observe two patterns: first, the average number of new-product projects 
(the curve with circles in Figure 6.4) exhibits a weak upward trend, which becomes 
more obvious after 2015, with the median (the bars in the boxes in Figure 6.4) 
exhibiting a similar pattern; second, the means are substantially higher than the 
medians in all eight years, due to some industries having large numbers of new-
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Figure 6.4 Distributions of the number of new‑product projects, 2011–2018
Source: NBS (2021).
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In summary, innovation activities are on a rising trajectory in China, whether 
measured in terms of inputs (R&D expenditure and researchers) or outputs (patents 
and product, process, organisational and marketing innovation). With these rising 
trends, it is important to investigate how they affect the Chinese economy. Therefore, 
in the next two sections, I examine the impact of innovation on national GDP and 
on industrial outputs at the industry level.
Innovation and GDP
To investigate the impact of innovation on economic growth in China, I utilise the 
aggregate production function framework; and, since the data are a time series from 
1989 to 2019, an autoregressive distributed lag model is used in the estimations, 
as in Equation 6.1.
Equation 6.1
In Equation 6.1, Y, I, L and K represent GDP, innovation, labour and capital, 
respectively; ∆ is the difference operator; ε is the error term; and P and Q are the 
lag lengths. In the estimations, due to the small sample size, I set P = 1 in most 
estimations. If the error terms exhibit autocorrelation in an estimation, I instead 
set P = 2. The lag length, Q, is also set to 1 in the estimations, and sometimes 
no lead is used. Conceptually, it is possible that some right-hand-side variables are 
endogenous. For example, on the one hand, innovation promotes economic growth, 
while on the other, higher economic growth is likely to lead to higher innovation 
as economic growth facilitates investment in innovation. The lags and leads of 
differenced lnL, lnK and lnI are intended to absorb such possible correlations with 
the error term. Innovation is captured by four dimensions in the regressions—
namely, the number of full-time-equivalent R&D researchers, R&D expenditure 
(as a share of GDP), the number of patent applications by residents and the number 
of patent applications by non-residents. Note that, in the ARDL model, the long-
run impact of innovation can be measured by α2 ⁄ (–ΣPp=1 αp1).
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The data on GDP are sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI ) (World 
Bank 2021), which are in constant 2010 US dollars. The labour force (unit: 10,000) 
acts as a proxy for labour, sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBS 2021). Data on capital are the gross fixed capital formation (percentage of 
gross national income, or GNI), calculated as the ratio of total investment in fixed 
assets against GNI, which are also sourced from the NBS. For innovation, data on 
R&D expenditure (percentage of GDP) and the number of full-time-equivalent 
R&D researchers (unit: 10,000 persons per year) are obtained from the NBS, while 
data on patent applications by residents and non-residents are sourced from the 
WDI. I first test the stationarity of the time series (lnY, lnI, lnL and LnK ), and 
Table 6.1 reports the results. Except lnL, the other series are all I(1) and lnL is I(0). 
Therefore, an ARDL model is appropriate in this case. 
Table 6.2 reports the estimation results, for which labour and capital are not 
included. In the estimations, a number of diagnostic tests were conducted, which 
verify the validity of the estimations. For example, for the regression where 
innovation is measured as the number of full-time-equivalent R&D researchers 
(column [1] of Table 6.2), the Ramsey regression equation specification error test 
(RESET test) finds a test statistic of 1.09 (p-value of 0.3829), which fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables. The Breusch–Pagan test 
for heteroskedasticity obtains a test statistic of 8.76 (p-value of 0.119), suggesting 
no presence of heteroskedasticity. The Dickey–Fuller test of the predicted residuals 
obtains a test statistic of –3.093 (with drift, and p-value of 0.0027), confirming 
that the residuals are stationary (I(0)). Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation 
finds a test statistic of 4.593 with p-value of 0.0321, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation at the 1 per cent level. The Breusch–
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation also fails to reject the null 
of no serial correlation from orders one to five at the 1 per cent level. 
The LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) fails to reject 
the null of no ARCH effects from orders one to five at the 1 per cent level. I also plot 
the cumulative sums of the recursive residuals and their squares from the regression, 
which stay within their 95 per cent confidence bands, confirming the stability of the 
regression (graph not reported to save space). For the other regressions, including 
those where I include lnL and lnK in Table 6.4, the same diagnostic tests are applied 
and, when applicable, adjustments are made to accommodate the findings of these 
tests. For example, in column [3] of Table 6.2, the standard errors are robust as the 
Breusch–Pagan test rejects the null of no heteroskedasticity at the 1 per cent level. 
These diagnostic tests are not reported, to save space, but are available on request. 
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In the four regressions in Table 6.2, the estimated coefficients of innovation are 
statistically nonsignificant at the 5 per cent level for regressions [1], [3] and [4]. 
In contrast, the innovation coefficient is estimated to be positive and significant at 
the 5 per cent level in regression [2]. The nonsignificant estimates appear to suggest 
that innovation measured in terms of the number of R&D researchers and patent 
applications of residents and non-residents plays a less important role in economic 
growth in the short term. In the four regressions, some of the estimated coefficients 
of the lags of differenced innovation are statistically significant, suggesting a time lag 
for innovation. The significant estimate of the coefficient of innovation, measured 
in terms of R&D expenditure as a share of GDP, is likely to capture the short-term 
growth effect for non-innovation-related spending.
In the long run, the situations are different. In all four regressions, the estimated 
coefficients of innovation are positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level, suggesting that innovation promotes economic growth in the long run. 
For R&D researchers, a 1 per cent increase in the number of full-time-equivalent 
R&D researchers results in a 0.69 per cent increase in aggregate output. The impact 
of R&D spending is even bigger, with an elasticity of 1.34. It is interesting to 
compare the long-run coefficient of residents’ patent applications with that of non-
residents. Despite both being significantly positive, the magnitude of the coefficient 
for non-residents’ patent applications is higher, suggesting that non-residents’ patent 
applications play a greater role in boosting economic growth.
In Table 6.2, the regressions do not control for the roles of labour and capital. 
I report the regression results that control for labour and capital inputs in Table 6.3. 
Capital, labour and innovation are highly correlated (pairwise correlation > 0.86). 
With the small sample size, the multicollinearity issue is a concern. To  address 
this, I first project labour on to the subspace spanned by an innovation measure 
and a vector of 1 to obtain a vector of labour measure that is orthogonal to the 
innovation measure and used in the regression. Second, I project capital to the 
subspace spanned by innovation, orthogonalised labour and a vector of 1, from 
which I obtain an orthogonalised capital for the regressions. 
Comparing the regression results of Table 6.3 with those of Table 6.2, unsurprisingly, 
we can observe differences in terms of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. 
In particular, the short-run coefficient of innovation, measured in terms of 
R&D expenditure, now becomes statistically insignificant at the 5 per cent level. 
Nevertheless, the pattern in which innovation, measured in any one of the four 
dimensions, plays an insignificant role in economic growth in the short run while 
promoting economic growth in the long run continues to hold even after labour and 
capital are controlled in the regressions. Thus, the findings in Table 6.2 are robust.
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Table 6.1 Unit root tests
Levels First difference
ADF PP ADF PP









lnY –1.216 –2.287 –1.298 –0.789 –3.809 –3.918 –2.751 –2.934 I(1)
lnI [1] 0.603 –1.771 0.421 –1.845 –3.924 –3.891 –3.938 –3.914 I(1)
lnI [2] –0.114 –2.125 –0.235 –2.257 –4.520 –4.453 –4.539 –4.476 I(1)
lnI [3] 1.348 –2.457 1.052 –2.425 –4.660 –4.547 –4.670 –4.571 I(1)
lnI [4] –0.699 –1.504 –0.686 –1.603 –5.477 –5.423 –5.482 –5.431 I(1)
lnL –3.566 –2.219 –4.343 –2.293 –4.953 –5.964 –5.003 –5.992 I(0)
lnK –0.976 –1.287 –1.062 –1.782 –2.955 –2.896 –2.942 –2.880 I(1)
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root; for lnY, one year lag is used; [1] is the 
number of R&D researchers; [2] is R&D expenditure; [3] is patent applications by residents; and [4] is 
patent applications by non‑residents.
Sources: Author’s estimations using data from World Bank (2021); NBS (2021).
Table 6.2 Regression results
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
lnYt‑1 –0.05* 0.03 0.58*** 0.09 0.68*** 0.19 0.88*** 0.18
lnYt‑2 –0.63*** 0.09 –0.71*** 0.20 –1.38*** 0.32
lnYt‑3 0.49** 0.18
lnIt 0.04 0.03 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant 1.38* 0.69 1.41*** 0.30 0.84 0.64 0.41 0.38
Long‑run coefficient
lnI 0.69*** 0.22 1.34*** 0.10 0.37*** 0.09 0.63*** 0.19
N 25.00 28.00 31.00 30.00
F 6.44 18.25 7.29 5.01
Adj. R2 0.53  0.79  0.51  0.49  
*** significant at the 1 per cent level
** significant at the 5 per cent level
* significant at the 10 per cent level
Notes: In [1], innovation is measured as the number of full‑time‑equivalent R&D researchers; in [2], 
innovation is R&D expenditure as a share of GDP; in [3], innovation is the number of residents’ patent 
applications, and the standard errors are robust; in [4], innovation is the number of non‑residents’ patent 
applications. The coefficients of lags and leads of differenced terms are not reported, to save space. 
Sources: Author’s estimations using data from World Bank (2021); NBS (2021).
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Table 6.3 Regression results with capital and labour
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
lnYt‑1 0.05 0.08 0.49*** 0.15 –0.11** 0.04 –0.17*** 0.05
lnYt‑2 –0.57*** 0.13
lnIt –0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.04** 0.02 0.10*** 0.04
lnLt –0.39 0.49 0.00 0.43 0.20** 0.09 0.28*** 0.09
lnKt 0.20*** 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.17** 0.06
Constant –0.95 1.86 2.43 1.51 2.80*** 0.98 3.84*** 1.16
Long‑run coefficients
lnI 1.58* 0.88 1.45*** 0.18 0.40*** 0.03 0.62*** 0.01
lnL 7.55** 3.41 1.62 4.46 1.86*** 0.49 1.62*** 0.23
lnK –3.48 6.65 0.39 0.40 0.85 0.78 0.99*** 0.08
N 25.00 28.00 32.00 32.00
F 8.06 10.22 4.7 5.62
Adj. R2 0.75  0.79  0.54  0.60  
*** significant at the 1 per cent level
** significant at the 5 per cent level
* significant at the 10 per cent level
Notes: In [1], innovation is measured as the number of full‑time‑equivalent R&D researchers; in [2], 
innovation is R&D expenditure as a share of GDP; in [3], innovation is the number of residents’ patent 
applications; in [4], innovation is the number of non‑residents’ patent applications. The coefficients of 
lags and leads of differenced terms are not reported, to save space. 
Sources: Author’s estimations using data from World Bank (2021); NBS (2021).
Industry analysis
Similar to the national-level analysis, the industry-level analysis also starts with the 
aggregate production function framework, where the industry output is a function 
of capital, labour and a measure of innovation. Unlike the ARDL model in section 
four, since we are using balanced panel data, here we utilise the fixed-effect estimator 
in the regressions. The empirical model is Equation 6.2.
Equation 6.2
lnYit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1lnIit + 𝛽2lnKit–2 + 𝛽3lnKit–2 + 𝜁i + 𝜖it
In Equation 6.2, Y, I, K and L are the industry output (revenue), a measure of 
innovation, capital and labour, respectively; ε is the error term; ζ is the unobserved 
industry fixed effect that can be correlated with the inputs (K, L and I ); and the 
subscripts i and t denote industry and year, respectively. The inputs in the right-
hand side of the equation can be endogenous. So, for K and L, I use the two-year 
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lag to alleviate the possible endogeneity of capital and labour. For innovation, 
I utilise two years lead of the level and difference of the innovation measure as the 
excluded instruments.2
The industry panel data are sourced from the NBS and the China Industry Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS 2011–17) and cover 28 two-digit industries over six years (2012–18). 
The two-digit industries are aggregates of enterprises above a designated size, and as 
such do not include all firms in the relevant industry. The industry output (revenue, 
unit: RMB100 million) is deflated using the ex-factory price index of industrial 
producers (1985 = 100). Capital is proxied by the total assets in the industry (unit: 
RMB100 million), which is deflated by using the fixed-asset investment price index 
(1990 = 100). Labour is measured as the average number of workers in each industry 
(unit: 1,000 persons), data for which are sourced from the China Industry Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS 2011–17). 
I use four indicators to measure innovation: the number of new-product projects, 
full-time-equivalent R&D researchers, R&D projects and valid invention patents. 
These  four indicators capture both the input and the output perspectives of 
innovation activities, and Table 6.4 presents the summary statistics of these 
variables. We can observe substantial variations for all variables, which allow for 
identification of the impact of innovation. For example, on average, industries 
have revenues of almost RMB110 billion with a standard deviation of more than 
RMB100 billion. The revenue for the highest industry is more than 490 times that 
of the lowest industry.
Table 6.5 presents the regression results, where the first two columns (FE [1] and 
FE [2]) are fixed-effect estimations assuming exogeneity of explanatory variables 
and the second two columns (IV FE [1] and IV FE [2]) account for the potential 
endogeneity of innovation. In the IV FE estimations, I check the relevance and 
validity of excluded instruments by the under-identification (the Kleibergen–
Paap rk LM test), weak identification (the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F test) and 
over-identification tests (the Hansen J test), and in all regressions the excluded 
instruments are relevant and valid. For example, in the regression with capital, labour 
and the number of new-product projects, the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM test statistic 
is 40.58 (p-value < 0.01), rejecting the null hypothesis that excluded instruments 
are irrelevant. The Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F test statistic is 102.85—higher than 
the critical value of the Stock–Yogo weak identification test (10 per cent maximal 
IV size: 19.93). The Hansen J statistic is 0.735 (p-value of 0.3914), suggesting the 
excluded instruments are valid. 
2  Except for the regression with the number of full-time-equivalent R&D researchers, capital and labour (the 
right column of panel [2] in Table 6.5), where the excluded instruments are four years lead of innovation and three 
years lead of differenced innovation as the two years lead instruments do not pass the Hansen J test.
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In all regressions, the estimated coefficients of innovation, measured for any of 
the four indicators, are positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The significantly positive estimates suggest that innovation promotes industrial 
development in China. A 1 per cent increase in the number of new-product projects 
and the number of valid invention patents results in an approximately 0.8 per cent 
increase in the industrial output. Similarly, a 1 per cent increase in the number of 
full-time-equivalent R&D researchers and the number of R&D projects leads to an 
approximately 1 per cent increase in industrial output. Note that, despite the fact 
the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of innovation exhibit some variation, 
they are generally consistent with each other in the sense that one estimate is not too 
far away from the others. 
Therefore, as with the findings from national-level analysis, the industry-level 
analysis also confirms the growth effect of innovation, which is robust to different 
measures of innovation activity. Note that the industry panel data only cover seven 
years, and our regressions here estimate the long-run effect of innovation, rather 
than examining the short-run dynamics. 
In Table 6.5, due to issues of data availability, process, marketing and organisational 
innovation are not examined. For process innovation, the available data cover 
21 two-digit industries in the manufacturing sector over three years (2016–18). 
For marketing and organisational innovation, the data are cross-sectional, covering 
28 two-digit industries in 2018. Table 6.6 reports the estimation results for process 
innovation, where the excluded instruments are its one-year lead of level and 
one-year lag of differenced process innovation. The statistical tests suggest these 
instruments are relevant, valid and not weak. Table 6.7 reports the regression 
results for marketing and organisational innovations, where I assume exogeneity 
of innovations, and therefore the estimated coefficients measure association, rather 
than causality. In both tables, the process, marketing and organisational innovations 
are measured as the shares of the number of innovating firms in the two-digit 
industries (percentage).
In Table 6.6, the estimated coefficient of process innovation is 0.01, which is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. A 1 per cent increase in the share of 
firms that conduct process innovation results in a 0.01 per cent increase in industry 
output. In Table 6.7, the coefficients of marketing and organisational innovation are 
estimated to be 0.06 and 0.07, respectively, both of which are statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent level. The estimates suggest that both marketing and organisational 
innovations are positively associated with industry output. Therefore, with this 
smaller sample, we continue to observe significant growth effects from innovation.
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Table 6.4 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Yt 1,093.7110 1,000.8160 8.58 4,222.00
Kt‑2 25,645.9900 24,167.5000 1,882.30 134,531.40
Lt‑2 244.1529 212.3263 13.13 909.26
npp 11,163.2600 15,076.9000 65.00 67,027.00
ferdr 73,200.9100 99,088.3900 566.80 552,618.00
rdp 10,263.7800 12,696.4100 85.00 52,317.00
nip 19,176.2400 40,928.2400 49.00 300,369.00
Notes: N = 196; Yt = unit = RMB100 billion (current price); Kt‑2 = unit = RMB100 billion (current price); 
Lt‑2 = unit = 10,000; npp = number of new‑product projects; ferdr = number of full‑time‑equivalent R&D 
researchers; rdp = number of R&D projects; nip = number of valid invention patents. 
Source: NBS (2021).
Table 6.5 Industry estimation results
FE [1] FE [2] IV FE [1] IV FE [2]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
[1] Innovation: Number of new‑product projects
lnIt 0.68*** 0.04 0.53*** 0.06 0.76*** 0.07 0.80*** 0.10
lnKt‑2 –0.08 0.13 0.03 0.12
lnLt‑2 0.35*** 0.11 –0.22 0.14
N 196.00 196.00 182.00 182.00
F 341.92 144.40 102.09 105.94
Centred R2 0.73 0.74 0.63 0.62
K‑P rk LM 26.81 40.58
K‑P rk Wald F 52.23 102.85
Hansen J 0.02 0.74
[2] Innovation: Number of full‑time‑equivalent R&D researchers
lnIt 0.77*** 0.04 0.76*** 0.09 1.10*** 0.12 0.34*** 0.13
lnKt‑2 –0.23* 0.13 0.38*** 0.09
lnLt‑2 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.17
N 196.00 196.00 182.00 168.00
F 438.03 154.28 88.01 557.19
Centred R2 0.73 0.74 0.38 0.80
K‑P rk LM 27.51 18.91
K‑P rk Wald F 35.91 14.61
Hansen J 0.53 6.06
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FE [1] FE [2] IV FE [1] IV FE [2]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
[3] Innovation: Number of R&D projects
lnIt 0.78*** 0.04 0.66*** 0.07 1.07*** 0.12 1.17*** 0.15
lnKt‑2 –0.22* 0.13 –0.25** 0.12
lnLt‑2 0.37*** 0.11 –0.31* 0.17
N 196.00 196.00 182.00 182.00
F 440.66 173.36 81.15 86.47
Centred R2 0.72 0.74 0.43 0.51
K‑P rk LM 27.60 41.24
K‑P rk Wald F 37.57 81.17
Hansen J 0.05 9.80
[4] Innovation: Number of valid invention patents
lnIt 0.64*** 0.03 0.44*** 0.04 0.79*** 0.08 0.98*** 0.16
lnKt‑2 –0.31** 0.15 –0.48*** 0.18
lnLt‑2 0.66*** 0.11 0.00 0.18
N 196.00 196.00 182.00 182.00
F 333.29 149.03 93.05 74.56
Centred R2 0.65 0.71 0.45 0.35
K‑P rk LM 29.92 37.86
K‑P rk Wald F 63.77 45.74
Hansen J 3.57 0.67
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level
* significant at the 10 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation; K‑P rk LM = Kleibergen–
Paap rk LM test statistic; K‑P rk Wald F = Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F test statistic; year dummies are 
dropped in the regression due to multicollinearity. 
Source: Author’s estimations using data from NBS (2021).
Table 6.6 Industry estimation results: Process innovation
FE IV FE
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
lnIt –0.0020 0.02 –0.003 0.01 0.08*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00
lnKt‑2 0.060 0.31 0.71*** 0.04
lnLt‑2 0.720*** 0.23 0.27*** 0.05
N 63.0000 63.000 54.00 54.00
F 0.0100 33.730 29.01 54.00
Centred R2 0.0003 0.440 –0.27 0.97
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FE IV FE
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
K‑P rk LM 17.02 17.63
K‑P rk Wald F 73.29 78.84
Hansen J    5.04  1.63  
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level 
* significant at the 10 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation; K‑P rk LM = Kleibergen–
Paap rk LM test statistic; K‑P rk Wald F = Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F test statistic; year dummies are 
dropped in the regression due to multicollinearity. 
Source: Author’s estimations using data from NBS (2021).
Table 6.7 Industry estimation results: Marketing and organisational innovation
[1] Marketing [2] Organisational
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
lnIt 0.09*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02
lnKt‑2 –0.02 0.34 –0.33 0.40
lnLt‑2 0.78*** 0.22 1.08*** 0.28
Constant 2.88*** 0.48 –0.26 1.91 2.12*** 0.69 0.51 2.00
N 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00
F 27.26 36.27 23.51 34.18
Centred R2 0.50 0.75 0.38 0.72
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level 
* significant at the 10 per cent level
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Source: Author’s estimations using data from NBS (2021).
Concluding remarks
This chapter aims to provide an update of aggregate innovation activity in China. 
In light of the increasingly binding resource constraints—for example, depletion of 
cheap labour released from the agricultural sector—innovation is likely to play an 
important role in China’s future economic development. Therefore, it is important to 
examine innovation in China to gain a better understanding of the country’s future 
growth trajectory. I focus on the growth effects of innovation in China from several 
dimensions—namely, the input perspective of R&D expenditure and the number of 
R&D researchers, as well as the output perspective of patents and product, process, 
organisational and marketing innovation. 
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The main message of this chapter is threefold: first, innovation in China is on 
a growth trajectory, with this growth showing little evidence of slowing; second, 
innovation appears to promote economic growth in the long run at both the 
national and the industry levels; and third, there is a lack of a short-run growth 
effect from innovation at the national level. With four decades of economic growth, 
China is paying more and more attention to innovation, which is likely to become 
a new source of future economic growth. This study utilises aggregate national and 
industry data. Future studies, on the other hand, will be able to explore disaggregated 
data at the firm or project level to provide a picture of innovation in China from an 
alternative angle. 
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The conditions in China’s corporate sector are important for Chinese economic 
growth and financial stability and have significant implications for China’s major 
trading partners, including Australia. Chinese business investment has been 
an important source of economic growth and has driven demand for resource 
commodities. However, by the same token, the corporate sector has been the largest 
contributor to nonfinancial-sector leverage, and corporate debt remains high by 
international standards. Analysis of the activities and financial health of China’s 
companies is also helpful for forming assessments about the broader trajectory of the 
Chinese economy and the effectiveness of government policies affecting businesses. 
A range of previous studies has examined conditions in China’s corporate sector.2 
These analyses have documented the decline in corporate profitability and the rise 
in leverage since 2008–09, which stemmed from the rapid increase in debt-funded 
investment that formed part of the Chinese Government’s stimulus response to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
1  This chapter provides an update on a RBA Bulletin article (Bowman 2019). The views expressed in this chapter 
are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Reserve Bank of Australia. The author thanks Eden 
Hatzvi for his helpful suggestions.
2  These include Lam et al. (2017); Laurenceson and Ma (2019); Read (2017); Roberts and Zurawski (2016); 
and Zhang et al. (2015).
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This chapter provides an update on recent developments by drawing on official 
industrial survey data. However, the official data cover only a limited number 
of industries and are restricted to companies above a certain size.3 Therefore, for 
more detailed analysis, this chapter uses alternative data derived from the financial 
statements of listed companies. As of mid-2020, more than 3,700 nonfinancial 
companies were listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, with 
a combined value of RMB68 trillion (US$10 trillion) in assets.4 Listed companies 
represent a relatively small but growing share of China’s broader corporate sector; 
these firms accounted for around 10 per cent of nonfinancial corporate debt in 2019.
Profitability has declined, driven by the 
private sector
A range of indicators suggests that growth in revenue and profits of Chinese firms 
has slowed in the past few years. The profitability of industrial firms captured in the 
official industrial survey had been trending lower following the 2008–09 stimulus. 
In large part, this downward trend reflected the fact that returns to new large capital 
outlays declined following the large boost to investment that occurred during the 
period of stimulus. Profitability rebounded in 2016 and 2017 following government 
efforts to reduce overcapacity, leverage and the cost of doing business, under the 
policy framework of ‘Supply-Side Structural Reform’ (see Boulter 2018). However, 
in the past few years, growth in revenue and profits has moderated again and the 
return on assets has trended sharply lower (Figure 7.1). 
The decline in profitability since 2015 has been driven by private companies, 
albeit the profitability of private firms still remains higher than that of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Figure 7.2).5 In contrast, the profitability of SOEs has been 
trending higher. The more granular data reported by listed companies also suggest 
that the slowing of profitability in recent years has been driven by private companies, 
particularly smaller firms, and that the profitability of SOEs has been trending 
higher (Figure 7.3).6
3  China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) publishes aggregate data on the financial position of industrial 
(mining, manufacturing and utilities), real estate and construction firms with an annual revenue exceeding 
RMB20 million. 
4  The data are sourced from financial statements collated by Wind Information and include all nonfinancial ‘A’ 
shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The sample is unbalanced, so it includes all companies 
listed on the exchange at each point in time. 
5  The work identifies state versus private firms using the ownership classification scheme from China’s NBS. 
State firms are reflected by ‘state-holding enterprises’, which include SOEs, state-funded corporations and state-
owned joint-operation enterprises for which the percentage of state assets is larger than that of any other single 
shareholder of the same enterprise. 
6  This work identifies state versus private among listed firms using the ownership classification scheme from 
Wind Information. State companies include those classified as local or central state-owned companies and public 
enterprises. The ownership classification is time invariant. 

















Figure 7.1 Industrial sector financial indicators
Notes: The latest observation in the left‑hand panel is based on the year‑to‑date data until April. 
Return on assets is estimated as total profits divided by total assets.



























Figure 7.2 Industrial sector profitability
Notes: Return on assets is estimated as total profits divided by total assets. The latest observation 
in the right‑hand panel is based on data up to April.
Sources: Author’s calculations; CEIC Data.































Figure 7.3 Listed company profitability (return on equity)
Notes: Return on equity is estimated as total profits (excluding goodwill loss) divided by total equity. 
Firms with negative equity are excluded. Enterprises are grouped by size into small (assets less than 
RMB1 billion or approximately US$140 million), medium (assets greater than RMB1 billion but less than 
RMB6 billion or US$140–850 million) and large (assets greater than RMB6 billion or US$850 million). 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Industry Classification is used. 
Sources: Author’s calculations; Wind Information.
It is likely that the profitability of SOEs has continued to be supported by the 
government’s implementation of supply-side structural reform, since the high 
leverage and excess capacity characterising these firms made them the primary target 
of these policies. SOEs have responded by reducing their investment expenditure 
and excess capacity. This is evident in SOE-dominated industries, such as mining. 
The exception has been for SOEs in the construction industry: their return on 
equity has declined as they reduced their leverage, but their profits relative to assets 
have been little changed. 
The decline in profitability of private companies appears to have been exacerbated 
by efforts by Chinese regulators to reduce risks in the financial system; these efforts 
have resulted in a squeeze on less-regulated sources of credit, on which private 
firms are more reliant. The deterioration in profitability is also likely to be related 
to a  broader slowdown in global manufacturing and trade that has weakened 
the cash  flow of export-oriented firms (which are concentrated among smaller 
private firms).
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The profitability of listed firms in the manufacturing and service industries, which 
are dominated by private firms, has generally declined. The slowdown in revenue 
and profits has occurred across all the subcomponents of manufacturing. The 
profitability of car manufacturers has also been severely affected by tighter emissions 
standards, which have forced manufacturers to reduce production of models 
designed to old standards faster than they can increase production of cars designed 
to the new standards (Cui 2019). The falling profitability of listed service industry 
firms appears to be related to slowing growth in consumer spending; the decline in 
profitability has been particularly acute for the accommodation, entertainment and 
retail industries.
More recently, the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic can be seen in these data. 
The  imposition of restrictions on activity led to a further contraction in revenue 
growth and the proportion of firms recording losses rose materially for both private 
firms and SOEs in 2020. 
The private sector is most exposed to the 
global trade slowdown
The deteriorating profitability of private companies in China is partly related to 
global developments. The global slowdown in trade, underpinned by weaker growth 
in some advanced economies and the US–China trade and technology dispute, is 
likely to have weighed on corporate cash flows, particularly for export-oriented 
manufacturing firms. Exports rebounded strongly in 2020, reflecting increased 
demand for personal protective equipment, medical supplies and goods needed for 
remote work; China has benefited from being one of the first economies to restart 
production following the onset of COVID-19. However, export growth in China 
may resume its decline as some of this pandemic-related demand dissipates and 
because of the sharp decline in global growth in 2020. 
Listed private companies receive a higher proportion of their revenue from offshore 
than SOEs, and this has been increasingly the case over time. This is reflected in the 
fact that the proportion of China’s exports coming from the private sector increased 
from 5 per cent in 2000 to 50 per cent in 2019, while the contribution from SOEs 
declined (Figure 7.4).
The slowdown in Chinese exports has weighed on employment in China’s industrial 
sector (particularly manufacturing) (Figure 7.5). Export-oriented firms are more 
labour intensive than firms with low export exposure, and export-oriented firms 
have responded to the slowdown in trade by reducing their labour intensity 
(Bowman 2019). 
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Figure 7.4 Exports
Note: The latest observation in the left‑hand panel is based on the year‑to‑date data up to May.
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Figure 7.5 Industrial employment
Sources: Author’s calculations; CEIC Data.
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Corporate leverage has declined
Corporate sector leverage, measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, has declined 
in the past few years (Figure 7.6).7 The amount of leverage among SOEs has 
declined, reflecting the success of supply-side policies, which were reinforced by the 
introduction of deleveraging as a key performance metric for centrally supervised 
SOEs (State Council 2018). 
Leverage has been declining over recent years in the construction and mining 
industries, driven largely by SOEs. The reduction in excess capacity as a result of 
supply-side structural reform is likely to have contributed to increased profitability 
in the remaining firms, increasing their scope to reduce their leverage. The reduction 
in leverage among listed construction firms has also been supported by cash 
flows being directed away from capital expenditure and towards debt repayment. 
Leverage in the manufacturing and service industries—which are dominated by 
private firms—has moderated since the early 2010s but has been stable for the past 
few years.
Leverage remains elevated in the real estate industry, having increased strongly over 
a number of years, but has declined since 2017 (Figure 7.7). However, conventional 
leverage measures, such as the debt-to-equity ratio, do not fully capture the financial 
risks facing property developers because they exclude non-debt liabilities such as 
presold apartments. Accounting for both debt and nondebt liabilities, data on 
financing flows for both listed and unlisted Chinese real estate developers suggest 
they had at least RMB25 trillion in debt outstanding by mid-2019 (27 per cent of 
GDP).8 The authorities have imposed restrictions to curb the amount of financing 
directed to the real estate sector amid concerns that financing to other industries 
may be ‘crowded out’ (Guo 2019). 
Developers have responded by increasing their use of presale funding, while 
delaying construction and extending delivery times to reduce near-term expenditure 
(Kemp et al. 2020). This has increased the risk that developers could face financial 
pressure should they encounter a shortage of funding needed to deliver presold 
homes. Increased regulation of real estate financing may help prevent leverage 
from ratcheting up further but may also increase the sector’s vulnerability to 
a negative shock. 
7  The decline in corporate leverage is also evident with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) measure 
of China’s nonfinancial corporate debt as a percentage of GDP, which declined from 160 per cent in 2016 to 
149 per cent in 2019. 
8  This consists of RMB11 trillion of bank loans, RMB3 trillion of trust loans, RMB2 trillion of entrusted loans, 
RMB4 trillion of bonds outstanding and RMB6 trillion in deposits and advance payments. 























Figure 7.6 Listed company leverage (debt to equity)
Notes: Debt to equity is estimated as total debt (interest‑bearing liabilities) divided by total equity. 
Firms with negative equity are excluded. 









Ratio to shareholder equity
Figure 7.7 Listed real estate company leverage 
Note: Firms with negative equity are excluded. 
Sources: Author’s calculations; Wind Information.
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Financial conditions for smaller firms tightened 
pre‑COVID‑19
Funding conditions tightened for smaller firms (predominately privately owned) 
pre-COVID-19 in response to the authorities’ deleveraging campaign. This 
campaign predominantly targeted shadow banking and small banks in China, both 
of which disproportionately lend to smaller firms. In response, loans to small firms 
had been growing at a slower pace than broader loan growth (Figure 7.8). The cause 
of the comparably slower growth of loans to small firms appears to be supply driven, 
as survey measures suggest loan demand has increased for smaller firms since 2018.
The tighter financing conditions have also been evident in listed company data, as 
the implied interest rate for smaller firms has increased more rapidly compared with 




























Loan demand by business size
Figure 7.8 Loan growth and demand 
Note: Loan demand proxied by the Banking Climate Index, which is estimated using survey responses 
collected by the People’s Bank of China. 
Sources: Author’s calculations; CEIC Data.
























Figure 7.9 Listed company implied interest rates 
Notes: Estimated as ratio of annual interest expense to average debt in the current and previous 
years. Firms with negative equity or debt are excluded. 















Figure 7.10 Industrial sector accounts receivable average payback
Notes: Measures the average number of days in which accounts receivable are collected. The last 
observation is for April 2020.
Source: CEIC Data.
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The tightening of financing conditions of smaller private firms has been exacerbated 
by developments in trade credit. SOEs improved their own liquidity positions by 
delaying payments to private suppliers. This has resulted in a sharp rise in the 
average number of days before accounts receivable are collected for private firms 
(Figure 7.10). 
The owners of listed private companies, especially smaller firms, have responded to 
this tightening of financial conditions by pledging an increasing proportion of their 
equity as collateral to obtain funding.9 The tightening of financial conditions has 
also contributed to a rise in corporate bond defaults by private enterprises (albeit 
from low levels).
Authorities have responded to recent trends
The Chinese authorities have enacted a number of easing measures in response to 
these trends and to the broader effects of COVID-19. These measures are focused 
on easing the financial pressures facing private firms, particularly small enterprises. 
Some of the key measures announced to date include the following:10
• Financial regulators have instructed banks to increase lending to private 
enterprises (Guo 2018). This has included the setting of targets for the growth rate 
of small and micro-enterprise loans for large commercial banks. The authorities 
also announced in May 2020 that loan repayments for small and medium 
enterprises should be extended as much as possible (Li 2020).
• The People’s Bank of China (PBC) has introduced a number of new measures 
to support the flow of credit, particularly to smaller firms, including a number 
of targeted reductions in the reserve requirement ratio and reduced interest rates 
on some of its lending operations. The authorities also expanded the PBC’s 
relending facility.11 
• Fiscal authorities have extended tax and fee reduction policies for small businesses. 
This includes exempting small businesses from making contributions to old-age 
insurance, unemployment insurance and work-injury compensation insurance 
schemes. The authorities will also reduce or cancel value-added taxes (VATs) for 
small-scale taxpayers. The payment of corporate income taxes by small businesses 
will be postponed until 2021 (STA 2020). 
9  For further details, see IMF (2019).
10  Further details on the financing problems for smaller private businesses and the policy response in China are 
articulated in PBC and CBIRC (2019).
11  The relending facility enables banks to obtain funding from the PBC in exchange for loans they have 
extended to certain customers—typically, small businesses.
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• Central SOEs must reduce rents for small firms, particularly those heavily 
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic (SASAC 2020).
• China’s Premier, Li Keqiang (2018), has instructed SOEs that they ‘must 
resolutely put an end to the arrears of private enterprise accounts’, to reduce the 
rising stock of accounts receivable owing to private companies.
The authorities have also supported the broader corporate sector by steadily increasing 
the amount of direct government subsidies (Figure 7.11), a rising portion of which 
has been directed towards larger enterprises, particularly in the manufacturing 
industry. The authorities may also provide support to companies through other 
measures. For example, access to funding is cheaper and more readily available for 
SOEs compared with private firms, in part due to the widespread perception of 
implicit guarantees (Bunny 2020). The recent rise in private firms’ borrowing costs, 
particularly smaller firms, has occurred despite efforts by the authorities to lower 
these costs. This suggests that easing financial conditions for smaller private firms 
























Figure 7.11 Listed company direct government subsidies
Notes: Enterprises are grouped by size into small (assets less than RMB1 billion or approximately 
US$140 million), medium (assets greater than RMB1 billion but less than RMB6 billion or US$140–850 
million) and large (assets greater than RMB6 billion or US$850 million).
Sources: Author’s calculations; Wind Information.
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Improving the efficiency of the corporate sector
The Chinese authorities have announced a range of measures in recent years that, 
if successfully implemented, will improve the efficiency of China’s corporate sector. 
These include:
• Promoting the market-based allocation of land, labour and capital so that 
efficient firms can readily access the necessary factors of production (State 
Council 2020). The Chinese authorities intend to increase the market-based 
allocation of land by reforming the rural land expropriation system, industrial 
land use and its land management mechanism. The allocation of labour will be 
enhanced by deepening reforms to the household registration system by relaxing 
restrictions on residential registration. The market-based allocation of capital 
will be advanced by improving the issuance and delisting system of the stock 
market, accelerating the development of the bond market and opening up the 
financial industry to international markets. 
• Following the principle of competitive neutrality so that enterprises under all 
forms of ownership are treated equally and resources are allocated efficiently 
between the state and private sectors (Li 2019). The OECD (2012) suggests that 
a competitive-neutrality framework should have some of the following elements: 
SOEs providing public services should be given adequate and transparent 
compensation while the commercial operations of SOEs should be separated 
from their responsibilities for public services; SOEs operating in a commercial 
and competitive environment should earn similar rates of return to comparable 
businesses; SOEs and private firms should enjoy equal tax, supervision and 
government procurement treatment; and debt neutrality. Mo Wangui (2019), 
Deputy Director General at the PBC, highlighted that gaps still exist between 
private firms and SOEs with regards to the protection of property rights, market 
access and equal access to factors of production including financial resources.
• Resolving zombie firms. The State Council mandated the closure or reorganisation 
of zombie companies, which are defined as firms operating in overcapacity 
industries that have experienced three consecutive years of losses (State Council 
2015). The authorities hope to achieve these goals by improving the bankruptcy 
process, increasing financial support for mergers and strictly forbidding financial 
subsidies directed towards zombie enterprises. The State Council (2019) 
suggested it would dispose of zombie enterprises by the end of 2020. 
Many of these reforms could be difficult to implement. In addition, the Chinese 
authorities have taken a number of steps in recent years that will increase the role 
of the state in the activities of the corporate sector, suggesting there may be limits 
to the extent that efficiency will be prioritised. For example, the authorities have 
sought to enhance their oversight of corporate decision-making (for both SOEs 
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and private enterprises) and to channel more capital towards strategic industries 
(Naughton 2018). The ability of the Chinese authorities to direct the activities of 
the corporate sector has also been a factor in China’s rapid economic recovery from 
COVID-19. The authorities may be more cautious about implementing reforms 
that weaken their ability to respond to future crises in this way.
Conclusion
The profitability of China’s corporate sector has been trending lower alongside the 
broader moderation in economic momentum. In recent years, profitability has been 
weighed down by tighter domestic financial regulation, the slowdown in global 
trade and, in 2020, the imposition of domestic and international restrictions to 
contain COVID-19. The decline in profitability has been driven by labour-intensive 
private enterprises and has contributed to weak employment outcomes in the 
industrial sector. 
Recent efforts by the authorities to reduce risks in the financial system have been 
successful in reducing leverage in China’s corporate sector. However, financial 
conditions have tightened for smaller private enterprises, likely as a by-product 
of the greater regulatory scrutiny. The authorities have subsequently tried to ease 
financial conditions for smaller private firms but achieving this in practice could 
be challenging. 
Risks remain elevated in the real estate sector, where tighter regulation of financing 
flows has led developers to rely increasingly on nondebt liabilities such as presales of 
apartments. The risk that developers encounter cash-flow difficulties and are unable 
to deliver presold homes has increased following the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In the longer term, the efficiency of China’s corporate sector can be supported by 
the effective implementation of a number of announced government measures 
including the liberalisation of factor markets, expanding competitive-neutrality 
policies and resolving zombie companies. 
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The transformation and 
upgrading of processing 
trade and its impact on 
firms’ productivity
Kunwang Li and Haoran Hu
Introduction
Since the beginning of the reform and opening-up period, China’s foreign trade 
has become one of the important drivers of economic growth. The proportion of 
exports in total gross domestic product (GDP) increased from less than 4 per cent 
in the initial period of opening up to its highest value, of 34.5 per cent, in 2007. 
China’s export growth has been largely related to the rapid development of processing 
trade. Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), processing trade accounted for more 
than 50 per cent of China’s exports. Processing trade has made great contributions 
to employment, industrialisation and foreign trade in China.
The processing trade policy was introduced in the late 1970s in China. 
Processing trade refers to the business activity of importing all or part of the raw 
materials, auxiliary materials, parts and components, accessories and packaging 
materials from abroad in bond and re-exporting the finished products after 
processing or assembly by enterprises within the mainland. China’s processing trade 
is divided into two categories: processing with supplied materials and processing 
with imported materials. When processing with supplied materials, the imported 
materials and parts are supplied by foreign parties, who are also responsible for 
selling the finished products. The enterprises processing with supplied materials do 
not have to make foreign exchange payments for the imports and only charge the 
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foreign party a processing fee. Under processing trade with imported materials, 
the enterprises make foreign exchange payments for those imported materials and 
parts and export the finished products after processing.
China’s processing trade has developed in the context of economic globalisation and 
the deepening international division of labour, relying on factors such as low land and 
labour costs, and facilitated by international industrial transfers. However, China’s 
processing trade has also faced problems—for instance, many processing trade 
enterprises remain at the low end of the global value chain, with lagging technology 
and low research and development (R&D) capabilities, and many are implicated in 
causing serious harm to the environment. As the costs of labour, land and resources 
grow and environmental pressures increase, China’s processing trade faces more and 
more challenges.
Starting in 2003, China introduced a series of policies aimed at promoting the 
transformation and upgrading of processing trade. Primary examples of these 
measures include: 
1. Attracting foreign direct investment in more advanced technology and greater 
value-added content in processing trade and encouraging multinational 
companies to transfer their R&D centres to China. 
2. Adjusting the processing trade product catalogue of prohibited categories seven 
times between 2003 and 2005 to include 1,803 products, with the aim of 
optimising the structure of processing trade. 
3. Encouraging labour-intensive processing enterprises in the eastern region 
to develop in the central and western regions, and successfully establishing 
44  processing trade transfer bases in underdeveloped regions in China 
since 2006. 
4. Reducing or abolishing export tax rebates for products related to energy-
intensive, high-pollution and resource-based industries. 
5. Establishing the national demonstration zone for the transformation and 
upgrading of processing trade in the Pearl River Delta and Suzhou Industrial 
Park in 2010. 
The overall goal of these policies is to promote the adjustment of processing trade 
from low technology and low value added to high technology and high value added, 
and to lead the upgrading of domestic technology and economic development.
Figure 8.1 shows that, before 2006, the trends for processing trade and ordinary 
trade were basically the same, but after 2007, the proportion of processing trade in 
total exports began to decline sharply. The proportion of processing trade exports in 
2004 was 55.3 per cent and was much the same the following year. The slight decline 
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witnessed in 2006 was related to the Ministry of Commerce’s significant adjustment 
of the export product catalogue for processing trade in 2005. Beginning in 2011, 
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Figure 8.1 Proportions of processing trade and ordinary trade in total exports
Source: Chinese Monthly Customs Transactions, General Administration of Customs of China.
The strategy of transforming and upgrading processing trade involves the adjustment 
of business entities, product catalogues and production chains. At the microlevel, 
the impact of policies on processing trade enterprises takes effect through three main 
channels: first, enterprises shift from processing to ordinary trade or no longer engage 
in export; second, firms continue to engage in processing trade, but their product 
categories shift to products with higher technological content or higher value added; 
and third, processing trade enterprises move their processing bases from the coast 
to inland regions. The evaluation of industrial policy needs to look at its impact on 
resource allocation. Based on the theory of heterogeneous firms’ trade, if a firm’s 
average productivity increases after a policy is implemented, the policy improves the 
efficiency of resource allocation; otherwise, it leads to resource misallocation.
This chapter aims to investigate the impact of processing trade transformation and 
upgrading policies on China’s resource allocation. We use Chinese customs and 
industrial panel data to empirically test the impact of these policies on enterprise 
productivity by using the double-difference method.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: section two describes the data sources, 
section three is the econometric specification of the evaluating policy, section four is 
the empirical test and the final section provides concluding remarks.
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Data and sources 
The data used in this study are drawn from two large panel datasets of Chinese 
manufacturing firms. The first is the Chinese Monthly Customs Transactions from 
2002 to 2006, which contain the value and quantity of all Chinese trade transactions 
at the six-digit product level. We supplement the trade data with information on 
manufacturing firms from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing—an extensive 
survey of Chinese manufacturing firms conducted each year by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China (NBS). We merge the two datasets to create a sample set with 
204,968 observations, accounting for 27.7 per cent of the customs database and 
13.1 per cent of the manufacturing database. The customs database was constructed 
beginning in 2000, which is later than the manufacturing database. We therefore 
set the start of our empirical study as the year 2000 and opted to use 2000–06 as 
our research period. After 2007, a lot of blanks exist in the ‘trade mode’ column in 
the customs database and the label of ‘ordinary trade’ is missing. However, manual 
checking finds that these blanks are not equivalent to ‘ordinary trade’. From another 
perspective, Chinese exports began to decline in February 2007, affected by the 
US subprime mortgage crisis, with processing trade exports declining even more 
rapidly. Therefore, the subprime mortgage crisis, together with the RMB4 trillion 
economic stimulus plan enacted in 2008 and the resulting European debt crisis, can 
generate an ambiguous effect on those corresponding observations.
Chinese Monthly Customs Transactions database
The customs database contains the product-level transaction data provided by the 
General Administration of Customs. It records all transaction data for import and 
export firms on a monthly basis, and we add up this data to obtain an annual 
value. Observed variables include firm name, telephone number, postal code, dollar-
denominated import and export values, eight-digit Harmonised System (HS) code 
of imported and exported products, export destination, transportation method, 
trade mode and firm status. We use customs data to identify firms’ trading patterns 
and status. Trade patterns include ordinary trade, processing trade and other trade 
modes. We classify firms marked as ‘ordinary trade’ as ordinary trade firms and 
classify firms labelled ‘processing trade with imported materials’ or ‘processing trade 
with supplied materials’ as processing trade firms. Together these two groups of firms 
account for about 98 per cent of the country’s total exports. There is a deviation in 
the above classifications: since some firms are engaged in both ordinary trade and 
processing trade, we classify them as mixed-pattern firms. To eliminate the problem 
of sample selection bias, we will group the mixed-pattern firms according to the 
proportion of their processing trade export participation. We then incorporate them 
into the treatment and control groups as needed.
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To get a direct measure of firms’ productivity, more firm-level information is needed. 
The manufacturing database contains such information as firms’ financial status, 
industry and region. To merge the customs and manufacturing databases, we follow 
the method of Tian and Yu (2012). First, we directly match the company name; 
then we conduct a second matching process for data that remain unmatched in 
the customs database. Both the customs database and the manufacturing database 
contain information on phone numbers and postal codes. We use the last seven 
digits of the phone numbers and the postal codes as related information to identify 
the same firm in the two databases.
Annual Survey of Manufacturing database
The observations of the manufacturing database can be refined to the county level 
with four-digit industries. We follow the method from existing research to process 
these observations (Brandt et al. 2012; Nie et al. 2012). The industry coding standard 
has changed over the course of our sample period: before 2002, the manufacturing 
database used the national economic industry classification (GB/T4754-1994); 
during the period 2003–06, the classification standard changed to GB/T4754-2002. 
To keep the industry code consistent, we unify the classification standard into the 
national economic industry classification (GB/T4754-2002). For the verification of 
area codes, we reconfirm the area codes according to the administrative division codes 
published on the website of the NBS. We delete observations with missing records 
for assets, value added and net value of fixed assets. We also delete observations that 
do not comply with accounting rules, dropping firms with total assets less than 
current assets, total assets less than net fixed assets or accumulated depreciation less 
than current depreciation. Firms with fewer than eight employees are also excluded.
The manufacturing database includes indicators such as a firm’s output value, fixed 
assets and number of employees, which facilitate the calculation of total factor 
productivity (TFP). Currently, the mainstream econometric method for identifying 
the TFP value is Olley–Pakes’ (1996) semiparametric estimation method (referred 
to as the OP method) and Levinsohn–Petrin’s (2003) estimation method (referred 
to as the LP method). The Solow residual value is prone to endogeneity problems 
and sample selection bias, while the use of the OP and LP methods can solve these 
problems. This chapter uses the OP method as the basic regression method to 
construct a TFP index (TFP_OP), while using the LP method for mutual robustness 
tests. The data needed for calculating TFP are all from the manufacturing database.
Empirical model specification
When estimating the effect generated by a certain type of industrial policy, 
problems can potentially include: 1) the direct policy measure cannot be identified 
by constructing indexes as a regressor; 2) other exogenous shocks simultaneously 
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involved in the phenomenon may be attenuated in our estimation methodology; 
and 3) it is critical to be able to specify the parallel trends in the pretreatment 
periods. To clarify these issues, we opted to use a difference-in-difference regression 
method, through which we are able to separate the observations into treatment and 
control groups. By introducing time dummy variables, we are able to control for 
pretreatment parallel trends. Given that policies aimed at the transformation and 
upgrading of processing trade were launched in 2003, we chose that year as the 
starting point for the treatment.
We argue that firms primarily involved in the export sector behave differently from 
those in non-export sectors. Export firms are affected by tariffs and other foreign 
trade policies, while non-export firms’ product markets are not affected by these 
fluctuations. Foreign-invested firms and joint ventures undertake 85 per cent of 
processing trade in China (Lu et al. 2010). Previous studies have found that Chinese 
non-export firms tend to be more efficient than export companies (Dai et al. 2014). 
Therefore, we exclude non-exporting companies from our sample dataset. We chose 
to use firms primarily engaged in ordinary trade as a control group, leaving other 
firms primarily engaged in processing trade clustered in the treatment group. 
We then show the annual average TFP trend of the two groups of firms. From 
Figure 8.2, it can be seen that the assumption of parallel trends is met and there is 
little difference in the average annual productivity of the two groups before 2003, 
whereas after 2003, the productivity of processing trade firms declines markedly. 











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ordinary trade processing trade
Figure 8.2 Productivity growth trend of different types of exporters: Processing 
trade versus ordinary trade (per cent)
Source: Annual Survey of Manufacturing, National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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We use a fixed-effect regression model that controls for firm location, sector and 
time. The econometric model can be expressed as follows: the subscripts t, j, i 
and r represent year, firm, two-digit industry and location, respectively; X is the 
control variable; εtj is the error term. The dummy variable treat indicates whether the 
observation is affected by the policy. We use treat=1 to indicate the treatment group 
and treat=0 to indicate the control group unaffected by the policy. The term time 
represents the time dummy variable, indicating a period during which the policy 
has been implemented. After the policy is implemented, we have time=1, otherwise 
the dummy variable takes on the value of zero. The term treat × time represents 
the interaction effect of our treatment and time, representing the net effect before 
and after the policy is implemented. In the empirical section below, we use tt to 
represent the interaction term. To eliminate interference from other factors in the 
model, we introduce control variables at the firm, city, province and industry levels.
Equation 8.1
TFPtj = ar + ai + at + βtreattj × timetj + Σn γnXntj + εtj
In the benchmark regression model, we first add the control variables at the firm level 
and then gradually add the control variables at the city, province and industry level. 
Corporate capital intensity (capint) is calculated by dividing the annual average of 
net fixed assets by the annual average of all employees. We then take the logarithm 
value and deflate it using the fixed-asset price index based on the year 2000. The age 
of a firm is measured by the period the firm has actually existed, which we calculate 
by taking the logarithm of the difference between the current year and the year 
the firm was established. Wage payment ability (wage) is measured by taking the 
logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s payable employee compensation to the annual 
average of all employees. Production capacity (output) is measured by taking the 
logarithm of the total industrial output per capita at constant prices. We then deflate 
the value using the industrial producer price index based on the year 2000. The scale 
of a firm is measured by the logarithm of the number of its employees. The level of 
firm profitability (prorate) is measured by the logarithm of total profit per capita, 
converting it using the industrial producer price index based on the year 2000. We 
identify the status of the firm via the sixth digit in the 10-digit customs enterprise 
code, classifying numbers ‘4’ and ‘9’ as foreign-funded firms and ‘2’ and ‘3’ as 
Chinese–foreign firms and Chinese–foreign joint ventures. The dummy variable 
(foe) is set for foreign-funded background firms, which takes the value of 1 when 
firms are foreign-funded or joint ventures and 0 otherwise. State-owned firms and 
collective firms are represented by the numbers ‘1’ and ‘5’, respectively. We set the 
dummy variable (soe), which takes the value of 1 for state-owned and collective firms. 
Private firms and individual businesses are represented by the numbers ‘6’, ‘7’ and ‘8’ 
and we classify these observations as private enterprises. The technological intensity 
of export products differs in many ways, and we employ the classification method 
proposed by Lall, Weiss and Zhang (2006) to ascertain the level of technological 
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intensity for each product from each company. We assign the technological level of 
a firm according to the technological intensity of its product with the largest export 
proportion. We then set the high technology-intensity dummy variable as htech, 
which takes the value of 1 for firms with high technology intensity. Similarly, the 
term mtech is for firms with a medium level of technological intensity.
In the following robustness test, to eliminate the interference of variance at the 
regional and industrial economic development levels, we introduce control variables 
at the city, province and industry level. The regional income level (lnwage) is 
measured by the per capita wage of the prefecture-level city, which is deflated by 
the consumer price index. Regional capital intensity (pcap) is measured by the per 
capita fixed assets of prefecture-level cities. The regional development level (pgdp) is 
measured by the per capita GDP of the prefecture-level city. We take the logarithm 
value and deflate it using the GDP deflator. Regional traffic conditions (pky) are 
measured by the ratio of the number of passengers transported in prefecture-level 
cities to the permanent population of the region. The degree of marketisation of 
each province (market) is measured by the comprehensive index of the marketisation 
process of each province proposed by Fan et al. (2011). The economic agglomeration 
degree (ecoag) of each province is constructed based on the method of Shi and 
Zhang (2016), which is measured according to the ratio of each province’s GDP to 
its geographic area. The industrial structure (FGP) is measured by the proportion 
of agricultural output value in the total regional output value in the same city. 
Industry concentration (HHI) is used to reflect the degree of competition in industry 
i, HHIi = Σj(yi
j)2, where yi
j represents the proportion of the employed population of 
firm j in industry i. Here industry is defined at the two-digit level. The degree of 
industrial agglomeration (IDSAG) is constructed based on the method proposed 
by Ellison and Glaeser (1999), mainly taking into account differences in the 
composition of firms in the industry, with some industries constituted by large-scale 
firms and others by a large number of small firms. The corresponding subscripts are 
as follows: r refers to the city;  refers to the proportion of employment in city r in 
the total employment in the country;  refers to the proportion of the employment 
in city i in the total employment in industry i in the country. And the measure  is 
similar to the former constructed industrial concentration measure. However, here 












Since the random-effect model-fitting approach was rejected by the Hausman test, 
we choose the fixed-effect model in this study. In the benchmark model specification, 
the TFP heterogeneity mainly relies on across-firm differences in export patterns, 
controlling for firm location, sector and time effects. As the regression result 
displays, the interaction term coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Since the export pattern choice could hinge on substantial 
firm heterogeneity, we cluster samples via the propensity score matching (PSM) 
method. The reported results in columns (5) and (6) are the regression model using 
the matched samples. Furthermore, the difference-in-difference (DID) method is 
proven to be robust across different sample sets.
As shown in Table 8.1, we find a negative effect on firms’ TFP value caused by 
processing trade transformation and upgrading policies. Former research results 
shed light on the causal role of processing trade in the learning-by-exporting effect 
(Ge 1999), especially for those countries with firms primarily engaged in processing 
trade (Kandogan 2003). Previous research has also focused on the economic growth 
linked to this learning effect (Feenstra and Hanson 1995). On the other hand, in 
addition to potential positive prompting effects, these transformation and upgrading 
policies may exert a crowding-out effect in the short term (Shang and Zhu 2017), 
thereby increasing the costs of operating in the market. In the course of economic 
development, the industrial structure is constantly changing (Gan et al. 2011); to 
meet regulatory requirements, firms need to adjust their production strategies or 
introduce new production processes, which might in turn attenuate their original 
innovation intensity, restrict their innovation capabilities or reduce their profit 
margin and productivity (Blonigen 2016). 
Table 8.1 Benchmark model regression
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP_OP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
tt –0.1260*** –0.1390*** –0.1180*** –0.1290*** –0.1730*** –0.1320***
(0.0107) (0.0133) (0.0107) (0.0133) (0.0174) (0.0171)
wage 0.3700*** 0.3800*** 0.4050*** 0.4210*** 0.4260*** 0.4490***
(0.0042) (0.0075) (0.0042) (0.0076) (0.0124) (0.0124)
age 0.0780*** 0.0590*** 0.0310*** 0.0130*** 0.0650*** 0.0120*
(0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0068) (0.0067)
scale 0.0370*** 0.0460*** 0.4760*** 0.4850*** 0.0720*** 0.5200***
(0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0070)
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP_OP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
capint 0.0140*** –0.0140*** 0.0680*** 0.0420*** 0.0070 0.0710***
(0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0053) (0.0052)
output 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
prorate 0.8530*** 0.8470*** 0.8520*** 0.8470*** 0.6700*** 0.6680***
(0.0117) (0.2018) (0.0117) (0.2025) (0.2329) (0.2399)





(0.0083) (0.0109) (0.0162) (0.0160)
mtech 0.0080 0.0150* 0.0030 0.0150* 0.0050 0.0240*
(0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0129) (0.0129)
foe 0.0100 0.0240*** –0.0030 0.0090 0.0180 –0.0120
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0128) (0.0125)
soe –0.0020 –0.0400*** 0.0050 –0.0420*** –0.0820*** –0.1080***
(0.0115) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0124) (0.0178) (0.0177)
cons 2.8100*** 3.0370*** 2.7720*** 2.9590*** 1.7640*** 1.8600***
(0.0212) (0.2587) (0.0212) (0.2586) (0.3406) (0.3342)
City fixed 
effects
‑ Yes ‑ Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
fixed effects
‑ Yes ‑ Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed 
effects
‑ Yes ‑ Yes Yes Yes
Observations 135,264 135,264 135,002 135,002 53,088 53,020
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; model (1) and model (3) are random‑effect regression models.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
Parallel trend and robustness tests
We follow Alder et al.’s (2016) method to perform a parallel trend test, which consists 
of adding a year dummy variable (year_dum) for each year to the model. For example, 
for 2003, we let the corresponding dummy variable take the value of 1 with other 
observations taking the value of zero. In addition, we add the interaction term (treat 
× year_dum) for the identification of the effect generated by the time dummy variable 
(year_dum) and the policy dummy variable (treat) jointly. In the empirical part, t_year 
is used instead of treat×year_dum. For example, in 2003, it is expressed as t_2003. As 
shown in Equation 8.3, the regression results are displayed in Table 8.2. 
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Equation 8.3
TFPtj = ar + ai + at + βtreattj × timetj + ∑n λn year_dumtj
+ ∑
n
μntreattj × year_dumtj + ∑n γnXntj + εtj
It can be seen that the interaction term coefficients from 2000 to 2002 are not 
statistically significant, but become significantly negative after 2003, showing that 
the test of the parallel trend hypothesis has been passed.



















*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
A sample selection bias may lie in the benchmark model, primarily caused by the fact 
that the sample of mixed-pattern firms is not considered. Mixed-pattern firms could 
engage in both ordinary trade and processing trade, and such firms are more or less 
affected by the policy. Hence it is difficult to identify the precise impact of the policy. 
We cluster different proportions of processing trade among the mixed-pattern firms, 
with firms with proportions above three-quarters used as the treatment group and those 
with proportions below one-quarter used as the control group. The results are displayed 
in Table 8.3. Models (1) and (2) only include mixed-pattern firms and we perform 
the regression according to the above grouping principle. The regression results show 
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that, although the interaction term coefficient is negative, it does not pass the test for 
significance. Models (3) and (4) are placebo tests. We use samples between the three-
quarters and the median of the mixed-pattern firm as the treatment group, and the one-
quarter to the median as the control group. We can see that the regression results are not 
significant. Models (5) and (6) merge all mixed-pattern firms into the treatment group 
and the control group, and the regression results are consistent with the basic model. 
On the whole, it appears that adding a sample of mixed-pattern firms may interfere 
with the accurate assessment of policy effectiveness. In this section, we use the sample 
of mixed firms to perform a robustness test. The following estimation mainly makes use 
of samples of purely processing trade and purely ordinary trade enterprises.
Table 8.3 Regression with mixed‑pattern firms
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
tt –0.0570 –0.1200 0.1800 0.1840 –0.0730*** –0.0680***
(0.1268) (0.1276) (0.1724) (0.1769) (0.0086) (0.0087)
Observations 29,750 29,709 35,396 35,351 200,410 200,062
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firms. City, industry and time fixed 
effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
We controlled for firm-level characteristic variables as well as the fixed effects of city 
and industry, as well as adopting the PSM method to attenuate the endogeneity bias. 
However, there may be deviations in policy results caused by variances in regional and 
industrial development trends and we therefore need to further eliminate endogeneity 
problems caused by the pretreatment trends of regional and industrial development. To 
do this, we added regional-level and industry-level variables into the model to ensure 
the exogeneity of the policy. At the same time, we performed PSM on the variables of 
firm, region and industry to select more similar samples. Among them, the region and 
industry-level characteristics are controlled by newly added variables. The regression 
results are shown in Table 8.4. It can be seen that the interaction term coefficient is 
statistically significantly negative—consistent with the benchmark model. The control 
variables at the regional level are also statistically significant. Factors such as regional 
wage levels, economic development levels, capital density and economic accumulation 
are positively correlated with the production efficiency of firms, which is consistent 
with economic facts. At the same time, the control variables at the industry level 
vary in the opposite direction to productivity, which is consistent with the empirical 
fact that agricultural productivity is lower than that of manufacturing or service 
industries. By collecting observations from our dataset, we can identify the economic 
zone attributes of each city from the fifth digit of the customs code. For example, ‘4’ 
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and ‘5’ represent the bonded area and export processing zone, respectively.1 Each city 
corresponds to only one economy zone code, which shows that the distribution of 
firms may differ across cities. Therefore, on the basis of controlling the fixed effects 
of cities and industries, we further add all control variables at the city, province and 
industry level to ensure the exogeneity of policies.
Table 8.4 Robustness test for region and industry characteristics
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
region industry Regional PSM Industrial PSM
tt –0.1170*** –0.1040*** –0.1390*** –0.1290*** –0.1110*** –0.1080*** –0.1490*** –0.1470***
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0189) (0.0181)
lnwage 0.0430*** 0.0460*** 0.0710* 0.0820**
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0366) (0.0387)
pgdp –0.0190 –0.0260 0.0430 0.0520*
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0281) (0.0282)
pcap 0.0510*** 0.0560*** 0.0310* 0.0390**
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0189) (0.0194)
pky 0.0060 0.0050 –0.0380* –0.0540**
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0222) (0.0225)
market 0.0110 0.0130 0.0470*** 0.0220
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0168) (0.0173)
ecoag 0.1450*** 0.1500*** 0.1870*** 0.1740***
(0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0641) (0.0656)
FGP –0.0030*** –0.0040*** –0.0070*** –0.0080***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0023)
IDSAG –0.0600 –0.1610 –0.0260 –0.0690
(0.3047) (0.3137) (0.3411) (0.3451)
HHI 0.0830 0.0440 1.0530 0.5310
(0.2726) (0.2781) (0.6569) (0.5516)
Observations 135,169 134,907 135,264 135,002 46,120 46,081 50,757 50,828
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firms. City, industry and time fixed 
effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
1  Among them, ‘1’ stands for special economic zones; ‘2’ is economic and technological development zones; 
‘3’ high-tech development zones; ‘4’ bonded areas; ‘5’ export processing zones; and ‘9’ other unlisted areas. For 
the policies and regulations prohibiting ordinary trade, please refer to the Interim Measures of the Customs of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Supervision of Export Processing Zones (The State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China 2000).
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The productivity of the treatment group and control group firms should have the 
same pretreatment trends. To eliminate the potential impact of different pretreatment 
trends, we add a time trend term for control (Jayachandran et al. 2010). Specifically, 
we add the corresponding year (t) to models (1) and (2) in Table 8.5. We take the 
logarithm to process it. We also add the interaction term (ts) to combine the year (t) 
with the policy grouping dummy variable (treat). The regression results are consistent 
with the benchmark model. In addition, interference from other potential policy 
factors may exist to cause differences in the productivity trends of processing trade 
and ordinary trade firms. We specifically used China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001 as a potential policy shock. The time boundary for 
models (3) and (4) was changed to 2001, and the samples after 2004 are excluded. 
The interaction term is represented by tr. It can be seen that the regression result 
is not statistically significant. To further eliminate the interference of substantial 
policy factors, we randomly set the time dummy of 2005–06 to 1. The interaction 
term is represented by td, and the regression result is as model (5). As shown in 
model (6), the regression results did not pass the significance test. Therefore, we 
believe that the impact of other potential policies can be further excluded.
Table 8.5 Robustness test for pretreatment trend and other coexistent policies
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











Observations 13,5169 134,907 48,862 48,636 135,169 134,907
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firm, region and industry. City, industry 
and time fixed effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
8. THE TRANSFORMATION AND UPGRADING OF PROCESSING TRADE AND ITS IMPACT
189
Further heterogeneity tests
The distribution of China’s processing trade between eastern and western regions 
and different types of enterprises is uneven. We further examine the different 
performance of the policy effects from the perspectives of region, enterprise and 
composition of processing trade.
Regarding the distribution of Chinese export companies, we make several 
assumptions. First, the productivity of firms in the eastern region is relatively higher 
than in other regions and most of the country’s export firms are concentrated in 
the east. The firms in the eastern region are also more likely to become the focus of 
regulation, therefore policies may lower the average productivity of export firms in 
the eastern region and thereby reduce their overall level of efficiency. Second, the 
regression results in Table 8.1 show that the coefficient of foe is basically positive and 
the coefficient of soe is basically negative, indicating that the productivity of foreign-
funded enterprises is relatively higher than that of state-owned and collective firms. 
At the same time, foreign-funded firms and joint ventures account for more than 
80 per cent of the export sector, making them the potential focus of regulation. 
The effect generated by policies may therefore reduce the overall efficiency level 
by lowering the production efficiency of foreign-funded enterprises. From another 
perspective, the imported-material processing trade firms are characterised by having 
‘two ends outside’, with both the import of raw materials and the export sales of 
products relying heavily on the international market. As such, the effect of domestic 
industrial policies could be relatively small. At the same time, ordinary trade firms 
are more likely to use domestic raw materials to replace imported raw materials 
under such policies, and as ordinary trade firms account for more than 95 per cent 
of processing trade, these may become an important target for regulation. 
Heterogeneity test of regions and trade patterns
Economic development in China varies significantly by region. The eastern region is 
more developed and has a higher degree of industrial development than the others. 
Mature industries are faced with meeting the requirements of the transformation and 
upgrading policies and many labour-intensive and relatively mature industries have 
gradually relocated to the central and western regions. Foxconn, for instance, has 
invested in factories in Zhengzhou City in the central region and Chengdu City in 
the west. The regression results in Table 8.6 show that the net effect of these policies 
is not significant in the central and western regions, but has a significant, negative 
impact in the eastern region. This is because the eastern region is the main gathering 
area for  processing trade, and the total export value of processing trade from the 
eastern region accounts for 98 per cent of the country’s total processing exports. 
Although the policy proposes promoting the transfer of processing trade enterprises 
to the central and western regions, the eastern region retains certain geographical 
advantages and such transfers cannot be completed in one step. In addition, export 
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enterprises in the eastern region face higher degrees of marketisation and have 
comparative advantages in location and transportation for processing trade. In the 
short term, transformation and upgrading policies may disrupt the original resource 
allocation conditions. The transfer of processing trade enterprises from the east 
to the central and western regions has resulted in a reduction in labour and land 
costs, but in the short term, this cannot compensate for the comparative advantages 
of the eastern region, thereby reducing the production efficiency of processing 
trade enterprises. As an extension, the central and western regions—as the main 
destinations for the transfer of processing trade—should actively undertake the 
transfer of enterprises and establish corresponding support facilities, as well as accept 
enterprises with higher development levels and higher production efficiencies, 
thereby improving the region’s overall level of production efficiency.
Table 8.6 Heterogeneity test with location
Variable












TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
tt –0.1010*** –0.0890*** –0.0230 –0.0210 –0.1280*** –0.1130*** –0.0580 –0.0540
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0822) (0.0843) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0390) (0.0398)
Observations 119,443 119,342 15,726 15,565 130,634 130,377 110,423 110,181
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firm, region and industry. City, industry 
and time fixed effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
The proportion of processing trade with supplied materials is below 5 per cent 
of total exports and this proportion has been on a downward trend since 2000, 
indicating that the importance of processing trade is also declining. It can be seen 
in Table 8.7 that the interaction term coefficient is significantly negative, which is 
consistent with the benchmark model. The interaction term coefficient in processing 
trade with supplied materials is negative, but not significant. The export value of 
processing trade with imported materials accounts for more than 95 per cent of all 
processing trade. Policies for the transformation and upgrading of processing trade 
are aimed at domestic firms, so firms engaged in processing trade with imported 
materials may be directly affected. Processing trade with supplied materials has the 
typical features of ‘two ends outside’. In this case, the firm imports its raw materials 
from abroad, following which almost all of its product is sold on foreign markets. 
These firms maintain close ties with the country in which their parent company is 
located. Hence, firms engaged in processing trade with supplied materials are more 
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susceptible to international market fluctuations and are relatively less affected by 
domestic industrial policies. In addition, firms engaged in processing trade with 
supplied materials are concentrated in simple processing and assembly businesses, 
most of which are labour-intensive industries characterised by low levels of 
production technology or low production efficiencies; as such, the crowding-out 
effects of these policies are likely to be negligible.
Heterogeneity test regarding the status of firms
The export value of joint ventures and foreign-funded enterprises accounts for 
more than 90 per cent of processing trade. The focus of policies for processing 
trade transformation and upgrading is on increasing the export proportion of 
private firms. As such, it is necessary to reconfirm the status of the sampled firms. 
The statistics indicate that the export value of joint-venture (cooperative) enterprises 
and wholly foreign-owned firms accounts for about 80 per cent of the total export 
value, although this declined in 2006. Meanwhile, the export value of private and 
state-owned firms has not changed much. We identify firms’ status by the sixth 
digit of the firm customs code, employing the same grouping method previously 
stated. We divide the samples into four groups: private enterprises, state-owned 
enterprises, joint ventures and foreign-funded enterprises. The specifications of the 
treatment and control groups remain consistent. The regression results are displayed 
in Table 8.8. The results show that the interaction term coefficients for the joint 
ventures and foreign-funded enterprises are significantly negative, indicating that 
the net effect of the policy is significantly negative. Meanwhile, the interaction term 
coefficient for the private and state-owned enterprises is not significant.
Table 8.7 Heterogeneity test regarding firm status
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private firms soe Joint ventures foe
TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
tt –0.0230 –0.0230 0.0180 0.0060 –0.0820*** –0.0760*** –0.0910*** –0.0810***
(0.0925) (0.0907) (0.0859) (0.0867) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0260) (0.0262)
Observations 36,860 36,841 21,365 21,260 41,648 41,566 35,296 35,240
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firm, region and industry. City, industry 
and time fixed effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
The export value of foreign-funded enterprises (including joint ventures) has 
fluctuated greatly since 2005, while the export value of private and state-owned 
enterprises has not changed much in the same period, indicating that foreign-
funded enterprises have experienced greater policy impacts. Private and state-owned 
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enterprises account for a relatively small proportion of exports, while the impacts of 
transformation and upgrading policies are not obvious. At the same time, foreign-
funded enterprises possess comparative advantages in terms of developing processing 
trade—for instance, compared with private and state-owned enterprises, foreign-
funded firms are more familiar with the international market; moreover, they may 
receive management and even technical support from their parent company, as 
well as relatively mature development experience and an established international 
customer network. Private and state-owned enterprises, on the other hand, are at 
a relative disadvantage in the realm of international competition; as such, supportive 
policies may cause distortions and the misallocation of resources in the short term, 
thereby reducing firm productivity.
In addition, foreign-funded enterprises engaged in processing trade have the 
potential to generate more significant technological learning effects for the country 
(Kandogan 2003). However, one of the goals of the transformation and upgrading 
policies is to increase the diversification of business entities and increase the 
proportion of private and state-owned firms’ exports as a share of total trade. 
Because of this, the direct impact of policies may serve to inhibit the transformation 
of foreign-funded enterprises’ technological learning effects, thereby reducing their 
production efficiency. Private and state-owned enterprises have different priorities. 
In 1994, China promulgated the Foreign Trade Law to deepen the reform of the 
foreign trade system and gradually transfer foreign trade management rights from 
state-owned enterprises to private enterprises (Ping and Huang 2018).
Heterogeneity tests regarding region, trade mode and 
enterprise status 
Region, trade mode and enterprise status are factors that cause variance in the 
net effectiveness of policies. The net effect of the policies is significantly negative 
when focusing on samples located in eastern China, which are primarily engaged 
in processing trade with imported materials and possess joint-venture or foreign-
funded firm status. We will take these factors into further consideration and finish 
the heterogeneity tests. 
We first consider the factors of region and trade mode, with the regression results 
displayed in Table 8.8. It can be seen from the table that the interaction term 
coefficient in the case of firms engaged in processing trade with imported materials 
in the eastern region is significantly negative, while the other results do not pass the 
significance test. It can be seen that the eastern region and processing trade with 
imported materials are the main factors influencing the policies’ negative net effects.
On this basis, we retain the sample of firms in processing trade with imported 
materials in the eastern region to further investigate the differences in the status of 
firms. The results are shown in Table 8.9. The results are consistent with previous 
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regressions: the interaction term coefficients of joint ventures and foreign-funded 
firms are significantly negative and the interaction term coefficients of private and 
state-owned enterprises are positive, failing to pass the significance test. The previous 
analysis shows that joint ventures and foreign-funded enterprises account for more 
than 80 per cent of processing trade exports and they are the key targets of the 
transformation and upgrading policies.
Table 8.8 Heterogeneity test by region and trade mode
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Processing trade with 
imported materials
Processing trade with 
supplied materials
Eastern Central and 
western
Eastern Central and 
western
TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
tt –0.1140*** –0.1000*** 0.1520 0.1480 –0.0300 –0.0270 –0.2960 –0.2930
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.1066) (0.1088) (0.0306) (0.0308) (0.1251) (0.1273)
Observations 115,134 115,034 15,500 15,343 95,114 95,025 15,309 15,156
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firm, region and industry. City, industry 
and time fixed effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
We argue, however, that the motivation for foreign-funded enterprises in processing 
trade to upgrade and improve their production efficiency may not be great, as the 
main purpose of these enterprises is to seek low-cost labour to reduce production 
costs and obtain higher profits. After being impacted by external policies, they 
have the flexibility to adjust their production strategies. Judging from the fact that 
a large number of foreign-funded firms have relocated their production bases to 
Southeast Asian countries in recent years, we believe foreign-funded enterprises 
have more flexibility in lowering costs. It can be seen from the regression results 
that the regression coefficients from model (1) to model (4) are positive but not 
significant, indicating that the crowding-out effect generated by these policies on 
private and state-owned enterprises is negligible. This is in line with the fact that 
the transformation and upgrading policies were intended to support private firms. 
Extending this further, we believe that the main focus of these transformation and 
upgrading policies should still be placed on private and state-owned enterprises. 
However, given that foreign-funded enterprises have suffered relatively greater 
policy crowding-out effects, appropriate subsidies could be provided during the 
initial stage of policy implementation to reduce their short-term negative impacts.
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Table 8.9 Heterogeneity by firm status
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private firms soe Joint ventures foe
TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP TFP_OP TFP_LP
tt 0.1130 0.1100 0.1230 0.1150 –0.0880*** –0.0800*** –0.1040*** –0.0940***
(0.1126) (0.1098) (0.1029) (0.1028) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0285) (0.0286)
Observations 31,983 31,970 14,934 14,911 36,697 36,671 31,520 31,482
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Notes: Regression equations include control variables regarding firm, region and industry. City, industry 
and time fixed effects have been controlled for unobserved variation.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
In summary, transformation and upgrading policies have caused a decline in the 
productivity of processing trade firms, on average. We find the constructed DID 
model to be robust under different assumptions. Moreover, we considered the 
development trends of regions and industries to deal with the endogeneity problem 
and excluded the influence of other potential policy factors through a parallel 
trend test.
Conclusion
Since the implementation of the processing trade transformation and upgrading 
strategy in 2003, the proportion of China’s processing trade in total exports has 
continued to decline, but the product structure has tended to improve in terms 
of technological content. This study uses the DID method to test the impact of 
processing trade transformation and upgrading policies on enterprise productivity. 
The study shows that such policies will reduce industry’s average productivity and 
lead to resource misallocation.
Specifically, our empirical tests found that: first, the net effect of the transformation 
and upgrading policies on productivity has been negative, which means that, from 
the perspective of resource allocation efficiency, the policies have incurred distortions, 
indicating that, although the policy goal may have been achieved, it has been at the 
expense of efficiency. Innovation and profit factors may be microchannels through 
which policies affect enterprise productivity. The transformation and upgrading 
policies for processing trade reduce the level of innovation and profitability of 
enterprises, but enterprise innovation and profitability can increase enterprise 
productivity. Second, the misallocation of resources is concentrated in China’s 
eastern region, while foreign-funded enterprises and firms engaged in processing 
trade with imported materials have been the most negatively affected by the policies. 
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China’s processing trade is concentrated in the eastern region and is primarily 
labour intensive. Most processing trade companies have relatively high production 
efficiency in labour-intensive industries—a fact that is most obvious among foreign-
funded companies. Additionally, labour-intensive processing trade enterprises 
are among those most negatively affected by the adoption of transformation and 
upgrading policies, leading to a loss of productivity, on average. Industrial policy 
must be efficiency-oriented or it will inevitably cause new distortions.
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The renminbi’s status as 
a safe‑haven currency 
Liqing Zhang, Libo Yin and You Wu 
Introduction
The China Financial Stability Report (Financial Stability Analysis Group of the 
People’s Bank of China 2019) pointed out that the factors threatening global 
financial stability will likely persist into the future, especially as unilateralism 
and trade-protectionist sentiments have only intensified globally, while financial 
markets are highly sensitive to trade—all of which has led to growing uncertainty 
around the world. As such, global systemic risk prevention and control remain vital. 
Consequently, analysis of the demand for safe havens and the allocation of safe-
haven assets appears extremely urgent. Traditionally, the main safe-haven currencies 
are the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen and the US dollar. However, these currencies 
do not exhibit the characteristics of a safe-haven asset all the time. Meanwhile, the 
large and concentrated demand for such assets is likely to lead to excessively high 
currency portfolio holding costs.
A highly topical research question is whether the renminbi (RMB) plays the role 
of a safe-haven currency. After two important reforms of the exchange rate system, 
the renminbi is striding towards greater marketisation. Currently, the value of 
the renminbi continues to be relatively stable, and the various monetary policies 
implemented and promoted by China’s central bank are relatively independent 
and prudent. The renminbi has always maintained a stable position in the global 
monetary system. Since the renminbi is not yet fully convertible under the capital 
account, the onshore and offshore markets operate simultaneously and, compared 
with that onshore, the offshore renminbi market has a more flexible mechanism. 
After years of painstaking management and development, offshore renminbi market 
products have become more diversified. According to the RMB Internationalisation 
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Report 2020 issued by the People’s Bank of China (PBC 2020), renminbi foreign 
exchange products in the offshore over-the-counter (OTC) market include spot, 
forward, swap, currency swap and option and a variety of renminbi-denominated 
investment products, such as renminbi currency futures, renminbi-traded open-end 
index funds (exchange-traded funds [ETF]) and renminbi real estate investment 
trusts (REITs). In addition, the implementation of financial innovation policies such 
as Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect, Shenzhen–Hong Kong Stock Connect 
and Bond Connect has promoted the continuous expansion of the breadth and 
depth of the offshore renminbi market. To a certain extent, the renminbi already has 
the characteristics of a safe-haven currency.
Whether the renminbi—specifically, the offshore renminbi—has become a safe-
haven currency has become a question among financial market observers and 
participants (Fatum et al. 2017). Habib and Stracca (2012) deemed the net foreign 
exchange asset position and the size of the stock market significant factors in 
measuring whether a country’s currency can be regarded as a safe-haven currency. 
Currently, China holds the largest net foreign asset position in the world, reaching 
US$3.2 trillion, and its stock market is the second-largest in the world. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to include the renminbi when considering global safe-haven currencies. 
However, there is no consensus in the literature as to what constitutes a safe-haven 
currency or, for that matter, which currencies exhibit safe-haven features and when 
these emerge. Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) found that, during episodes of elevated 
market uncertainty prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Japanese yen, 
the Swiss franc, the euro and the British pound were all exhibiting safe-haven 
currency features. Coudert et al. (2014) offered a daily data analysis of the evolution 
of 26 currencies from both advanced and emerging economies. They  found that 
only the Japanese yen and the US dollar exhibited safe-haven currency properties. 
Hossfeld and MacDonald (2015) defined a currency to be a safe-haven currency 
if its effective returns were significantly negatively related to global stock market 
returns in times of high financial stress. They hold the idea that the US dollar better 
qualifies as a safe-haven currency relative to the Swiss franc, but the euro and the 
yen are not safe-haven currencies. Grisse and Nitschka (2015) argue that a safe-
haven currency is one that offers hedging value against global risk—on average and 
particularly during a crisis. They examined the hedging characteristics of the Swiss 
franc and found it exhibits safe-haven characteristics against most, but not all, other 
currencies. The results in Fatum and Yamamoto (2016) showed that, during the 
GFC, the Japanese yen appreciated significantly vis-a-vis all other possible safe-
haven currencies, thereby implying that the yen was the ‘safest’ safe-haven currency 
during this recent period of extreme market turmoil. Moreover,  the hedging 
characteristics of currencies are time-varying—that is, a currency may exhibit 
hedging characteristics only for a specific period.
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It is worth noting that little scholarly attention has been given to whether the 
renminbi is a safe-haven currency, and what there has been has focused on the 
extent to which the renminbi has become the anchor of other local currencies. 
Currently, only Fatum et al. (2017) have discussed the risk aversion of the renminbi. 
They considered that, at the full sample level, the renminbi exhibited safe-haven asset 
characteristics against some currencies, including the pound and the euro, but not 
against other major currencies, such as the US dollar and the yen. Nevertheless, at 
the at the sub-sample level, the renminbi does not have risk-averse properties. 
Basically, the renminbi cannot yet be counted as a safe-haven currency, nor has it 
moved towards becoming one. Regarding the research into the renminbi’s anchor-
currency status, we list the following studies as representative examples. Ito (2010) 
quoted the method of studying currency anchors proposed by Frankel and Wei 
(1994) and found that the renminbi has played a de facto currency basket role in 
East Asian countries since China’s implementation of a managed floating exchange 
rate system on 21 July 2005. Subramanian and Kessler (2013) believe the influence 
of the renminbi in East Asia has surpassed that of the dollar and the euro, and it is 
playing the role of an anchor currency. Ito (2017) pointed out that, in the post-GFC 
era, the weight of the renminbi in the recessive currency basket of Asian countries 
has surpassed that of the US dollar. The research of Pontines and Siregar (2012) and 
Shu et al. (2015) also supports the above conclusions. Chinese scholars have also 
carried out extensive research on this topic. Yang and Li (2017) consider that the 
renminbi has become an implicit currency anchor for most countries in the world, 
particularly those that have close economic and trade relations with China. Liu and 
Zhang (2018) point out that, with the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), the renminbi’s anchor effect will gradually be amplified in inland regions 
such as Central Asia. Nevertheless, Jian and Zheng (2016) probed the dynamic 
spillover effects between the renminbi and East Asian currencies from the dual 
dimensions of space and time and found that the renminbi would not be able to 
shake the dominant position of the US dollar among East Asian currencies. Peng 
et al. (2015) also found that the renminbi is not currently the dominant currency 
in Asia. Although the renminbi may not have become the currency anchor in the 
region, this does not prevent it having increasing influence, especially the offshore 
renminbi (Yin and Wu 2017). Does this influence include the hedging properties 
of the renminbi—that is, in times of crisis, can the renminbi become a haven for 
various risk assets in the region? This point requires further investigation.
This raises some academic questions: Does the renminbi, especially the offshore 
renminbi, have the characteristics of a safe haven? Do these characteristics behave 
significantly differently due to the different monetary environment—that is, 
are there significant differences in the safe-haven characteristics of the offshore 
renminbi in different currency portfolios? Meanwhile, do these attributes have time-
varying characteristics? In the context of renminbi internationalisation and the BRI, 
analysing these issues clearly assists us in exploring the hedging characteristics of 
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the renminbi from a quantitative perspective and investigating the hedging value 
provided by the renminbi to investors when extreme events occur, which in turn 
provides support for renminbi internationalisation and the BRI. It also has critical 
reference value and practical significance for the security of the financial system and 
the reform of the exchange rate system under the ‘New Normal’.
Starting from the extended uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), this chapter selects 
the bilateral exchange rates of the offshore renminbi relative to major currencies and 
those of countries along the BRI as its research objects. By observing the changes 
in the offshore renminbi when global risks are rising, and combining its differential 
performance in different currency environments, we are able to explore the safe-haven 
characteristics of the offshore renminbi, while simultaneously assessing the time-
varying effects of safe-haven characteristics. This study contributes to the literature 
by providing evidence that the offshore renminbi is a safe-haven currency. We argue 
that the offshore renminbi exhibits safe-haven asset characteristics against some of 
the major currencies and those of countries along the BRI. It provides technical 
support and a demonstration of feasibility for promoting the development of the 
renminbi as a carrier of cross-border trade payments and settlements in countries 
along the BRI, and even as a denominated and reserve currency. To a  certain 
extent, the exploration of the safe-haven value is an important manifestation of 
the offshore renminbi market’s ability to perform its functions, which opens up 
new directions for subsequent research on the renminbi and its offshore markets. 
Based on the time-varying safe-haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi, 
export-oriented enterprises can reasonably plan their asset-allocation strategies, and 
financial regulatory authorities can carry out appropriate policy coordination and 
institutional arrangements.
Theoretical background
This section aims to employ an asset-pricing framework to interpret the changes in 
exchange rates. It first presents some conceptual background and then introduces 
recent advances in the currency risk models that create the foundation for our 
empirical analysis.
UIP regressions
With the assumption of rational expectations and risk neutrality, UIP declares that 
the expected changes in exchange rates reflect the interest rate differential between the 
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In Equation 9.1, s kt+1 is the log spot exchange rate of the home country relative to 
country k at time t+1 and E indicates the expectation operator; it and i
k
t reflect the 
interest rates of the home country and country k, respectively; δt+1 is a risk premium. 
An increase in s indicates an appreciation of the home currency and depreciation of 
the foreign (country k) currency.
According to the study by Akram et al. (2008), interest rate differentials are 
approximately equal to forward discounts at least at the monthly frequency—
namely, Equation 9.2.
Equation 9.2





In Equation 9.2, f kt denotes the log forward exchange rate of the home country 









In Equation 9.3, the forecast error, e kt+1, is white noise. In particular, e
k
t+1 is unrelated 
to any information that is available in period t. Substituting Equation 9.3 into 
Equation 9.1, we have Equation 9.4.
Equation 9.4
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We can then give the transformation form of the standard UIP regression for the 
bilateral exchange rate with country k, Equation 9.5.
Equation 9.5
∆s kt+1 = α
k + βk (f kt – s
k
t ) + λ
k
t+1 
According to the UIP condition, the regression coefficient, β, should be equal to 1 
and the constant term, α, should be equal to zero. The error term, λkt+1, reflects both 
forecast errors and the risk premium. In other words, the forward exchange rate 
should be equal to the future spot exchange rate. However, there is little literature 
to support the UIP condition. In fact, most of the literature points out that the 
UIP condition is idealised. One potential explanation is that market participants 
have a  demand for risk premiums in foreign currency investments—that is, the 
assumption of risk neutrality is too rigorous (for example, Ranaldo and Söderlind 
2010; Lustig et al. 2011; Jin and Chen 2012; Menkhoff et al. 2012; Farhi and Gabaix 
2016; Xiao and Liu 2016; Verdelhan 2018). According to this research, the ex post 
deviation from the UIP condition may be attributed to covariation of exchange rate 
returns with contemporaneous currency risk factors (Grisse and Nitschka 2015).
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However, many studies employ survey-based expectations of exchange rates to 
illustrate that the UIP is reasonable ex ante. Recent representative literature includes 
Bacchetta et al. (2009) and Grisse and Nitschka (2015). Grisse and Nitschka (2015) 
used survey expectations data on Swiss franc exchange rates and found that the 
UIP basically holds ex ante. Generally, the findings indicate that the asset-pricing 
viewpoint for currency returns may not be the best or only explanation for the ex 
post deviation from the UIP condition.
However, for the assessment of currency investment strategies and the safe-haven 
characteristics of exchange rates, the asset-pricing models for currency returns still 
have a strong appeal. This is because a safe-haven currency can help investors to 
acquire hedging value against global risk (Grisse and Nitschka 2015). Adopting this 
model to evaluate the safe-haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi relative 
to some of the major currencies and those of countries along the BRI will be the 
contribution of this chapter.
Theoretical background to exchange rate return 
pricing models
The asset-pricing models of exchange rate returns regard the UIP condition as an 
investment strategy with zero net value. At time t, this strategy first claims borrowing 
in the home country with interest rate i and then converting the home currency 
at the spot exchange rate into 1/S foreign currency units (FCUs). Holding FCUs 
can obtain a certain foreign interest rate, ik. At time t+1, the investor converts the 
FCUs into the home currency at the spot exchange rate, St+1 (Burnside et al. 2011; 






(1+i kt )St+1 – (1+it)
We then directly employ the following asset-pricing equation for excess returns 
based on the above interpretation of the UIP condition (Cochrane 2005), such that 
we get Equation 9.7, which should hold and in which wt+1 indicates the stochastic 
discount factor.
Equation 9.7
Et [( ) ]= 0 wt+1 1St (1+i
k
t )St+1 – (1+it)
We can generate the ‘risk-adjusted’ form of the UIP condition by dividing Et(wt+1) 
and rearranging—namely, Equation 9.8.
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Equation 9.8






Meanwhile, the covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition is listed as Equation 9.9.
Equation 9.9




In Equation 9.9, Ft denotes the forward exchange rate of the home currency relative 
to the foreign currency at time t.
Combining Equations 9.8 and 9.9, we further obtain the alternative form of the 
‘risk-adjusted’ UIP condition that constitutes the basis of most empirical studies of 
the link between risk factors and exchange rate returns—namely, Equation 9.10.
Equation 9.10





According to Equation 9.10, expected exchange rate returns are influenced not 
only by the previous period’s forward discount/interest rate differential but also by 
the stochastic discount factor. This rationale forms the backbone of asset-pricing 
models for exchange rate returns in recent studies. And we describe that in the 
next subsection, which guarantees follow-up empirical analysis work can be carried 
out smoothly.
Recent empirical advances in exchange rate return 
pricing models 
The UIP regressions should be expanded by including currency risk factors in 
accordance with the asset-pricing viewpoint on exchange rate determination 
(Verdelhan 2018). The specific form is Equation 9.11.
Equation 9.11
∆s kt+1 = α



















In Equation 9.11, n represents the number of risk factors in an augmented currency 
risk premium model, k denotes the currency and θ indicates a specific currency 
risk factor.
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Note that Equation 9.11 additionally assumes that the investor’s discount factor is 
a linear function of the risk factors, θ. The introduction of risk factors expands the 
UIP so as to be able to evaluate the impact of the risk factors on contemporaneous 
exchange rate returns. Therefore, it is crucial to explore favourable risk factors in 
empirical research.
Since traditional risk factors, such as those proposed by Fama and French (1993), 
fail to effectively depict exchange rate returns, we try to obtain information about 
currency risk factors directly from exchange rate data by following recent studies. 
By sorting currencies’ forward discounts or interest rate differentials, Lustig et al. 
(2011) constructed two first-principle components in portfolios of foreign currency 
returns based on US investors’ perspective, and they correspond to a country-
specific and global risk factor of excess currency returns. The empirical results 
show that differences in the risk exposure to the global factor decide the average 
risk premium on the currency portfolios. Lustig et al. (2011) further pointed out 
that their empirical model embodied an extension of the two-country framework 
proposed by Backus et al. (2001) to a multi-country and even global context. In this 
model, the country-specific factors play no part in the determination of currency 
risk premiums.
Moreover, under the conditions of exchange rate changes and excess currency 
returns, Lustig et al. (2011) and Verdelhan (2018) show that the other risk factors 
that derive from portfolios of excess currency returns are also informative of both 
time-series and cross-sectional variations in terms of bilateral exchange rate changes 
as well as bilateral excess returns. Thus, we utilise this model as our benchmark to 
explore the specific characteristics of the offshore renminbi exchange rate returns in 
the following sections.
Data
In this chapter, we consider the offshore renminbi exchange rates relative to selected 
major currencies, as well as the currencies of countries along the BRI. Specifically, the 
major currencies selected are: the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Swiss 
franc, the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, the Norwegian krone, the New 
Zealand dollar, the Swedish krona, the Singaporean dollar, the US dollar and the 
South African rand. Most of these currencies are not only the main currencies in 
the foreign exchange market, but also maintain a high degree of correlation with 
the commodity market. Simultaneously, the selection of countries along the BRI 
is based mainly on the announcement of the ‘Belt and Road Portal’ at the end 
of August 2020. The sources of the spot exchange rate data and the one-month 
forward exchange rates are available from DataStream. Meanwhile, these are subject 
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to daily data under the US dollar quotation. Considering the availability of data, 
26 countries along the BRI were selected, as shown in the last two columns of 
Table 9.1. In the subsequent empirical analysis, this chapter will examine the safe-
haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi relative to the major currencies and 
those of countries along the BRI to comparatively analyse whether the offshore 
renminbi possesses safe-haven properties.
Our sample period spans from 11 July 2011 to 31 August 2020—chosen because 
the forward exchange rate data for the offshore renminbi can only be traced back 
this far. It should also be noted that the data adopted in this chapter are all bilateral 
exchange rates on the offshore renminbi relative to other currencies, and we gain 
these rates from the cross-rates of US dollar exchange rates. For example, the bilateral 
exchange rate of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dirham/offshore renminbi is 
obtained by cross calculation between the offshore renminbi/US dollar and UAE 
dirham/US dollar.
Last, this chapter employs changes in the VIX based on daily data as a proxy for 
global currency risk. The VIX denotes the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
option-implied volatility index of the S&P 500. The VIX is mainly used to indicate 
the turbulence of global financial markets and the risk aversion of investors. If the VIX 
rises, global financial market volatility and investor risk aversion will be exacerbated. 
The data for the VIX are acquired from the CBOE’s website (www.cboe.com/). All the 
data mentioned above have been processed by logarithm.
Table 9.1 Currency names and their corresponding symbols
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New Turkish lira TRY













South African rand ZAR







Empirical results and analysis
This chapter discusses the safe-haven properties of the offshore renminbi relative to 
some major currencies and those of countries along the BRI. First, it quantitatively 
analyses the safe-haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi in view of the UIP 
and augmented UIP regressions. Second, it adopts the rolling window regressions to 
obtain a comprehensive analysis of the offshore renminbi’s safe-haven features and 
its time-varying state.
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The analysis of UIP regressions
This subsection mainly elaborates whether the UIP is reasonable for explaining 
the bilateral exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi relative to major 
currencies and those of countries along the BRI. The regression model is described 
by Equation 9.12.
Equation 9.12
∆s kt+1 = α




t ) + λ
k
t+1 
In Equation 9.12, k indicates one of the bilateral offshore renminbi exchange 
rates, and s and f are the changes in the log spot exchange rate and the one-month 
log forward exchange rate, respectively. If β0 equals 1, it indicates that the UIP is 
applicable in explaining exchange rate changes. Otherwise, it is necessary to consider 
adding more risk factors to expand the regressions.
The results for the offshore renminbi relative to the major currencies and those 
of countries along the BRI under the UIP are summarised in Tables 9.2 and 9.3, 
respectively. We further report the Durbin–Watson (DW) statistic for checking the 
autocorrelation of the regression residuals. Combining the results in Tables 9.2 and 
9.3, we find that: the UIP cannot well explain the exchange rate changes of the 
offshore renminbi. Depending on the estimation results of the coefficient βk0, we 
can test whether it rejects or accepts the null hypothesis that βk0 =1. Taking the 
offshore renminbi vis-à-vis the Australian dollar denoted by the AUD in Table 9.2 
as an example, its estimation of β0 is 0.061 with a standard error of 0.077. Then the 
corresponding t-statistic is (0.061-1)/0.077= –12.19, and its absolute value is 
obviously larger than the threshold of t-statistic at 95 per cent confidence level. 
Hence, the UIP is not applicable in the explanation of the exchange rate changes 
of the offshore renminbi relative to the Australian dollar. This conclusion generally 
reflects in the bilateral exchange rates of the offshore renminbi relative to major 
currencies and the currencies of countries along the BRI. It means that the lagged 
forward discounts factors do not play a certain role in explaining the exchange rate 
changes of these currencies.
Obviously, it is necessary to expand the UIP by considering currency risk factors 
to better discuss the issue of the bilateral exchange rate changes of the offshore 
renminbi relative to other currencies. Therefore, this chapter will conduct a new 
analysis of the issue based on an augmented UIP with currency risk factors.
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Table 9.2 UIP regressions for the offshore renminbi against major currencies
αk βk0 R2 DW
AUD –0.015 0.061 0.0002 1.939
(0.015) (0.077)
CAD –0.011 0.004 0.0000 1.918
(0.017) (0.073)
CHF 0.013 –0.032 0.0000 1.931
(0.036) (0.100)
EUR –0.006 0.014 0.0000 1.927
(0.025) (0.075)
GBP 0.024 –0.136 0.0009 1.868
(0.025) (0.094)
JPY –0.028 0.076 0.0002 1.911
(0.031) (0.098)
NOK –0.027 0.075 0.0001 1.918
(0.023) (0.102)
NZD –0.009 0.079 0.0002 1.945
(0.016) (0.101)
SEK –0.013 0.022 0.0000 1.939
(0.022) (0.071)
SGD –0.004 0.014 0.0000 1.934
(0.013) (0.056)
USD 0.006 –0.013 0.0001 1.929
(0.009) (0.040)
ZAR 0.010 0.162 0.0004 1.900
(0.059) (0.184)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 9.3 UIP regressions for the offshore renminbi against the currencies 
of countries along the BRI
αk βk0 R2 DW
AED 0.006 –0.014 0.0001 1.929
(0.009) (0.040)
BGN –0.008 0.021 0.0000 1.928
(0.024) (0.078)
BHD 0.001 0.017 0.0002 1.943
(0.008) (0.035)
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αk βk0 R2 DW
CZK –0.020 0.057 0.0002 1.928
(0.025) (0.077)
EGP 0.111*** 0.080*** 0.0223 1.990
(0.036) (0.011)
HRK –0.015 0.061 0.0003 1.928
(0.019) (0.066)
HUF –0.020 0.049 0.0002 1.923
(0.020) (0.069)
IDR –0.042** –0.098 0.0011 1.919
(0.020) (0.068)
KRW –0.000 –0.018 0.0000 1.951
(0.014) (0.065)
KWD 0.003 –0.028 0.0002 1.944
(0.008) (0.039)
KZT –0.004 0.045*** 0.0034 1.945
(0.023) (0.015)
LKR –0.012 0.020 0.0002 1.926
(0.015) (0.035)
MAD 0.002 0.023 0.0001 1.930
(0.012) (0.047)
MYR –0.013 0.081 0.0007 1.935
(0.010) (0.068)
OMR 0.006 –0.015 0.0001 1.930
(0.008) (0.038)
PHP 0.004 –0.092** 0.0019 1.926
(0.008) (0.044)
PKR –0.033** –0.028 0.0007 1.931
(0.015) (0.034)
PLN –0.011 0.080 0.0004 1.920
(0.018) (0.083)
QAR 0.006 –0.014 0.0001 1.930
(0.009) (0.044)
RON –0.007 0.005 0.0000 1.928
(0.014) (0.053)
RSD 0.005 0.069 0.0011 1.917
(0.016) (0.042)
RUB –0.086* –0.101 0.0006 1.939
(0.048) (0.092)
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αk βk0 R2 DW
SAR 0.006 –0.016 0.0002 1.931
(0.009) (0.042)
THB –0.000 0.065 0.0011 1.893
(0.008) (0.042)
TRY –0.072* –0.007 0.0004 1.826
(0.040) (0.045)
VND 0.001 0.020 0.0003 1.941
(0.006) (0.021)
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level 
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The analysis of augmented UIP regressions
In this subsection, we observe whether potential currency risk factors can help us 
better understand the exchange rate dynamics of the offshore renminbi. In the 
subsequent analysis, we apply the asset-pricing models as used in studies by Lustig 
et al. (2011), Grisse and Nitschka (2015) and Verdelhan (2018) to the offshore 
renminbi exchange rate context.
The currency-pricing model used in this chapter contains two risk factors. The first 
is currency-specific and is expressed by the average exchange rate change of the 
offshore renminbi. In other words, the average bilateral exchange rate changes of 
different currencies relative to the offshore renminbi are not completely consistent. 
According to Lustig et al. (2011), this factor interprets most of the time variation 
in excess currency returns. When we calculate the currency-specific factor, we must 
exclude the exchange rate itself, as recommended by Verdelhan (2018). For example, 
we use the arithmetical average of the exchange rate changes of 11 major currencies 
as the first risk factor when computing the average exchange rate changes of the 
offshore renminbi relative to the Australian dollar in the augmented UIP regressions. 
The second risk factor is the VIX, which is an effective measure of global risk on 
currency markets. Lustig et al. (2011) have shown that the empirical proxy of the 
global risk factors added to UIP regressions should be positively related to the volatility 
of global stock markets. Unlike Lustig et al. (2011), who adopted differences in the 
returns on high and low forward discount sorted currency baskets as the proxy for 
global risk factors, this chapter refers to the VIX proposed by Grisse and Nitschka 
(2015). The latter argue that VIX returns can be viewed as a significant measure of 
global equity market volatility and hence serve as an approximate proxy variable to 
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estimate global risk factors in the model of Lustig et al. (2011). It should be pointed 
out that, although the VIX is derived from the US stock market, it maintains 
a  highly positive correlation with the volatility indices of other equity markets. 
Thus, the employment of the VIX as a proxy of global risk factors is conducive to 
avoiding potential double counting in the augmented UIP regressions. Moreover, it 
will generate econometric issues by directly incorporating the global factor of Lustig 
et al. (2011) into a regression together with the forward discount rate of the bilateral 
exchange rate. The reason is that a particular currency pair or cross-rate is already 
contained in Lustig et al.’s (2011) global risk factor, which is derived from currency 
portfolios sorted on forward discounts/interest rate differentials. We thus tend to 
adopt a global risk factor proxy that is obtained neither from forward discounts/
interest rate differentials nor from exchange rate data.
As Lustig et al. (2011) report, differences in the sensitivities of the returns to the 
global risk factor account to a large extent for the cross-sectional differences in 
foreign currency returns. Thus, exposures to global risk factors should reflect the 
safe-haven characteristics of a currency—namely, a safe-haven currency should have 
negative exposure to global risk factors. This means the safe-haven currency should 
gain in value when global risk materialises and thus provide a hedge for all investors 
(Grisse and Nitschka 2015).
The augmented UIP regressions then adopt the specification form of Equation 9.13. 
Equation 9.13
∆s kt+1 = α




t ) + β
k
1 AFXt+1 + β
k
2 ∆(VIX)t+1 + λ
k
t+1 
In Equation 9.13, AFX refers to the average bilateral exchange rate changes of the 
offshore renminbi relative to all currencies excluding the currency of country k.
The results for the offshore renminbi relative to the major currencies and those of 
countries along the BRI under the augmented UIP regressions are summarised in 
Tables 9.4 and 9.5, respectively. A few observations are worth noting. First of all, the 
forward discount rate is still weak in explaining not only the bilateral exchange rate 
changes of offshore renminbi against major currencies, but also the exchange rate 
changes of countries along the BRI. Specifically, the situation where the coefficient, 
βk0, on the forward discount is significantly different from zero remains scarce. 
Second, the average exchange rate change of a specific currency has an extremely 
significant effect in explaining the bilateral exchange rate change of the offshore 
renminbi relative to the currency, and it is shown that the situation where the 
coefficient, βk1, on the AFX significantly differs from zero holds in all cases. In the 
analysis of the offshore renminbi relative to major currencies, the estimates of the 
coefficient, βk1, range from 0.072 for the US dollar to 1.264 for the Norwegian 
krone. One potential reason the coefficient of the offshore renminbi against the US 
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dollar is smallest may be the fact that Chinese international trade is closely linked to 
the United States and hence the capital transactions behind it are relatively frequent. 
Although the bilateral trade volume between the European Union and China is 
higher, the former, as a common political economy, has a much larger membership 
than just those who use the euro. Third, in the analysis of the offshore renminbi 
relative to major currencies, the coefficients of βk2 have distinct results. It should 
be noted that positive (or negative) coefficient estimates indicate that the offshore 
renminbi depreciates (or appreciates) against the respective currency when the 
VIX—that is, global risk—increases. On average, the Swiss franc, the euro, the yen 
and the US dollar provide a better safe haven against global risk than the offshore 
renminbi. In the context of increasing global risks, the risk hedging provided by 
these currencies is significantly better than that of the offshore renminbi. In fact, as 
the most vital currency in the world, the US dollar plays the role of the benchmark 
currency in international trade, financial markets and commodity markets, and its 
safe-haven properties are naturally stronger than those of the offshore renminbi. 
The Swiss franc, the euro and the yen are traditional safe-haven currencies. As for 
the other currencies, their safe-haven properties are notably weaker than the offshore 
renminbi’s. Fourth, in the analysis of the offshore renminbi relative to the currencies 
of countries along the BRI, the coefficients of βk2 also have distinct results and the 
proportions with positive coefficients are more than those with negative coefficients. 
Currently, a  significant negative coefficient signal indicates the offshore renminbi 
appreciates against the respective currency when global risk increases. This is the case 
for the bilateral exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi against the Czech 
koruna, Hungarian forint, South Korean won, Polish zloty, Russian rouble and New 
Turkish lira, which make the safe-haven features of the offshore renminbi more 
prominent. By contrast, the fact that half the coefficients of βk2 appear to be significantly 
positive denotes the fact that the safe-haven features of the offshore renminbi are not 
yet prominent for the currencies of countries along the BRI. However, it is worth 
emphasising that the Korean won, the Russian rouble and the New Turkish lira 
are all regionally representative currencies, and the offshore renminbi has stronger 
hedging properties against global risk than these. To a certain extent, there may be 
a situation where the offshore renminbi has stronger safe-haven properties relative to 
the currencies of countries along the BRI than those revealed by the empirical results. 
In addition, insignificant coefficients of βk2 demonstrate that the offshore renminbi 
relative to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) currencies has not 
changed significantly under the rise in global risk factors. According to the thesis of 
Baur and Lucey (2010), this phenomenon to a certain extent reflects the fact that 
specific assets have safe-haven properties. Therefore, the offshore renminbi also has 
a safe-haven value relative to these currencies. In summary, the offshore renminbi 
holds safe-haven characteristics, which mostly exist for a few major currencies, while 
the safe-haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi relative to the currencies of 
countries along the BRI appear relatively weaker.
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Table 9.4 Augmented UIP regressions for the offshore renminbi against 
major currencies
αk βk0 βk1 βk2 R2 DW
(Constant) (fkt – skt ) (AFXt+1) (∆(VIX)t+1)
AUD –0.003 0.005 1.109*** –0.604*** 0.489 1.939
(0.010) (0.054) (0.024) (0.109)
CAD –0.000 –0.024 0.759*** –0.247*** 0.390 1.906
(0.013) (0.057) (0.020) (0.093)
CHF 0.028 –0.059 0.910*** 1.082*** 0.315 1.946
(0.030) (0.083) (0.028) (0.130)
EUR 0.010 –0.015 0.998*** 0.592*** 0.546 1.942
(0.017) (0.051) (0.019) (0.087)
GBP 0.039* –0.172** 0.796*** –0.069 0.296 1.867
(0.021) (0.078) (0.025) (0.119)
JPY –0.026 0.078 0.485*** 2.052*** 0.161 1.916
(0.028) (0.087) (0.029) (0.140)
NOK –0.006 0.003 1.264*** –0.796*** 0.490 1.939
(0.016) (0.070) (0.027) (0.123)
NZD 0.006 –0.006 1.188*** –0.336*** 0.445 1.962
(0.012) (0.072) (0.027) (0.126)
SEK 0.006 –0.016 1.144*** –0.119 0.489 1.955
(0.016) (0.049) (0.024) (0.111)
SGD 0.002 0.009 0.605*** –0.118** 0.582 1.942
(0.008) (0.035) (0.011) (0.051)
USD 0.006 –0.011 0.072*** 0.471*** 0.036 1.930
(0.009) (0.039) (0.012) (0.061)
ZAR 0.016 0.157 1.262*** –2.675*** 0.290 1.903
(0.050) (0.158) (0.045) (0.203)
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level 
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9.5 Augmented UIP regressions for the offshore renminbi against the 
currencies of countries along the BRI
αk βk0 βk1 βk2 R2 DW
(Constant) (fkt – skt ) (AFXt+1) (∆(VIX)t+1)
AED 0.009 0.003 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.304 1.935
(0.008) (0.033) (0.016) (0.052)
BGN 0.014 –0.001 1.447*** 0.326*** 0.545 1.930
(0.016) (0.053) (0.027) (0.087)
BHD 0.003 0.038 0.484*** 0.519*** 0.297 1.950
(0.007) (0.029) (0.016) (0.053)
CZK –0.005 0.068 1.615*** –0.207* 0.444 1.942
(0.018) (0.056) (0.037) (0.119)
EGP 0.116*** 0.081*** 0.477*** 0.212 0.038 1.994
(0.036) (0.011) (0.078) (0.254)
HRK 0.010 0.017 1.438*** 0.237** 0.506 1.928
(0.013) (0.047) (0.029) (0.094)
HUF 0.002 0.028 1.768*** –0.887*** 0.385 1.929
(0.015) (0.053) (0.046) (0.147)
IDR –0.033* –0.088 0.597*** 0.073 0.136 1.925
(0.018) (0.061) (0.031) (0.102)
KRW 0.008 –0.026 0.606*** –0.218* 0.105 1.965
(0.013) (0.059) (0.037) (0.123)
KWD 0.007 –0.008 0.619*** 0.458*** 0.456 1.958
(0.006) (0.028) (0.014) (0.047)
KZT 0.001 0.044*** 0.592*** 0.303 0.037 1.950
(0.022) (0.015) (0.065) (0.218)
LKR –0.005 0.026 0.489*** 0.495*** 0.155 1.924
(0.014) (0.033) (0.024) (0.081)
MAD 0.016** 0.023 1.213*** 0.263*** 0.630 1.932
(0.007) (0.029) (0.019) (0.062)
MYR –0.005 0.072 0.665*** –0.024 0.180 1.951
(0.009) (0.059) (0.029) (0.097)
OMR 0.009 –0.001 0.483*** 0.491*** 0.302 1.937
(0.007) (0.032) (0.016) (0.052)
PHP 0.010 –0.078** 0.598*** 0.102 0.237 1.933
(0.007) (0.037) (0.022) (0.074)
PKR –0.026* –0.021 0.514*** 0.444*** 0.118 1.929
(0.014) (0.033) (0.030) (0.098)
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αk βk0 βk1 βk2 R2 DW
(Constant) (fkt – skt ) (AFXt+1) (∆(VIX)t+1)
PLN 0.011 0.054 1.750*** –0.833*** 0.426 1.935
(0.013) (0.062) (0.042) (0.134)
QAR 0.010 –0.004 0.483*** 0.481*** 0.298 1.936
(0.008) (0.037) (0.016) (0.053)
RON 0.010 0.007 1.527*** 0.064 0.505 1.934
(0.010) (0.038) (0.031) (0.099)
RSD 0.014 0.032 1.450*** 0.334*** 0.456 1.927
(0.011) (0.031) (0.033) (0.104)
RUB –0.072 –0.092 0.847*** –3.152*** 0.099 1.948
(0.044) (0.084) (0.079) (0.259)
SAR 0.008 0.009 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.303 1.938
(0.008) (0.034) (0.016) (0.052)
THB 0.008 0.048 0.655*** 0.000 0.330 1.886
(0.007) (0.034) (0.019) (0.063)
TRY –0.053 0.008 0.996*** –1.456*** 0.111 1.823
(0.037) (0.042) (0.063) (0.205)
VND 0.005 0.009 0.481*** 0.460*** 0.270 1.947
(0.005) (0.018) (0.017) (0.056)
*** significant at the 1 per cent level 
** significant at the 5 per cent level 
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The time‑varying relationship between exchange rate 
changes and global risk factors
Considering that there may have been structural breaks in the course of our sample 
period, the corresponding research conclusions may have changed substantially. 
Meanwhile, within this period, several reforms of the renminbi exchange rate 
system have also been carried out, which may have had a profound impact on the 
relationship between the exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi and global 
risk factors. Therefore, this subsection enriches this chapter’s research conclusions by 
further exploring the time-varying relationships between the bilateral exchange rate 
changes of the offshore renminbi against the major currencies and those of countries 
along the BRI and global risk factors.
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Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the dynamic evolution paths of the relationships between 
the bilateral exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi against major currencies 
and those of countries along the BRI, respectively, and global risk factors. According 
to Figure 9.1, several observations are remarkable. First, during the sample period, the 
time variation between the bilateral exchange rate change of the offshore renminbi 
against the Swiss franc and global risk factors was consistent with that of the Japanese 
yen. Specifically, with an increase in global risks, the Swiss franc and the Japanese 
yen maintained an appreciative trend relative to the offshore renminbi, and the safe-
haven characteristics of the two currencies tended to strengthen, while the Japanese 
yen possessed better safe-haven characteristics than the offshore renminbi. This may 
be due to the geographical proximity of and close international trade between China 
and Japan. Therefore, compared with traditional safe-haven currencies, the safe-
haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi do not exist. Second, compared with 
the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, the time variation fluctuations in the bilateral 
exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi against the euro and the US dollar 
and global risk factors were relatively weak. The reason the euro fluctuated sharply 
in the first half of 2016 may be attributed to the vote for Brexit, during which risk-
averse sentiments surged and assets priced in the euro were able to attract some 
of the pound’s safe-haven inflows, causing the time-varying relationship to reach 
a peak state—that is, the hedging value of the euro relative to the offshore renminbi 
increased. As for the US dollar, it maintained a moderate appreciation status relative 
to the offshore renminbi. On the whole, the US dollar’s safe-haven feature is not 
salient. Especially in the second half of 2017, the offshore renminbi was better able 
to withstand global risk fluctuations than the US dollar. This may be because the US 
dollar was affected by the dual impacts of the international and domestic situations 
in 2017 and was unable to extricate itself from a sluggish market. Counterposed to 
this, the value of the renminbi continued to be firm, thereby satisfying investors’ 
hedging demands to a certain extent. However, it is noticeable that the safe-haven 
characteristics of the US dollar relative to the offshore renminbi have become 
more obvious since the China–US trade friction began and continue to present 
a growing trend. This to some extent reflects the fact that the offshore renminbi 
is not yet fully equipped with safe-haven characteristics. Third, the time variation 
between the exchange rate changes and global risk factors tended to be consistent in 
terms of the offshore renminbi against the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand 
dollars. Among them, the main variation was in the first half of 2016, when the 
offshore renminbi had stronger safe-haven properties than these three currencies. 
A potential reason for this is that these are all commodity currencies and their values 
are profoundly affected by international commodity prices. From 2015 until the 
first half of 2016, commodity prices were in a sluggish state of decline, hence the 
corresponding commodity-currency values remained relatively weak. However, for 
the renminbi, its currency value was relatively stable and the steady demand for 
commodities in the Chinese market meant the hedging value of the offshore 
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renminbi was greatly increased. Fourth, the offshore renminbi has more prominent 
safe-haven characteristics than the Norwegian krone, the Singaporean dollar and 
the South African rand—a fact that is especially obvious relative to the South 
African rand. Specifically, the time variation between the exchange rate changes 
of the offshore renminbi against these three currencies and global risk factors is 
generally negative, and the time variation for the South African rand tended to 
decline overall, especially between 2015 and the first half of 2016, such that this 
negative time-variation relationship continued to strengthen.
According to Figure 9.2, we obtain several conclusions. First, the time variation 
between the bilateral exchange rate change of the offshore renminbi against the 
Hungarian forint and global risk factors is basically consistent with that of the 
Polish  zloty. Although the time variation appears positive in some periods, its 
overall trend presented as dominantly negative. That is, the safe-haven properties 
of the offshore renminbi relative to these two currencies are persistent. However, 
it is worth noting that the safe-haven attributes after 2015 gradually weakened 
compared with their strength before 2015. It appears as a time-varying relationship 
that begins to wander up and down near zero. This may be due to the fact that 
global political and economic uncertainties have intensified, prompting investors to 
gradually focus on traditional safe-haven assets, and leading to the weakening of the 
offshore renminbi’s safe-haven attributes. Second, the time variation between the 
bilateral exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi against the Czech koruna 
and global risk factors is basically inverse to that of the Russian rouble. The safe-
haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi relative to the Russian rouble persist, 
because the time variation between the bilateral exchange rate change of the offshore 
renminbi against the rouble and the global risk factors is below zero. In extreme 
cases, holding the offshore renminbi to hedge against exchange rate fluctuations 
in the rouble can yield higher returns. At the end of 2014, the rouble depreciated 
drastically due to the  dual impacts of the plunge in oil prices and the crisis in 
Ukraine. At this time, the safe-haven value of the offshore renminbi was highlighted 
considerably. Under this circumstance, a 1 per cent increase in global risk factors, 
as measured by the VIX, will induce a 12 per cent appreciation of the offshore 
renminbi against the rouble—more than four times larger than the average effect. 
Obviously, to a certain extent, this reflects the fragility of Russia’s economic and 
financial regime and the instability of the rouble. In bilateral trade with Russia or 
other international economic and financial activities, we must increase the awareness 
of risk aversion and make timely preparations to convert the rouble into the offshore 
renminbi or other safe-haven currencies. Currently, the safe-haven characteristics 
of the offshore renminbi relative to the Czech koruna are confused. In extreme 
cases, the time variation between the bilateral exchange rate change of the offshore 
renminbi against the Czech koruna and global risk factors has turned into a positive 
relationship. Third, the safe-haven characteristics of the offshore renminbi relative 
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to the New Turkish lira persist and have become even more outstanding in extreme 
situations. From 2018 to 2019, affected by the political situation and uncertainty 
about monetary and fiscal policies, the New Turkish lira depreciated sharply and the 
safe-haven nature of the offshore renminbi was significantly enhanced. A 1 per cent 
increase in the VIX generated a 5 per cent appreciation in the offshore renminbi 
relative to the New Turkish lira. As for the hedging characteristic of the offshore 
renminbi relative to the Korean won, it is being strengthened. After 2016, the time 
variation between the bilateral exchange rate change of the offshore renminbi against 
the won and global risk factors has remained below zero. This may be because China 
and South Korea continuously carry out currency-swap mechanisms and actively 
promote economic and trade exchanges and financial market transactions, which 
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Figure 9.1 The dynamic path of the relationship between the bilateral exchange 
rate changes of the offshore renminbi relative to major currencies and global 
risk factors
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Conclusions and policy implications
Based on the classic asset-pricing framework, this chapter analyses the bilateral 
exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi relative to some major currencies and 
those of countries along the BRI, before exploring whether the offshore renminbi 
possesses the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. Specifically, this chapter first 
introduces the augmented uncovered interest rate parity regressions including 
currency risk factors to obtain a basic understanding of the offshore renminbi’s 
safe-haven characteristics. It then focuses on assessing the time variation between 
the bilateral exchange rate changes of the offshore renminbi relative to different 
currencies and global risk factors represented by the VIX to further examine the 
time-varying characteristics of the abovementioned safe-haven attributes.
This chapter draws some interesting conclusions. First, the offshore renminbi has 
safe-haven characteristics, which exist against some major currencies and some 
currencies along the BRI. Specifically, among major currencies, the offshore renminbi 
behaves like a safe-haven asset against partial currencies such as the Australian, 
Canadian, New Zealand and Singaporean dollars. Among the currencies of the 
countries along the BRI, the offshore renminbi also behaves like a safe-haven asset 
against partial currencies, including the Czech koruna, the Hungarian forint, the 
South Korean won, the Polish zloty, the Russian rouble and the New Turkish lira. 
Second, compared with major currencies, the safe-haven properties of the offshore 
renminbi are generally weaker in the currencies of the countries along the BRI. 
Taking into account the future growth trend of the Chinese economy, the continuous 
deepening of the renminbi’s internationalisation and the advancement of the BRI, 
global recognition and acceptance of the renminbi will be greatly improved and the 
current status quo of weaker safe-haven properties for the offshore renminbi will also 
be ameliorated. Third, the traditional safe-haven currencies represented by the Swiss 
franc, the euro, the yen and the US dollar provided a better hedge against global risk 
than the offshore renminbi, and the hedging value of these currencies is significantly 
stronger than that of the offshore renminbi. In other words, the renminbi currently 
does not have enough power to compete with traditional safe-haven currencies in 
global financial markets and the rise of the renminbi has not completely subverted 
the global monetary system. Fourth, the safe-haven properties of the offshore 
renminbi possess time-varying characteristics. When extreme events occur, the 
hedging value of the offshore renminbi becomes more pronounced. For instance, 
during the financial crisis in Russia and the currency crisis in Turkey, the offshore 
renminbi’s hedging performance against the rouble and the lira was outstanding. 
Obviously, to some extent this can provide new ideas for the arrangement of foreign 
exchange hedging strategies under situations of extreme risk.
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In the process of advancing the internationalisation of the renminbi and the 
BRI, the renminbi’s becoming a safe-haven currency is not among the primary 
strategic objectives, and yet it certainly remains a very important and meaningful 
attribute. On  the one hand, it demonstrates the gradual formation of the 
renminbi’s international status, while simultaneously guaranteeing the international 
community’s recognition of China’s identity as a responsible major country. On the 
other hand, it can help renminbi-denominated financial products gain wider market 
recognition in global foreign exchange asset allocations, especially when global 
markets are exposed to potential extreme risks. 
To strengthen the renminbi’s safe-haven characteristics, there are several areas 
in which China still needs to make significant progress. First, the reform of the 
renminbi exchange rate system should be steadily advanced to ensure that its 
flexibility better reflects market rules; second, the Hong Kong offshore renminbi 
market should be moved forward vigorously and given more scope for early and pilot 
implementation of financial innovation policies; third, the construction of renminbi 
internationalisation infrastructure should be promoted, and more useful attempts to 
support payment and settlement systems, accounting standards and rating systems 
should be made; fourth, economic and trade relations with countries along the BRI 
should continue to be strengthened and consideration should be given to placing 
the ‘experimental field’ of renminbi internationalisation in these countries. 
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